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This thesis describes the design and evaluation of a novel Decision Support System (DSS) for
naturalistic, safety-critical decisions on-board modern aircraft. The system is intended to improve
pilots’ decision-making accuracy and performance, by supporting human cognitive strategies.
In recent years, the development of dynamically reconfigurable Safety-Critical Manned Sys-
tems (SCMS) has acquired increasing attention in several engineering domains including civil and
military aerospace, marine and ground transportation. Dynamic reconfiguration of the on-board
control systems enables adaptation to the changing conditions during operation. At the occurrence
of a fault or damage, reconfiguration allows for the transition to a degraded operating mode by
deactivating a number of services in order to preserve sufficient resources for the provision of
essential functionality.
The current focus of mainstream research is on full autonomy and full authority solutions,
which nonetheless make the transition to a degraded mode transparent to the operator, as much
as possible. This thesis takes a different approach, developing a human-centred perspective: by
drawing on well-established fields such as Cognitive Engineering, Human Factors and Naturalistic
Decision Making, it identifies limitations of fully automated dynamic reconfiguration solutions,
including some safety problems, and proposes novel technology to keep the operator much more
effectively “in the control loop” during reconfiguration.
A review of the relevant literature leads to the identification of three main research problems:
(a) determining the characteristics of effective decision support information for SCMS dynamic
reconfiguration decisions; (b) developing DSS technology to autonomously generate the type of
information required; (c) developing a methodology to evaluate and validate the performance of
the DSS and assess its effectiveness in support of the decision making activity.
First, pilot behaviour during fault management decisions is investigated and a novel design for
decision support information that parallels human cognitive strategies is devised. The hypothesis
advanced is that decision support information that favours mental simulation by including (a)
explanations that justify each reconfiguration alternative, (b) implications for each alternative and
(c) an assessment of the uncertainty embedded in the sensor information would have a positive
impact on both human decision accuracy and performance.
Second, a novel Constraint-based DSS is developed to generate the type of information sug-
gested by the research hypothesis. A number of algorithms and software applications designed to
handle the reconfiguration process and generate decision support information are developed and
their performance is assessed. The tools developed are integrated into the Safe and Interactive
Reconfiguration Architecture (SaIRA), a novel framework for automated decision support.
Third, seven experiments, which involved thirteen civilian aircraft pilots, were performed to
(a) empirically verify the claims advanced throughout the thesis concerning the issues with auto-
mation and human involvement during SCMS dynamic reconfiguration, and (b) to assess the ef-
fectiveness of SaIRA. A validation methodology that merges a number of relevant objective and
subjective metrics is proposed. The experiments reveal that SaIRA improves pilots’ decision ac-
curacy, decision performance, situation awareness and, more generally, their cognitive readiness
whilst reducing cognitive workload and frustration under heavy time pressure. Whilst this work
has been undertaken in the context of civil aviation systems, there is reason to believe such classes
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This thesis describes the design and evaluation of a novel Decision Support System (DSS) for
naturalistic, safety-critical decisions on-board modern aircraft. The system is intended to improve
the pilot’s decision-making accuracy and performance, by paralleling human cognitive strategies
(e.g. supporting mental simulation).
Consider the cockpit cabin of a modern Boeing 737 aircraft. A severe fault suddenly affects the
left engine. The left power generator is lost; sensors detect a high temperature in the surrounding
area, the data handling system manager acknowledges the loss of communication with on-wing
devices. Alarms sound in the cabin and the warning lights start flashing. Flashes, coloured lines
and flickering lights reach the pilot’s photoreceptors and nerve cells at the back of the eye. Light
is converted into electrochemical signals, which climb up to the lateral geniculate nucleus in the
thalamus. From there, signals are sent to visual area 1 (V1) which feeds areas V2, V3, V4 amongst
others. Similarly, signals from the other senses reach the thalamus, a sort of signals switchboard1,
and are forwarded to specific brain areas. A huge amount of information reaches the dorsal path-
way, flowing towards the parietal lobes, which allows the pilot to localise the flashing lights on
the cockpit, locate the buttons, work out how to act on them and guide the necessary movements.
Other signals are diverted to the ventral pathway and reach the temporal lobes, which allow the pi-
lot to identify which type of alarm has just sounded. These bottom-up processes, driven by sensory
information, are integrated with top-down processes, which are driven by the pilot’s knowledge,
expertise, goals and expectations. As time passes, the risks are increasing and, as a result, the
electrochemical activity in the amygdala rapidly increases, signals from the brain reach the sweat
glands on the pilot’s skin. The attention is narrowed, the pilot starts becoming overloaded with
information, the complexity is too intense and he or she starts to feel frustrated.
The pilot struggles to produce a mental representation of the current situation and the brain
searches for similar events in the long term memory. Pre-motor, motor, parietal cortex and cere-
bellum are processing information rapidly to allow for the mental simulation of each potential
decision alternative. This allows the consequences of each course of action to be calculated. Nev-
1An important observation must be made that it is becoming increasingly clear that the notion of a pure relay station
is too simple here, as there are generally many more back-projections from the cortex to the thalamus compared to the
forward projections between the thalamus and the cortex [Trappenberg 2010]. However, the simplification made here
seems appropriate for the qualitative nature of this section.
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ertheless, there is likely to be some information missing. The pilot struggles to organise the amount
of data the cockpit is delivering. As time passes, the risks increase dramatically.
This extremely simplified description of the paths followed by a tiny portion of the information
processed by the brain reveals how the amount and type of information generated by the cockpit
is crucial, during safety-critical fault management decisions, to enable the pilot to work out a
solution to such a complicated problem in a timely manner. The human brain is an astonishingly
efficient problem solver but its decision-making effectiveness can be severely compromised by
unfavourable framing of input information coming from the control system interface [Payne et al.
1998]. A solvable problem could become unsolvable with the wrong information framing. Too
much data, too little data, display of the causes instead of the consequences of a fault (or vice
versa), text or graphics, colour and flickering and frequency of alarms are just a few of the variables
which have to be taken into consideration when designing cockpit instrumentation.
Making the right decisions during the reconfiguration of a safety-critical manned system dur-
ing operation (e.g. whilst airborne if the system is an aircraft), under time pressure and uncertainty,
is an extremely complicated problem for the system operator. The design of appropriate support
for the decision-maker is the central problem of this thesis.
In response to the complexity of controlling modern aircraft, mainstream research is focusing
on increasing the levels of autonomy and authority of the system. The vision is to make certain
fault management processes completely transparent to the pilot, leaving her with just the task of
‘flying’ the aircraft. As discussed in detail in the following chapters, this approach has inherent
drawbacks in terms of safety. For instance, a number of documented accidents (examined below)
reveal that excessive automation is likely to lead to cognitive mismatch, a disparity between the
operator’s mental model of the system and the way the system is really working [Baxter et al.
2007]. If the automation fails to react to a fault or if the pilot detects that the system is not behaving
correctly, she is not in a position to take control because the previous actions were masked from
her. Additionally, as seen in the simplified scenario described above, fault management decisions
usually need to be made in an extremely short time, hence the pilot doesn’t have the time to retrace
the previous actions of the system and achieve a reasonable degree of situation awareness.
This thesis takes into consideration a specific type of fault management process which is typ-
ical of next-generation aircraft and is currently subject of debate in both the academic and in-
dustrial communities: avionics dynamic reconfiguration. In brief, at the occurrence of a fault
or damage, modern aircraft allow for the relocation of functions running on affected computing
modules to other healthy modules. This is an extremely complex process because hundreds of
functions run on dozens of computing modules on-board modern aircraft; the functions have dif-
ferent criticality levels and are connected by dependency relationships. At the occurrence of a fault
or if the aircraft is damaged in-flight, deciding which functions should be deactivated and which
should be kept active, having evaluated the consequences of each option, is a problem that goes
beyond human cognitive capabilities. At the same time, changing the functionality of the aircraft
whilst airborne, without properly involving or informing the pilot, is a dubious safety option; the
complexity of the system in conjunction with the unstructured scenario of operation make the de-
velopment of dependable, fully-automated, reconfiguration technology extremely difficult (these
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topics are discussed in detail in Chapter 3).
This thesis proposes a human-centred alternative to full automation; the pilot is actively in-
volved in the control of the fault management process by making critical decisions (e.g. deciding
which configuration to apply between two options), but throughout the process she is assisted by
bespoke DSS technology, integrated into the cockpit instrumentation.
An effective DSS for avionics dynamic reconfiguration must be able to (a) handle the recon-
figuration process by generating configurations that can mitigate the effects of the fault or damage
which triggered the reconfiguration, and (b) generate decision support information that allows the
pilot to make an informed decision in a timely manner, reducing the opportunities for errors. The
analysis presented in the following two chapters reveals a considerable number of technical chal-
lenges and obstacles that are hidden in the two main requirements. They can be divided into five
main groups, as follows:
• Decision-maker profiling. A crucial element in the study of a decision-making problem
is the characterisation of both the decision context and the factors influencing the decision
maker. This type of analysis leads to the definition of a user profile. An effective way of
shaping the content and form of the decision support information produced by the DSS is
‘moulding’ it on a user profile [Dale and Reiter 1995]. Material from the aviation psycho-
logy literature can be used to study pilot behaviour in the system dynamic reconfiguration
context. However, avionics dynamic reconfiguration is a new technology and reconfigura-
tion decisions have peculiarities that require appropriate investigation, e.g. a combinatorial
problem underlies the decision-making problem, which is an uncommon type of decision
for pilots.
• Decision support information characterisation. Once both the features of the decision-
making problem and the decision-maker’s profile are available, the type of interaction between
the system and the human must be characterised, the content of the information must be
defined and the way the information is presented to the decision maker must be delineated.
• Dynamic reconfiguration technology. The DSS must be integrated with the fault manage-
ment technology in order to provide a practical alternative to a fully automated solution.
Given the novelty of the human-centred approach proposed in this thesis, bespoke techno-
logy must be developed to demonstrate the practicability of the ideas promoted. The tech-
nology devised must be able to fuse sensor information with pre-defined fault management
data in order to generate configurations that can mitigate the effects of the fault detected.
Additionally, the developed process must allow for the automated extraction of decision
support information for the pilot.
• Validation methodology. A method to validate the novel system proposed in this Ph.D.
programme must be identified. The method must allow for the assessment of both the per-
formance and effectiveness of the DSS.
• Validation technology. The technology to enable a robust validation of the system needs to
be identified or developed, if unavailable.
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The above challenges have been addressed as follows:
• Decision-maker profiling. Unlike mainstream profiling methods which focus on capturing
the behavioural aspect of decision making, this thesis proposes a novel user profiling ap-
proach which draws on ideas from the Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) domain and
focuses on the cognitive aspect of decision support. A number of factors that are likely to
affect pilot decision behaviour during avionics reconfiguration are studied; this information
is then used to develop a user profile.
• Decision support information characterisation. This thesis develops a novel design for
decision support information, intended to assist the decision maker by generating inform-
ation that parallels human cognitive strategies. For instance, Chapter 2 shows that mental
simulation plays a crucial role in decisions of the type analysed in this research programme.
As as a consequence, the decision support information generated by the proposed system
automatically produces the implications of each decision alternative and displays them in
a concise way on the cockpit display, relieving the pilot of the task of calculating them
in real-time (an activity that is likely to go beyond human capabilities in such a complex
problem).
• Dynamic reconfiguration technology. Based on previous work in the Constraint Program-
ming (CP) domain, novel CP-based models, algorithms and software tools have been de-
veloped to solve the avionics dynamic reconfiguration problem and manage the interaction
with the pilot. All the technology developed in this Ph.D. programme is integrated into the
Safe and Interactive Reconfiguration Architecture (SaIRA). The SaIRA concept is imple-
mented in a real demonstrator and used during the human-computer interaction experiments
presented in the final part of the thesis.
• Validation methodology. Two aspects of SaIRA require validation, its performance in gen-
erating system configurations and its effectiveness in supporting the pilot. Benchmarking
experiments were designed and carried out in order to assess the performance of the core
algorithm proposed for the generation of decision support information. Regarding effective-
ness, a significant contribution of this thesis is the development of a validation methodology
that goes beyond classic methods, which focus only on the decision outcome, and instead
merges sophisticated subjective and objective techniques, such as eye movement analysis,
mental workload and situation awareness estimation, to assess the effectiveness of the sys-
tem.
This methodology allows for robust conclusions, which take into consideration not only
the decision accuracy obtained, but also the human behaviour observed during the decision
making process. It is worth noticing that, unlike other decision-making contexts, the ef-
fectiveness of keeping the mental workload as low as possible is a parameter of quality for
cockpit processes and instrumentation.
• Validation technology. In order to validate the performance and effectiveness of SaIRA
in accordance with the pre-defined methodology, a number of tools have been designed,
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developed and integrated with FAA2-approved flight simulation technology. Bespoke eye-
tracking technology has been developed specifically for this study (Appendix A).
The groundwork for the research hypothesis of this Ph.D. programme emerges from the strategy
set up to address the challenges of the central problem: during the process of avionics dynamic
reconfiguration, decision support information that parallels cognitive strategies should have a
positive effect on pilots’ decision-making performance and accuracy, thus it should improve the
safety of the process. The hypothesis is not finalised at this stage because propaedeutic ideas need
to be presented in order to augment it and appreciate the rationale behind its final formulation.
The remainder of the thesis follows approximately the order of exposition of the challenges
given above, as described in the next section.
1.1 Thesis Structure
Preliminaries (Chapter 2) provide propaedeutic information which is crucial to introduce both the
central research problem and the rationale behind the research hypothesis. Background informa-
tion is provided about (a) the topic of dynamic reconfiguration of safety-critical systems in general,
(b) the problem of human involvement in the process in question, and (c) decision support systems
engineering. The literature from all three domains is critically discussed, leading to details of the
challenges which need to be addressed. Recent criticism of modern validation techniques from
the Human Factors domain is also discussed, providing the basis for the development of a new
validation methodology that goes beyond the criticism.
Chapter 3 questions the viability and safety of full autonomy and authority solutions to the
avionics dynamic reconfiguration problem. A number of accidents, mainly from the aviation do-
main, are used to contribute to the argument. Two mental constructs, situation awareness and
mental workload, are used to catalyse the discussion of the inherent drawbacks of both excessive
autonomy and insufficient autonomy. The central hypothesis of research can then be formulated.
An extensive discussion of the factors that are likely to influence the pilot during avionics
reconfiguration decisions is presented in Chapter 4. This material implicitly characterises the user
profile for the proposed DSS. Subsequently, the profile is used to design the type of decision
support provided by SaIRA; a number of claims about both pilot behaviour during reconfiguration
decisions and the impact of the DSS are made and then organically connected to the research
hypothesis.
Once all the required features of the decision support information are elaborated, Chapter 5
presents SaIRA in detail and reveals the logic implemented to generate the information required.
Algorithms, software tools and techniques devised to solve the problems in the context of this
Ph.D. programme are presented.
Chapter 6 provides a detailed description of the human-computer interaction experiments per-
formed to validate SaIRA. Experimental methods, tools and results are discussed.
Finally, the conclusions are given in Chapter 7, along with the limitations and further work.
2Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) — http://www.faa.gov
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Additionally, Appendix C illustrates how Evidential Reasoning algorithms have been assembled
within SaIRA in order to represent uncertainty of sensor readings. Appendix A concludes the ma-
nuscript with a description of the tools developed to perform the human-computer interaction
experiments, allowing for the reproducibility of this study.
This thesis has four core aims: a) identifying the limitations of fully automated approaches to
the dynamic reconfiguration of SCMS, b) proposing an effective and practicable human-centred al-
ternative in which the system operator is effectively involved in the system control loop, c) design-
ing effective automated decision support technology to improve the operator’s decision making
accuracy and performance by paralleling human cognitive strategies, and finally d) empirically
verifying the effectiveness of the framework and ideas proposed. The thesis develops and presents
a DSS philosophy and system which respects the mental processes outlined at the beginning of
this chapter, and shows the effectiveness of the approach through experimentation.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Potamoi	 toi	n aÔtoi	n èmbaÐnou	n, hetera kaÐ hetera hudata èpirrei
Ever-newer waters flow on those who step into the same rivers.
Heraclitus of Ephesus, Greek philosopher
c. 535 — c. 475 BCE
Heraclitus is famous for his doctrine of change. The environment of systems operating in the
real world change; change happens, change is unavoidable, change is usually not predictable. In
fact predictions are as reliable as the knowledge available to the agent who makes the prediction,
and this knowledge is undoubtedly characterised by epistemic uncertainty, which increases with
the complexity of the system under examination. In this light, change can be a threat to the safety
of humans interacting with complex systems operating in complex, unstructured environments.
Indeed, an argument can be made that a safety-critical system cannot be regarded as such unless
adaptability to the changing conditions of its environment is accounted for in its design.
This thesis is about the process of adaptation of modern, manned, high-integrity systems to
the changing conditions of the environment they operate in. The intention is to contribute to
the improvement of the safety of next-generation high-integrity systems. High-integrity systems
are complex, software controlled systems, which, in the event of failure, have a high impact on
humans, the environment, organizations and society. They can be divided into two fields of ap-
plication:
• Safety critical systems (SCS). SCS have a direct influence on the life and health of humans
and on the environment. Examples can be found in all areas of industry, such as aerospace,
automotive, railway and marine systems, power generation and medical technology.
• Mission critical systems (MCS). MCS possess a high criticality with respect to the func-
tioning of an organization.
This research focuses specifically on Safety-Critical Manned System (SCMS), a particular
type of safety-critical system in which a human operator is involved in the control of the system
and, to a certain extent, can be regarded to as part of the system. For ease of exposition, the
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Introduction approached the research problem focusing on manned aircraft, which is a typical
example of a SCMS; in the rest of the thesis, the discussion is extended to other SCMS in order to
generalise the conclusions as far as possible.
Figure 2.1 provides a map of the following chapters of the thesis and their aims. This chapter
contains a critical review of the literature from heterogeneous domains which are propaedeutic to
the study of effective solutions for the management of the dynamic reconfiguration of SCMS.
Firstly, the state-of-the-art technology for the dynamic reconfiguration of SCMS is presented.
Then, ideas from the Naturalistic Decision Making field are put into the context of the decisional
problem being addressed. Finally, relevant ideas and state-of-the-art technology from the Decision
Support Systems engineering domain are discussed.
With reference to Figure 2.1, the material included in this chapter is propaedeutic to Chapters 3,
4 and 5. Furthermore, the background material related to the problem of human involvement (Sec-
tion 2.2) is important for the definition of the empirical evaluation approach adopted in Chapter 6.
2.1 Dynamic Reconfiguration of Safety-Critical Systems
In this section, the state-of-the-art technology for the dynamic reconfiguration of SCMS is re-
viewed.
Section 2.1.1 should be considered as a preamble to the remainder of the thesis and is deliber-
ately written in slightly controversial and informal terms. The tone of the exposition, however, is
not meant to diminish its relevance, on the contrary, its content represents the starting point of the
research journey followed by the author and provides a key motivation for the research presented
in the following chapters.
2.1.1 Integrity and Safety
Integrity.
It is “one of the most important and oft-cited of virtues. It is also perhaps the most puzzling”
[Stanford University 2010]. “Integrity” stems from the Latin adjective integer (whole, complete).
The Babylon Dictionary [2010] defines it as follows:
1. the state or quality of being entire or complete; wholeness; entireness; unbroken
state;
2. moral soundness; honesty; freedom from corrupting influence or motive;
3. unimpaired, unadulterated, or genuine state; entire correspondence with an ori-
ginal condition; purity.
This definition is projected into the industrial engineering of developing systems with sub-
stantial safety, availability, reliability and robustness requirements [Leveson 1995]. In force of
this praxis, this research journey started with the aim of providing a small contribution to the
development of high-integrity solutions to improve the safety of next generation, dynamically re-
configurable aircraft. The initial expectations, however, changed substantially in the light of the
ideas discussed below.
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Figure 2.1: Map of the following chapters of the thesis and their aims.
The Greek philosopher Socrates (469 ∼ 399 BC) was an exemplary model of integrity, he
placed his life at risk by refusing to carry out orders that were immoral. His lack of repentance
infuriated the court, which then condemned him to death. Whilst in prison, before being given
poisonous hemlock to drink, some friends visited him and planned his escape. But Socrates re-
fused to flee, maintaining that although the charges against him were unjust, they were made by a
legitimate court and therefore must be obeyed.
Integrity is not meant to preserve the safety of human beings. Socratic integrity, as it is re-
ferred to in the literature, is about avoiding alterations to (pre-defined) moral behaviour. Making a
parallel with modern systems, integrity is about avoiding improper alterations to a defined system
30 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
[Avizienis et al. 2001]. However, is it possible to define, a priori, what is a proper and what is
an improper alteration of a complex, modern system like a aircraft, operating in an unstructured
environment?
At this point, it is useful to consider the following accident scenario:
Accident 2.1 On the 14th September 1993 the Airbus A320-200 (Lufthansa Flight 2904) was
cleared to land at Oke¸cie International Airport (Warsaw, Poland). Pilots were informed of wind-
shear conditions on the runaway, so they tried to compensate by touching down with the aircraft
banked slightly to the right.
Shortly before touchdown the wind conditions changed from a cross-wind to a tail-wind. The
right gear touched first, the left gear touched after 9 seconds and only at that point did the ground
spoilers and engine thrust reversers deploy because these automatic systems depend on oleo strut
(shock absorber) compression.
The pilots managed to land but the aircraft was running too fast, it overran the runaway and
hit the embankment and an LLZ aerial with the left wing. Two people out of seventy died, one of
whom was the co-pilot.
[Aviation Safety 1993]
Airbus high-integrity technology for flight management is the successful result of decades of
study, analysis and tests. It would not be possible for pilots to control such complex machines
without the support of automation. Airbus engineers developed the logic that controls the spoilers
in a way that they are armed after having touched the ground. The reason for this behaviour is that
landing gears have shock absorbers which communicate to the aircraft when it is on the ground.
When the gear compresses, the logic tells the aircraft that it has landed [Dekker 2001].
The mechanism that controls the spoilers and thrust reverser is high-integrity and even though
it was not subject to any improper alteration during Accident 2.1, people’s safety was impaired. In
this regard it is interesting to consider the definition of complexity given by Weaver [1948]:
The complexity of a particular system is seen as the degree of difficulty in predicting
the properties of the system, if the properties of the system’s parts are given.
Weaver’s idea of complexity, which has strongly influenced contemporary thinking, clearly
unveils the difficulty (to use an euphemism) of defining proper and improper system alterations a
priori. In real, unstructured environments the high-integrity of a system can guarantee the safety
of people only in the context of circumstances that can be foreseen by system designers. If the
system does not allow overriding of its pre-defined logic, high-integrity can have the unintended
effect of undermining safety.
This concept is captured by Avizienis et al. [2001], who interpret system integrity as one of
the dimensions of dependability. Avizienis et al. define dependability as “the trustworthiness of
a computing system which allows reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers” and
encompasses the following attributes1:
1Confidentiality, the absence of unauthorized disclosure of information, is also included in the list of attributes of
dependability, however, it is only applied when addressing system security, which is outside the scope of this thesis.
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• Availability - readiness for correct service;
• Reliability - continuity of correct service;
• Safety - absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment;
• Integrity - absence of improper system alteration;
• Maintainability - ability of a process to undergo modifications and repairs.
As discussed below, a significant body of research tackles the problem of improving the safety
of reconfigurable systems from the point of view of high-integrity engineering. Outstanding results
in this domain have been achieved by employing formal methods (e.g. Knight et al. [2003]; Strunk
and Knight [2004]) and by integrating safety requirements early in the development process (e.g.
Blackwell et al. [1999]; Rushby [2002]; Bate [2003]; Bate et al. [2003]).
This Ph.D. programme extends current research by approaching the problem orthogonally. In
the light of (a) the complexity of modern systems, (b) the impossibility of forecasting a priori all
possible operating conditions and (c) the consequent limitations of classic high-integrity engin-
eering methods, this thesis investigates novel solutions for the dynamic reconfiguration of SCMS
which involve the system operator at run-time, allowing the operator to override part of the logic
of the system in the interest of safety.
2.1.2 Safety-Critical Integrated Modular Systems
In recent years, aviation systems have been developed as federated systems, with each major func-
tion, or application, in a separate hardware unit [Conmy and McDermid 2001]. As a consequence,
aviation applications are physically separated from one another, and are often developed and main-
tained by different companies.
The aviation industry is moving towards a new approach to the development of avionic sys-
tems: Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA). The IMA concept, in brief, is an airborne real-time
computer network consisting of sensors, actuators and a number of computing modules capable of
supporting numerous applications of differing criticality levels2 (see Figure 2.2).
The IMA concept is currently applied, with different degrees of adherence to the standards,
by the largest aircraft manufacturers in their latest products (e.g. Common Core System (CCS)
by Boeing, OpenIMA by Airbus and Modular Data Processing Unit (MDPU) by Thales). At the
time of writing, the IMA of the Airbus A380 represent the state-of-the-art implementation in the
civil domain [Itier 2007]. Dramatic improvements have recently been announced in the military
domain for the upcoming F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft by Lockheed Martin [Sutterfield et al.
2008; Simmonds and Nesterov 2010].
In a full IMA implementation (i.e. totally adherent to the standards) each computing module,
called a ‘Line Replaceable Module’ (LRM), is able to safely run all of the avionic software ap-
plications. The reliability of the execution of on-board flight management functions is guaranteed
by real-time operating systems equipped with a battery of fault-tolerant facilities like space and
2See RTCA Inc. [1992] for more information on airborne software criticality levels.
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Figure 2.2: Federated avionics (a), and Integrated Modular Avionics (b) architecures
time partitioning of the execution space, predictable multi-level scheduling policies, functional
redundancy, and others (see Krodel and Romanski [2008] for a review).
Filyner [2003] identifies two main benefits of the IMA architecture. Common processing sub-
systems enable multiple applications to share the same computing resources and software abstrac-
tion removes the dependency of the application layer from the underlying physical systems.
A number of standards in both the civil and military domains provide the basic guidelines
for the development of IMA architectures. In Europe, EUROCAE ED-79 [EUROCAE 1996] is
the reference for the civil market; the ARINC 653 [Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC-
653) 2006] provides guidelines for the IMA software3. The main European IMA standard for the
military arena is defined by the Allied Standards Avionics Architecture Council (ASAAC) and is
known as ‘Def Stan 00-74’ [UK Ministry of Defence 1966].
The aviation field represents only one dimension of a general industry trend towards Integrated
Modular Systems (IMS) as a response to the exponential increase in the functions and sub-systems
of modern SCMS. In the marine domain, Hughes et al. [2006] describe the Integrated Reconfigur-
3[Coutinho 2008] puts forward interesting extensions to the standard, especially concerning dynamic reconfigura-
tion.
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able Intelligent System (IRIS) which is an IMS for military ships. Goodchild and Whiston [1998]
present SHIMA, a Small Helicopter IMA. Wills et al. [2000] put forward an IMA implementation
for an Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV). In the space arena, the author (as an EADS Astrium
Ltd employee) is heavily involved in the design and development of two next-generation IMS
architectures for spacecraft: (a) the ‘Dynamically Reconfigurable Processing Module for Future
Space Applications’ (DRPM) [Montano et al. 2010] and the ‘Modular Architecture for Robust
Computing’ (MARC) [Gasti et al. 2007].
This thesis extends current research in the SCMS engineering field by taking the IMA archi-
tecture as a model and investigating ways of managing the process of dynamic reconfiguration
when the human is ‘in the loop’ (the problem is better characterised later in the chapter). As IMA
is a specific case of IMS, most of the conclusions reached can easily be generalised to domains
other than aviation.
2.1.3 IMA Dynamic Reconfiguration
The modularity and flexibility of the IMA architecture enables advantage to be taken of the pos-
sibility of reconfiguring the avionics of the aircraft, in flight, to adapt the functionality to changing
conditions. The changing conditions can be planned (e.g. mode-change, conditions change, alter-
ation of mission objectives in the case of military aircraft) or unplanned (e.g. faults). In the domain
of adaptive embedded systems, Trapp and Schu¨rmann [2003] refer to the two types of reconfig-
uration as function-based adaptation and fault-based adaptation. The authors use the concept of
‘graceful degradation’ of service in relation to the latter form of adaptation.
Dynamic reconfiguration brings important benefits to safety-critical systems engineering, in-
cluding improved dependability, improved mission performance, reduced operational and main-
tenance costs (see Rushby [2002]; Parkinson et al. [2003]; Jolliffe and Nicholson [2005] for a
comprehensive analysis).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the dynamic reconfiguration process. Each Line Replaceable Module
runs a real-time, partitioning operating system (Module OS). Each partition runs one or more ap-
plications, which, optionally, reside on another ‘local’, partition-level operating system (Partition
OS). This level of segregation avoids faults in one partition jeopardising the execution of the soft-
ware running within other partitions (see Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC-653) [2006]).
By pooling the computing resources and allowing them to be shared by different subsystems, when
a fault occurrs the affected software can be relocated to another healthy LRM.
Approaches and Techniques for Dynamic Reconfiguration
A review of the literature shows that the problem of IMS dynamic reconfiguration has been ex-
amined from different perspectives already.
The ASAAC standards define the reconfiguration of integrated avionics as the transient activ-
ity between two ultimate states of the system [NATO 2005a;b].
A similar definition is proposed by Strunk et al. [2004]: reconfiguration is the process through
which a system halts operation under its current source specification S i and begins operation




























































Figure 2.3: IMA reconfiguration process: function B is relocated from LRM 1 to LRM 2.
under a different target specification S j (see Figure 2.3).
Strunk and colleagues propose a generic architecture for an IMS reconfiguration controller
called SCRAM (Subsystem Control Reconfiguration Analysis and Management). SCRAM is used
as a vehicle to introduce a formal framework for assured reconfiguration of embedded systems
[Strunk and Knight 2004]. The authors express functional and state properties in set theory, whilst
timing properties are expressed in Real-Time Logic (RTL) [Jahanian and Mok 1986]. Particular
attention is given to the reconfiguration sequencing mechanism and the timing. An important
assumption is that applications, and computing modules in general, have a fail-stop behaviour: the
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application or computing module is required to operate correctly or stop and signal an error. The
rationale is that such behaviour is much simpler to verify than complete functionality and thus, in
the authors’ view, presents an advantage in both development and certification.
Knight et al. [2003] relate assured reconfiguration to the concept of survivability. Having
reviewed several definitions of survivability from different engineering domains (such as inform-
ation systems, combat machines and telecommunications services), they provide a first formal
definition of survivability: a system is survivable if it complies with its survivability specification.
The apparent simplicity of the definition stems from the underlying complexity of the specification
structure which they formally present using a Z-like notation [Woodcock and Davies 1996]. The
link between reconfiguration and survivability is interesting for our research work as it cross-refers
to our ideas concerning integrity and safety introduced in Section 2.1.1.
Stephenson et al. [2005; 2006] give a contribution to the IMS reconfiguration problem from the
point of view of product lines. They propose a framework in which “the impact of the different
possible configuration and reconfiguration schemes is assessed by instantiating them as staged
product-line configuration processes”.
Schrage and Vachtsevanos [1999]; Wills et al. [2000] introduce the Open Control Platform
(OCP), a hierarchical software infrastructure for real-time, reconfigurable complex control sys-
tems. OCP has been successfully demonstrated on an Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV). An
interesting achievement of this project, undertaken in collaboration with Boeing, is that heterogen-
eous information is merged by the reconfiguration mechanism, including aerodynamics and motor
control dynamics and processed using innovative algorithms. Data fusion is an important feature
of the framework proposed later in this thesis, although a different approach from OCP is adopted.
Arshad [2003] sheds light on the planning phase, a phase of the IMS reconfiguration which
went unnoticed in the literature. Arshad highlights that the dynamic reconfiguration process can be
divided into three phases, (a) sensing the need for reconfiguration, (b) planning it and (c) carrying it
out. The author introduces a novel technique for carrying out the planning process using ‘temporal
planners’, which compute the plan for dynamic reconfiguration under tight time and resource
constraints. Arshad’s work identifies a further dimension of the IMS dynamic reconfiguration
problem that is critical to guarantee the integrity of the process.
Outside the context of this Ph.D. programme, Montano et al. [2010] proposed the Dynamically
Reconfigurable Processing Module (DRPM), a framework for the dynamic reconfiguration of IMS
for next-generation spacecraft which encompasses the dynamic reconfiguration of FPGA4 modules
which are part of the on-board network. Besides taking care of the allocation of functions on
each LRM, the Reconfiguration Manager reconfigures the functionality of each processor at run-
time. The technology, developed in collaboration with the European Space Agency, has been
successfully demonstrated on real space flight hardware.
The problem of software execution timing analysis for IMS dynamic reconfiguration has been
investigated by several authors. Starting with the two-level scheduling hierarchy architecture pro-
posed by the ARINC standard for IMA, Lee et al. [2000]; Younis et al. [2000] first model IMA as
a composition of multiple partition servers and channel servers; they then introduce a method to
4FPGA – Field-Programmable Gate Array.
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provide schedules for both tasks and messages that provide for robust temporal partitioning.
Bate and Burns [2003] express their concerns on the adequacy of standard timing analysis for
real IMA implementations. They propose extensions to standard timing techniques that account
for the safety requirements that are characteristic of avionics.
Watkins et al. [2006] focus on the resource allocation aspect of the IMA reconfiguration prob-
lem. They propose an analytical method based on compositional reasoning which they call a
“contract-based approach to the integration of modular systems”. The method is implemented
through the use of a set of tools that analyses the system, allocates the logical avionics architec-
tures to the physical platform architecture, and subsequently generates the platform configuration
parameters. This technology was implemented on the Boeing 787 aircraft as the Common Core
System (CCS).
The general feeling resulting from the material presented so far is that the IMA dynamic re-
configuration process is assumed to be autonomous. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the
following excerpt from the EUROCAE ED-79 standard:
Some failure conditions can be mitigated through human interaction. Recognizing
that incorrect human interactions could exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the situ-
ation, it is essential to examine the type and independence of the support provided to
ensure the correctness of such interaction. Support should be provided for both hu-
man recognition of the system or item failure condition and human action to mitigate
the failure effects.
[EUROCAE 1996]
This passage refers specifically to real-time fault management processes. As previously seen,
dynamic reconfiguration is a form of adaptation to unexpected events like faults, hence dynamic
reconfiguration is a sophisticated form of fault management for next generation aircraft. As a
consequence, the passage from EUROCAE ED-79 applies to the IMA dynamic reconfiguration
process.
The extract from the EUROCAE ED-79 pivots around two main issues, (a) characterisation of
the type of support that the human can provide to the system and (b) characterisation of the type
of decision support that the system can provide the pilot during the real-time, fault management
process.
To the best of our knowledge, to date no study has considered human involvement in the
process. This thesis proposes a novel framework for IMA dynamic reconfiguration based on the
Constraint Programming paradigm that is designed to actively involve the pilot in the process
(Chapter 5). Moreover, the experimental data gathered provides a significant insight into pilot
experience during IMA dynamic reconfiguration. The overall research makes a contribution in
both the directions highlighted by EUROCAE ED-79:
(a) A series of human-computer interaction experiments is performed in order to specifically char-
acterise pilot behaviour during IMA dynamic reconfiguration.
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(b) A novel framework for a DSS for IMA dynamic reconfiguration is presented; the system is
used to investigate the impact and effectiveness of different, purpose-made types of decision
support information.
2.1.4 Conclusions
The limits of employing high-integrity technology alone to achieve system safety become pro-
gressively more apparent with the increasing complexity of modern SCMS. Investigating ways to
involve the human in certain safety-critical processes, including SCMS dynamic reconfiguration,
seems to be a promising solution.
The industrial trend of moving from legacy federated systems towards the Integrated Modular
Systems (IMS) concept has a number of benefits but, at the same time, it generates new issues, es-
pecially in terms of safety. In this context, dynamic reconfiguration is one of the most challenging
processes and represents an open problem for both the academic and industrial communities.
Modern standards for IMS, such as EUROCAE ED-79, acknowledge the importance of hu-
man interaction during fault management processes. They also prescribe an examination of the
type of intervention and the type of support provided by the system to the operators. This thesis
investigates the problem of human involvement during IMA dynamic reconfiguration.
2.2 Human Involvement
Human involvement during the dynamic reconfiguration process of SCMS is a key contribution
of this thesis. This section starts by exploring how the interpretation of human error has recently
changed within the human factors community. Subsequently, a number of theories of Decision
Making (DM) are discussed. These theories are propaedeutic to the analysis of the behaviour of
operators during SCMS dynamic reconfiguration decisions, which is the content of Chapter 4.
2.2.1 Old and New Views on Human Error
In his lectures on rhetoric, Nietzsche [1922]5 defines metonymy as “the substitution of cause and
effect”6. The philosopher looks upon the fact that we say ‘the rock is hard’ as if it were something
other than a judgement on our part. What we refer to as ‘hard’ is actually an effect, namely
hardness, which is projected back onto the object as a cause of that effect [Klein 1997b].
It seems that in recent years the human factors community has witnessed a metonymy, in
Nietzsche’s terms, concerning the interpretation of human error which, as observed by Woods
et al. [1994], was first regarded to as a cause of failure whilst now it is considered more as a
symptom of failure.
Dekker made an extensive analysis of this subject, exploring its repercussions in different
areas of the human factors domain, such as safety assessment, accident reconstruction, automation
engineering, decision making in disaster relief and healthcare [Dekker 2003; 2002; 2000; Singer
5Translation into English: [Blair 1983].
6TheFreeDictionary [2010] defines metonymy in more general terms: “A figure of speech in which one word or
phrase is substituted for another with which it is closely associated.”
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and Dekker 2000; Dekker 2001; Dekker et al. 2005]. The author acknowledges the existence of
an old and a new human error view. In the old view, systems are considered safe, and it is human
error that leads to most of the accidents. The new view is summarised in three main points:
• systems are basically not safe;
• people are central to creating safety;
• their “errors” are indications of irreconcilable goals and pressures farther up-stream.
In the new view, it is assumed that operators of safety-critical systems, like pilots, behave in a
‘reasonably’ rational way, depending on the characteristics of their operating environment. In this
view, the categorisation of human error becomes less interesting than investigating the rationale
for the pilot’s course of action. Dekker [2001] maintains that “understanding how people make the
systems they operate so successful, and probing the patterns by which their successes are defeated”
is the only hope for real safety improvement.
This thesis provides a contribution to the field by investigating how pilots behave during IMA
dynamic reconfiguration under different operating conditions and with different types of support
from the system. Pilots are exposed to situations in which the system behaves in an unsafe way
on purpose, explicitly breaking the assumptions of the old human error view. This allows the
collection of empirical data that, in line with the latest ideas about human error, accounts for real
situations and can effectively help practitioners in the development of SCMS.
Given that understanding the behaviour of pilots is crucial to improving safety in the new
human error view, basic ideas from cognitive psychology, that apply to pilot decision making
activity during IMA dynamic reconfiguration, are elaborated and implemented in our experiments
(Chapters 4 and 6). Propaedeutic information concerning decision making theory is presented
below.
2.2.2 Theories of Decision Making
By investigating the characteristics of SCMS dynamic reconfigurations and how humans reason
in such circumstances, we aim at shaping an effective framework for decision support during
the process of dynamic reconfiguration of SCMS. This section introduces concepts of Decision
Making (DM) theories in preparation for the remainder of the thesis.
The field of DM is vast, including topics from cognitive psychology, computer science, human-
computer interaction, automation engineering and cognitive engineering. Only the topics that are
relevant for our analysis are introduced here. For a complete dissertation on DM, the reader should
refer to Schraagen et al. [2008]; Smith and Kosslyn [2007].
Hammond [2000a] (page 53) states that the literature on judgement and DM is populated
by theories that can be gathered under two general, rival meta-theories. The coherence meta-
theory supports the achievement of logical or statistical rationality whilst the correspondence
meta-theory strives for empirical accuracy. Falzer [2004] traces the roots of the former back
to Peterson and Beach’s Bayesian-inspired claim that humans function as intuitive statisticians
[Peterson and Beach 1967] and studies by Hoffman et al. on regression models as representations
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of clinical judgement [Hoffman 1960; Dawes 1986]. Instead correspondence, is traced back to
Brunswik’s probabilistic functionalism [Brunswik 1947; Gigerenzer et al. 1991] and Tversky and
Kohler’s work on support theory [Tversky and Koehler 1994].
The literature also contains another subdivision of DM theories which is structured in three
groups as follows:
• Normative (or prescriptive) theories, which investigate analytically how decisions should
be made.
• Descriptive (analytical) theories, which describe how people should and can make de-
cisions (assuming they’re actually not perfect statisticians).
• Descriptive (naturalistic) theories, which focus on how humans actually make decisions in
real circumstances.
Before proceeding, it must be noted that a general, unifying theory of DM applicable to all
situations has not yet been developed. The common logic underlying each theory is that decision-
makers are ‘rational’; however, each theory starts with different assumptions and is crafted to suit
a particular set of circumstances [Zsambok et al. 2002].
The most influential theories available in the literature are briefly discussed below, highlight-
ing ideas that are applicable to our work. At this point it is important to note that it is not the
intention of this thesis to gain an insight into the brain mechanisms that characterise pilot decision
behaviour during IMA dynamic reconfiguration. Hence, the focus is not on examining all the
potential non-rational behaviours that can possibly emerge (an objective of dubious practicability
anyway). Rather, this thesis aims at verifying empirically that the complexity of SCMS dynamic
reconfiguration decisions is such that, without effective decision support information, operators are
likely to incur the risk of making wrong safety-critical decisions. The information gathered is then
used to shape an effective framework for decision support.
In this context, pilot brain mechanisms are considered as a “black box”. Several ideas from
cognitive psychology are used to make hypotheses which are then empirically investigated, but
the focus is always on pilot behaviour rather than on the discussion of which mechanism actually
determines it.
2.2.2.1 Normative theories
Taking the temporary risk of oversimplification, a decision can be brought down to a choice
amongst two or more possibilities. In an ideal world, the decision maker uses a goal function
to evaluate the utility associated with each possibility and chooses the best one. In such theoretical
conditions the decision outcome is pretty much obvious since no room is left for uncertainty.
The behaviour of the decision maker in this type of ideal scenario was first studied in the 1950s
(the phrase “decision theory” was first used by Lehmann [1950]), aiming to provide a framework
for making the best possible decision in a given set of circumstances [Neumann et al. 1953; Ed-
wards 1954].
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These studies gave rise to a number of theories on decision making that are now referred to as
normative (or prescriptive) since they investigate how decisions ‘should’ be made. In normative
theories, the decision maker’s evaluations of consequences are signified in terms of utilities, which
are numbers that, at the time the human is faced with the decision, express the strength of like
or dislike of the outcomes that might occur. The basic normative model is provided by Expected
Utility Theory (EUT), which can be summarised as follows:
Definition 2.2.1 The (subjective) expected utility E of an action is equal to the sum of the prob-




EUT and normative theories in general provide a good approximation of human behaviour, but
only if the situation is simple and provides all the relevant information. People’s judgements under
conditions of uncertainty, risk and time pressure are not captured by the rules of mathematical
probability theory; similarly, any formal theory that prescribes an ideal relation between values and
utilities does not provide a realistic model. Real world human decisions, like those that an aircraft
pilot faces during a real-time fault management procedure, happen in scenarios characterised by
time pressure, risks and uncertainties. All these factors drastically influence the behaviour of the
decision maker which drifts away from any prediction made through a normative model.
The literature contains evidence of several decision biases (not necessarily independent) that
invalidate normative theories in real contexts including: time pressure [Janis and Mann 1977;
Stokes et al. 1987; Orasanu and Fischer 1997; Orasanu 1997; Zsambok and Klein 1997; Klein
1997a; Klapproth 2008], decision relational complexity [Quesada et al. 2005; Halford and Wilson
1998; Cowan 2001], loss of situation awareness [Endsley and Strauch 1997], mental misrepres-
entation of the situation [Baxter et al. 2007], emotions [Luce et al. 1999; Mano 1999; Isen 2001;
Fiedler 2001; Rahman 2009; Mosier and Fischer 2009], stress [Poulton 1976; Gillis 1993; Kon-
togiannis and Kossiavelou 1999; Kowalski-Trakofler et al. 2003], decision information framing
[Payne et al. 1998], complacency towards the information provided [Billings et al. 1976; Parasura-
man et al. 1993; Smith and Geddes 2003; Bustamante et al. 2009] and negative attitude against
automated decision support aids [Lee and Moray 1992; Muir 1994; Riley 1996; Endsley and Kiris
1995; Endsley 1996; Parasuraman and Riley 1997; Dzindolet et al. 2003; Lee and See 2004].
It can be concluded that, because of the likelihood of SCMS reconfiguration decisions being
biased by the factors mentioned above, normative DM theories are not suitable to investigate
human decision behaviour in our context. Therefore, they are not referenced further in this thesis.
2.2.2.2 Descriptive (analytical) theories
A number of new DM theories that take into consideration the potential emergence of decision
biases arose in the 1950s, after empirical studies started to reveal the inability of normative theories
to capture human decision behaviour in real scenarios.
Simon [1955] introduces the concept of bounded rationality. The author suggests that our
brain develops adaptive strategies that trade-off between, on the one hand, the cognitive effort of
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searching for and processing information and, on the other hand, the choice of the best alternative.
Such strategies are defined as satisficing, methods that aim at finding not necessarily the best of
all alternatives, but one that is good enough to meet the desires of the decision maker.
Most important dimension theory [Slovic 1975] advocates that when humans are faced with
an equal choice they choose the alternative that rates highest on the “most important dimension”.
The fact that the perception of risk influences decision behaviour is well captured by prospect
theory [Tversky and Kahneman 1992], which is one of the most influential descriptive analytic
models dealing with risk and uncertainty [Smith and Kosslyn 2007]. In support of the robustness
of the theory, more recently Trepel et al. [2005] outlined the possible neural basis of the compon-
ents of prospect theory, surveying evidence from human imaging, lesion, and neuropharmacology
studies, as well as animal neurophysiology studies.
According to the theory, human actions are determined by the mental representations of a
situation, not directly by the situation itself. The first stage of the decision making process is
comprehending the prospects ahead by framing the terms of the decision, which involves using
heuristics to simplify the scenario and evaluate prospective gains and losses in relation to a refer-
ence point (or anchor). The anchor is the present situation, before the decision is made. Once
the terms of decision are represented in memory and associated to values and weights, which are
the subjective estimates of probabilities for the prospects under consideration, an expected-value
is calculated for each prospect from all the relative values and weights.
Several aspects of these theories are relevant for our analysis, hence they are discussed in more
detail later in the thesis. A more comprehensive review can be found in [Elliot 2005].
Payne et al. [1993] gathers all the descriptive theories under the meta-theory of adaptive de-
cision maker: he envisions a cognitive system with a “toolbox” which includes several algorithms
and heuristics to perform complex decisions in an efficient way. The decision maker chooses al-
gorithms or heuristics in an adaptive manner, relying on strategies that fit the needs at the time and
that capitalise on the specific structures of the current environment.
Elliot [2005] highlights that a number of studies on decision biases have been criticised for
artful production of biases [Lopes 1992] and that these biases are reduced if the study includes
contextual factors [Klein 1998]; furthermore the biases are less likely to emerge in experienced
decision makers [Christensen-Szalanski and Beach 1984; Fraser et al. 1992; Gigerenzer 1987;
Shanteau 1992; Smith and Kida 1991], a result which is taken into particular consideration in the
conclusions of this research.
The theories mentioned in this section still incorporate some mechanistic, analytical processes
(e.g. probability based assumptions), which are not representative of how the human brain actually
works during real decisions [Tversky and Kahneman 1973]. However, they provide explanations
to some observable phenomena which are relevant to this research. As a result, some of these
theories are referenced later in the thesis.
2.2.2.3 Descriptive (naturalistic) theories
Descriptive (naturalistic) theories, which focus on how humans actually make real decisions, not
on how humans should make them or how they would make them in protected environments, are
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most suitable to this research. Originating in the 1970s, these theories reveal how human behaviour
departs from the prescriptions of entirely rational choices specifically in risky and uncertain scen-
arios. At the present time, the Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) framework is probably the
most referenced set of descriptive theories in the literature. It emerged in the early 1990s, to study
decisions taken in natural settings that take forms that are not easily replicated in the laboratory
[Salthouse 1992; Klein et al. 1993; Klein 1993b].
NDM theories are suitable for investigating human decision behaviour during SCMS dynamic
reconfiguration because these theories are specifically targeted to understanding how people use
their experience to make decisions in complex, dynamic, real-time environments [Meso et al.
2002]. They explore methods used by experts, either working as individuals or in groups, to assess
the characteristics of the current situation and make decisions.
The basis of NDM lies in the fact that human cognitive resources are limited in memory and
computational power [Norman and Bobrow 1975]. It was argued that, in order to compensate for
its limitations, the brain engages in the least amount of cognitive work it can get away with in face
of tasks that exceed the available resources [Payne et al. 1993; Fiske 1993]. This phenomenon is
also referred to as cognitive misery by some authors (e.g. Skitka et al. [1999]).
The remainder of this section provides a brief overview of the five most influential NDM
models available in the literature. A more comprehensive review is given by Zsambok et al. [2002].
The argumentation is kept at a macroscopic level, as the aim is to provide background information
for later chapters and at the same time, rule out those models that are evidently not applicable to
the problem being investigated.
It is anticipated that, throughout the description of the DM models, the reader should pay
attention to the role of mental simulation (the definition is given hereinafter). In fact, this process
plays a crucial role in the characterisation of the decision support system proposed in Chapters 4
and 5.
Recognition-Primed Decision
The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model [Klein 1989; 1993a] asserts that decision makers
draw upon their experience to identify a situation as representative of, or analogous to, a particular
class of problems. Recognition leads to the identification of a course of actions, which is then
evaluated through a process of mental simulation.
Klein and Calderwood [1986] focus on dynamic situations, characterised by unfolding events
and rapid changes over time. They observe that decision-makers do not usually react to the chan-
ging situation by first diagnosing an initial part of the event as Situation-A, the second as Situation-
B and so on. Rather, they usually identify the initial situation and, as time goes by, they generate
expectations on how it can possibly evolve. Mental simulation is critical for this operation.
The concept of mental simulation has been defined in several ways in the literature, both
in terms of a process or the end-product of a process. Here mental simulation is described in
terms of the simulation theory [Goldman 2002], which posits that humans gain insights into the
plans, beliefs, and desires that motivate the actions of others by covertly simulating those same
actions in themselves, without actually performing them. This theory is robust enough to have a
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physiological counterpart [Hesslow 2002].
Noble’s cognitive model
Noble [1993] focuses on the situation assessment portion of the decision making process and pro-
poses a cognitive model, somewhat similar to RPD, in which each type of previously experienced
problem (or decision) is treated as if it is stored in memory as a separate reference problem. Each
reference problem embeds context, goals, solution methods and other forms of information relative
to a specific type of problem.
A reference problem gets activated if its features match those of the new problem under exam-
ination. Several different reference problems can be activated with different strengths at the same
time, depending on how much they ‘match’ with the new problem. Once the situation has been
assessed, as with RPD, mental simulation and correspondences with the reference problem allow
the generation of expectations about how the situation could possibly evolve.
Image Theory
Image Theory [Beach 1998] is vast and accounts for a large number of aspects of decision be-
haviour. Here only the portion of the theory that is required for this argumentation is briefly
introduced.
In Image Theory, the features of the current problem (stimulus situation) are evaluated and if
they match with other features stored in memory, then the situation is said to be recognised. If the
features are not perfectly matching, but only resemble those stored in memory, then the situation
is said to be identified. Recognition and identification allow the current situation to be framed; a
frame is information stored in memory that allows meaning to be given to the current situation.
Frames are used as a point of reference for each new situation and are updated as events unfold.
Once a frame is activated, associated policies are activated, too. Policies guide courses of
actions (or plans). Plans are evaluated through a compatibility test which allows plans whose
features are not suitable for the current situation to be dropped. Additionally, the profitability test
is performed through a set of strategies that allow selection of the best option.
A critical operation for the decision maker is figuring out whether the plan under evaluation
allows the pre-defined goals to be reached. This is done by mental simulation; if the simulation is
not satisfactory, plans are changed.
Rasmussen’s model
Rasmussen [1983] proposes a model for representing human performance at skill-, rule- and
knowledge-based levels. His analysis focuses on the decision making activity of expert operat-
ors of complex automated systems like nuclear power plans.
The knowledge and experience that the operator has about the process/system determines the
level of cognitive control that is exercised (skill-, rule- or knowledge-based) and as a consequence,
the features and structure of the information flow between the human and the system.
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Skill-based control is exercised by people with a higher level of expertise. Actions are gener-
ated in the subconscious by means of dynamic mental models of a familiar situation.
In rule-based control, actions are conscious and follow rules, which are procedures or sub-
routines stored in memory that define the behaviour for each situation. The boundary between
skill and rule-based is not sharp; the decision maker could switch from one type of control to the
other, depending on the familiarity with the task.
Finally, knowledge-based control is conscious decision making activity that is performed in
situations in which the goals change dynamically or the knowledge is insufficient. In these situ-
ations humans construct plans and test their applicability through “thought experiments”. If the
test is not successful, the plans can be modified dynamically. Again, this process is akin to the
mental simulation activity found in later stages of the decision process, as well as in the other
models previously described.
Explanation-based model
Unlike previous models, the explanation-based model developed by Pennington and Hastie [1988]
is not targeted at the control of automated processes, rather it is designed on studies of jury de-
cisions. However, such decisions are complex and characterised by high uncertainty, hence the
model can be included in this analysis with good reason.
In the explanation-based model, the decision maker builds a causal story that explains inform-
ation previously received. The story, along with the information, determines the decisions. The
rationale given by Pennington and Hastie is that constructing stories and asking ‘why-type’ ques-
tions helps establish relationships between facts; the more complete and consistent the story, the
lower the uncertainty.
Once again, mental simulation is a critical process to construct stories, to discard inconsistent
ones and to establish casual chains of relationships.
2.2.3 Conclusions
In recent years the human factors community has witnessed a metonymy as to what concerns the
interpretation of human error, which was first regarded as a cause of failure (old human error
view), whilst now it is considered more as a symptom of failure (new human error view). In this
light, a good way forward to improve the safety of next-generation SCMS is getting an insight into
the rationale for human decisions during system operation.
Five well established NDM cognitive models that are applicable to the decision making activ-
ity of pilots during IMA dynamic reconfiguration have been described. According to each model,
mental simulation plays a crucial role, allowing the establishment of a casual link between the
features of the decision scenario (input) and the consequences of an action/decision (output) by
the human. Indeed, this concept was clear to the German philosopher and classical philologist
Nietzsche, who pointed out that few things make us as anxious as not having a cause for things
that go wrong [Nietzsche 1888]. Explanations of the causes of unexpected events and justifica-
tions for the courses of action to be taken are critically important for the human decision maker;
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they allow causes to be linked to effects, situation awareness to be built and informed choices to
be made. However, generating justifications for the evaluation of each decision alternative is a
difficult problem for a human being; fragmented or incorrect information, cognitive limitations,
stress, risks and other decision biases make the problem unfeasible in demanding situations.
During safety-critical decisions for the control of modern SCMS, would the availability of
automatically generated decision support information, justifying each decision alternative, allow
a more informed choice and improve human decision making performance and accuracy? Should
this be the case, such a decision support approach would undoubtedly make the overall SCMS
safer.
Our hypothesis, which is extended and refined in the next chapter, is that in the context of the
problem examined here, the human decision making performance and accuracy could be improved
by a decision support aid specifically designed to favour mental simulation.
2.3 Decision Support Systems
As previously seen in this chapter, unplanned dynamic reconfiguration of IMA is tangled up in the
real-time fault management process. The position of this thesis is that at the occurrence of a fault
that requires reconfiguration, a timely and effective exchange of information should be established
between the aircraft and the pilot, with the system starting the “communication”.
Warnings that follow an unexpected event have three main purposes, (a) to alert the pilot that
something is wrong, (b) to report what is wrong, (c) to guide the pilot in what to do [Martensson
and Singer 1999]. Studies of aviation psychology document that pilots lament that current warn-
ing systems in commercial aircraft are not effective in accomplishing these three objectives. For
instance, pilots report that fault management technology delivers too much data, particularly all
kinds of secondary and tertiary failures, with no logical order; furthermore, primary faults, which
are the root causes, are rarely highlighted [Martensson and Singer 1999; Singer and Dekker 2000].
The approach taken in this thesis, to structure the exchange of information with pilots dur-
ing IMA dynamic reconfiguration, exploits and extends current research in the domain of De-
cision Support Systems (DSS) engineering. The interpretation of the term DSS adopted here
is ‘a class of computer-based information systems that support human decision-making activit-
ies’. Nowadays, DSS are effectively used to support decision makers in diverse domains, such as
railway [Dadashi et al. 2011], medicine [Shortliffe et al. 1979], retail industry [Ha¨ubl and Trifts
2000], nuclear emergencies [Ehrhardt et al. 1993; Vamanu et al. 2004], national security [NASA
and University Of California San Diego 2005] and military tactics [Hutchins, Morrison and Kelly
1996].
DSS have also appeared in the aviation field, e.g. [Sarter and Schroeder 2001; Painter et al.
1997]. A notable example from the fault management field is the Hazard Monitor [Bass et al.
1997], which tracks user interactions with the system and tries to match them against informa-
tion contained in a knowledge-base as a way of doing plan recognition. The objective of Hazard
Monitor is to make suggestions about what the user should consider doing next.
Recommender systems (RS) are a specific type of DSS that “aim to relieve information and
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interaction overload over users by applying intelligent filtering techniques that ultimately present
to the user the most relevant and attractive information, people, or communities” [ACM TIST
2010]. At present, RS are extensively used on the web by retailers of music, videos, books, news,
film, images, and other items [Jannach 2010]. In a typical scenario, the RS uses a user profile
to predict the ‘rating’ that a decision maker would give to an item he has not yet considered.
Intuitively, this problem has certain similarities with the problem faced by pilots during an IMA
dynamic reconfiguration: (a) the search space is too big to be explored without the support of
computer-based intelligent filtering; (b) the decision time is limited; and, (c) a solution (i.e. an
avionics configuration) is generated by the system on the basis of the present circumstances.
This thesis makes a contribution to the field by presenting a novel recommendation system
framework for IMS dynamic reconfiguration, based on the Constraint Programming paradigm and
a number of domain-dependent heuristics. Empirical data about its effect on pilot decision making
performance is collected and discussed.
2.3.1 The Generic Decision Support Problem
The first papers to mark the emergence of RS as an independent area of research date back to
the 1990s [Resnick et al. 1994; Hill et al. 1995; Shardanand and Maes 1995]. More recently,
Adomavicius and Tuzhilin [2005] defined the recommendation problem as follows:
Let C be the set of all users and let S be the set of all possible items that can be
recommended, such as books, movies, or restaurants. The space S of possible items
can be very large, ranging in hundreds of thousands or even millions of items in some
applications, such as recommending books or CDs. Similarly, the user space can also
be very large-millions in some cases. Let u be a utility function that measures the
usefulness of item s to user c, i.e., u : C × S → R, where R is a totally ordered set
(e.g., non-negative integers or real numbers within a certain range). Then, for each
user c ∈ C, we want to choose such item s′ ∈ S that maximizes the user’s utility.
More formally:
∀c ∈ C, s′c = arg maxs∈S u(c, s) (2.1)
The major difficulty in recommendation problems is that u is usually ill-defined and, when a
clear definition exists, it is usually available only for a subset of the items in C × S , hence it must
be extrapolated to all of them. In most cases, u is extrapolated through heuristics or statistical
functions, such as means.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the utility of each IMS configuration is not easy to define and
summarise in a single number. Furthermore, IMS configurations are dynamically generated on the
basis of the current operating conditions, hence static utilities extrapolated on the set of applicable
configurations are scarcely effective.
Decision support measures are used to determine how well an RS predicts high-relevance
items. Examples of measures are classical IR measures of precision (the percentage of correctly
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predicted high ratings among those that were predicted to be high by the RS), F-measures (a
harmonic mean of precision and recall), and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) measures,
demonstrating the trade-off between true positive and false positive rates [Herlocker et al. 1999].
Classic decision support measures do not seem sufficient to characterise the effectiveness of
a SCMS reconfiguration recommendation, e.g. precision is only one dimension of relevance; de-
cision time, the pilot’s situation awareness and cognitive demand are some of the other dimensions
of decision support measurement that are significant for the SCMS dynamic reconfiguration prob-
lem which are not easily captured by classical measures.
Dale and Reiter [1995] refer to the classic measures of evaluation as glass box methods, as
opposed to black box evaluations which look at the performance of the system as a whole. Black
box methods have been used to evaluate well-known interactive systems like ‘KNIGHT’ [Lester
and Porter 1997] and ‘AlethGen’ [Coch 1996b;a].
This thesis makes a contribution to the field of research by: (a) investigating pilot reaction to
different types of recommendations and (b) investigating the use of black box measures to define
the utility of recommendations in SCMS reconfiguration problems. To this purpose, a number
of metrics of user experience that are uncommon in the RS domain but are typical of aviation
psychology studies are used to evaluate the performance of the system as a whole, e.g. situation
awareness, decision time, perceived cognitive demand and eye movement analysis.
2.3.2 User Profiling
The definition of the user profile, which is part of the formulation of the recommendation problem,
is a subject that receives a lot of attention in the RS engineering field, because the success of the
system depends to a large extent on the ability of designers to capture user interests and of the
system to satisfy them.
With reference to Equation 2.1, Adomavicius and Tuzhilin [2005] maintain that “each element
of the user space C can be defined with a profile that includes various user characteristics, such
as age, gender, income, marital status, etc. In the simplest case, the user profile contains a single
element, which is the User ID”.
Ramezani et al. [2008] distinguish between (a) persistent user models, which contain user
interests and preferences deduced from user inputs accumulated over time, and (b) ephemeral
user models, which contain current user interests (or intentions) based solely on inputs from the
current user session.
A review of the literature shows that the two approaches are implemented in different ways
by means of a plethora of algorithms. Syskill & Webert [Pazzani and Muramatsu 1996], an RS
that suggests what web pages might interest a user, constructs a user profile from the user’s ratings
of pages and uses this profile to suggest other pages accessible from the index page. In VITA
[Felfernig et al. 2007], an RS for financial decisions, each customer registered with the system has
a profile which consists of personal information, previous recommender session data, purchased
products and other financial service providers. In FAB [Balabanovic´ and Shoham 1997], a hybrid
RS for the Web, relevance feedback is used to generate user profiles: weights are associated with
the words of web pages previously selected by the user; the weights of the words contained in all
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the pages selected by the user are used to build a profile. This approach is informally referred to
as the “bag of words” [Mooney and Roy 2000; Bilgic and Mooney 2005].
The majority of current approaches to generating user profiles aims at capturing the behavi-
oural aspect of the decision making and the analytical capabilities of decision makers. However, in
the 1980s, Young [1983] envisioned DSS technology to be “executive mind-support systems” that
seek to establish a symbiosis of human mind and computer. Chen and Lee [2003] notice that, up to
then, this grand vision had yet to become a reality. To the best of our knowledge, this objective has
not yet been accomplished; the cognitive aspect of decision support has received relatively little
attention, despite its evident criticality in the design of any form of decision support.
This thesis makes a step in the direction indicated by Young. Instead of deducing user’s interest
and preferences from user inputs accumulated over time, the approach adopted is to characterise
an user (pilot) profile starting from basic assumptions from aviation psychology and testing them
empirically using a novel RS, purpose-made for this PhD programme. In many interactive systems
the user model is not explictly defined but it is effectively hard wired into the system [Dale and
Reiter 1995]; this is the approach followed here. A typical pilot’s profile, relevant to the problem
of decision making during SCMS dynamic reconfiguration, is elaborated in Chapter 4; this profile
is used as a reference point for the design of the RS algorithms presented in Chapter 5 and its




The type of interaction that is established with the user allows the RS to be classified as follows:
• Conversational recommenders: an interactive dialogue is established with the user (e.g.
FindMe [Burke et al. 1997]). The system asks for feedback or answers to questions. Ques-
tion/answer systems are a form of conversational RS in which the system questions the user
and uses the responses to formulate a recommendation (e.g. INCA [Langley 1999]). An-
other variation of conversational RS are candidate/critique systems, which display a basic
set of recommendations to a user and solicit feedback (e.g. ATA [Linden et al. 1997]).
• Single-shot recommenders: the user is not provided with any feedback; each interaction
produces an independent recommendation (e.g. FAB [Balabanovic´ and Shoham 1997]).
Conversational recommenders have the advantage that the user can “drive” the construction of
the final recommendation by interacting with the system in a sort of refinement process. On the
other hand, the interaction monopolises the attention of the decision maker for a prolonged time.
With reference to the IMA dynamic reconfiguration problem, the pilot time budget to complete
the reconfiguration process and the cognitive resources availability vary depending on the phase
of the flight and the operating scenario in general. A prolonged interaction would be unfeasible in
the majority of situations, such as after a fault. For this reason, this thesis focuses on single-shot
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recommendation only; however, the RS framework proposed in Chapter 5 is general enough to
be extended to allow more interaction with the pilot during the search for an applicable config-
uration. This allows the application of the technology introduced in this thesis to problems with
a similar structure to the IMA dynamic reconfiguration problem but with more relaxed decision
time budgets.
Selection versus configuration
RS are designed to help the decision maker to solve one of the following two combinatorial,
complex problems: selection or configuration. In a selection problem (e.g. Granston and Holler
[2001]), the decision maker chooses from many options in a problem whose search space size is
too large for them to readily scan and to compare all the options. In a configuration problem
(e.g. Inakoshi et al. [2001]), the user determines the “best” ways to combine sets of components
or attributes of an object.
A configuration problem requires the decision maker to have knowledge about the interaction
of the components or attributes that are combined in the final product. Making a parallel with the
IMA dynamic reconfiguration problem, structuring the interaction in the form of a configuration
problem requires pilots to “construct” an avionics configuration in real-time, through the combin-
ation of its components or attributes. On the contrary, in a selection problem the pilot would need
to select a single configuration from a reduced set of configurations suggested by the system.
The narrow time budget available to complete a reconfiguration and the deep, pervasive know-
ledge of the avionics that pilots would need to construct safe and effective configurations in real-
time make this type of interaction hardly applicable to our problem.
The approach taken in this thesis is to structure the interaction between pilot and system during
IMA dynamic reconfiguration in the form of a selection problem.
Knowledge base
The type of knowledge base used by RS to produce recommendations divides them into four main
groups: (a) collaborative (b) content-based (c) knowledge-based, and (d) hybrid systems.
In collaborative recommendation systems the knowledge base is build up incrementally,
merging collaborative opinion profiles, demographic profiles and user opinions. The most well-
known approach is nearest neighbour. Another variant is the popular item method, in which the
collaborative information is processed as features associated with items, rather than with users.
Furthermore, some researchers have proposed model-based methods to compress the collaborative
opinion data, including clustering, singular value decomposition and others [Resnick et al. 1994;
Sarwar et al. 2001]. An example of collaborative RS is Ringo [Shardanand and Maes 1995], a
music recommender in which users express their musical preferences by rating various artists and
albums and get suggestions of groups and recordings that others with similar preferences also like.
Felfernig and Burke [2008] classify content-based recommendation as “a pure classification
task in the machine learning sense”. The RS produces a classification rule for each user on the basis
of the user’s ratings and the attributes of each item. This mechanism allows the classification of
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each item as likely to be interesting or not. Contrary to collaborative systems, no social knowledge
is used. A well known example of this type of RS is NewsDude [Billsus and Pazzani 1999], a
system that suggests news stories the user might like to read.
The literature identifies all recommendations that rely on knowledge sources other than those
of collaborative and content-based approaches as knowledge-based recommendations. Bilgic
and Mooney [2005] describe them as “something of an accident of history”. An example of these
systems is the restaurant recommender Entree [Burke and Hammond 1996], which recommends
restaurants in a new city similar to restaurants the user knows and likes. Whilst the system allows
the user to navigate the search space by stating the preferences with respect to a given restaurant
(i.e. redefinition of search criteria), the user profile is not updated at run-time.
There are two well-known variants of knowledge-based RS, (a) case-based and (b) constraint-
based RS. Case-based recommendation systems treat recommendation primarily as a similarity-
assessment problem. A database of well-known cases is used to make comparisons with each item
in the search space; a matching function calculates the likelihood of user interest for each item.
Ginty and Smyth [2002] illustrate this process neatly on a real RS for the retail industry.
Constraint-based recommendations are constructed by explicitly defining constraints over
the search space that drive the quest for the right item to recommend. Examples of this technology
are provided by Boutilier et al. [1997], Felfernig et al. [2007] and Felfernig and Burke [2008].
Finally, hybrid recommendation systems use components or logic from a mixture of the
approaches mentioned so far. For instance, Inakoshi et al. [2001] propose a RS that combines
constraint-based and case-based reasoning; Zanker [2008] investigates the combination of constraint-
based reasoning and collaborative filtering.
This thesis extends current research in constraint-based recommendations by proposing a novel
framework for recommendation construction that employs Explanation-based Constraint Program-
ming and a number of domain-dependent heuristics (e.g. ranking avionics configuration by means
of a bespoke Weighted Sum Model). The technology proposed is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
2.3.4 Information Framing
The decision support information generated by the framework proposed in this thesis contains
descriptive data about the unexpected event that triggered the reconfiguration (for example, the
fault description) and other information about one or more configuration recommendations (such
as the reason why the configuration in question is being proposed, the consequences of applying
the configuration suggested by the system).
This type of information is complex, structured and contains causal relationships. Intuitively,
alarms and simple warning messages are not sufficient to convey it effectively, hence the system
must provide the pilot with textual or graphical information without overloading him or her.
Natural Language Generation (NLG) theory structures the process of construction of textual
information in the following five phases:
1. Content Determination: what information should be communicated;
2. Information Structuring: how chunks of information are grouped;
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3. Lexicalisation: deciding the specific words that should be used;
4. Aggregation: deciding how the structures created before should be mapped onto linguistic
structures (sentences, paragraphs);
5. Linguistic Realisation: converting abstract representations of sentences into real text.
Through the five phases just mentioned, state-of-the-art, sophisticated NLG systems are able
to generate ‘readable’ and ‘appropriate’ textual information for heterogeneous contexts. For ex-
ample, ‘FOG’ [Goldberg et al. 1994] generates textual weather forecasts from numerical weather
simulations produced by a supercomputer and annotated by a human. Amongst the other achieve-
ments of FOG, the system is able to decide how detailed the information it provides should be,
depending on the weather information being processed.
In the software engineering domain, ‘ModelExplainer’ [Lavoie et al. 1997] describes models
of object-oriented software in textual format. One complexity in this system is the capability of
aggregating information in order to produce sentences which contain several clauses. Reiter et al.
[1995] propose ‘IDAS’, a NLG system that produces hypertext help information for operators of
complex machines. It uses data stored in a knowledge base that describes the machine. ‘AlethGen’
[Coch 1996b] focuses on the high quality of the multi-paragraph text generated and the data-driven
planning approach, which allows production of an extensive set of different text structures.
As previously mentioned, alarms and warning messages are not sufficient to provide pilots
with enough information during IMA dynamic reconfiguration. On the other hand, the text gener-
ated should have a pre-defined structure that makes the information conveyed readily understood;
in consequence, high-level, human-like text could become counterproductive for the IMA recon-
figuration problem. As a result, the approach of this thesis is not to focus on sophisticated tech-
niques for lexicalisation, aggregation and linguistic realisation, but to focus the attention mainly
on content determination and information structuring. An approach to structured decision support
information for avionics reconfiguration decisions based on the schema paradigm is introduced in
Chapter 5.
2.3.5 Explanations
Several researchers have recognised the importance of providing users with explanations of re-
commendations, in order to improve both their trust in the system and the effectiveness of recom-
mendations. Explanations help users to either detect or make an estimate of the likelihood of errors
in the recommendation. Some RS provide explanations for their suggestions in the form of similar
items the user has rated highly in the past (e.g. Amazon) or keywords describing the item that
caused it to be recommended.
Previous work in the DSS field has proved the effectiveness of explanations in improving
human’s decision performance. MYCIN [Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984] is a fitting example of a
DSS of this type from the medical domain. The system is designed to identify bacteria causing
severe infections and to recommend antibiotics, with the dosage adjusted for the patient’s body
weight. Explanations are used to make recommendations transparent to the user; in fact, the user
can ask both why the system arrived at a conclusion and how much it knows about the subject.
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Matsumoto and Sakaguchi [1992] propose a knowledge-based RS that uses explanations to
support operators of power plants during critical activities. Regarding this thesis, the relevance of
this work is in the effective exploitation of explanatory facilities to progress the safety of decision
making problems.
Bresina and Morris [2006] propose a constraint-based approach to automatically provide ex-
planations and recommendations for temporal inconsistencies within the context of planning. Even
though the recommendations provided by this framework are specifically designed for temporal
inconsistencies, the way the information is codified into constraints and processed is interesting
for this thesis.
Lester and Porter [1997] present a seven-year project in the field of explanation generation that
led to the development of ‘KNIGHT’, a robust explanation system that constructs multi-sentential
and multi-paragraph explanations from the large-scale knowledge base in the domain of botanical
anatomy, physiology and development. KNIGHT uses a semantically-rich, large-scale knowledge
base to generate explanations; the small size of the knowledge base required by the SCMS dynamic
reconfiguration problem, allows the structuring of the data in the form of a constraint network
and the generation of explanations by means of bespoke constraint programming algorithms and
heuristics (Chapter 5).
Be´langer and Martel [2005] introduce an advisor tool to assist military staff in managing events
and related courses of actions (COAs), as well as prioritising these COAs according to differ-
ent evaluation criteria. The system is equipped with an automated generator of explanations for
the ranking proposed to the operator which is based on a Multi Criterion Aggregation Procedure
(MCAP) technique. Multiple criteria are also used to evaluate decision options by the system pro-
posed in this thesis but a novel algorithm based on Weighted-Sum Model has been implemented
(Chapter 5).
Other examples and theories on the effectiveness of explanations in RS are provided by Gregor
and Yu [2002], Miller and Larson [1992] and Horvitz et al. [1988].
Despite the successful experience with explanatory facilities in the expert systems domain in
general, Bilgic and Mooney [2005] comment that, at least in the RS domain, very few studies
provide a systematic analysis of explanation generation methods for recommenders which takes
into account the cognitive aspect of the user.
A positive example in this direction is provided by Herlocker et al. [2000]. The authors present
a study in which a cognitive model of the typical user is constructed; then the behaviour of 210 par-
ticipants who interact with the ‘MovieLens’ web-based video recommender [Dahlen et al. 1998] is
investigated. The participants are supported by computer-generated explanations of recommend-
ations. The result is that the user experience was improved for 86% of participants. The authors
also show that certain styles of explanation increase the likelihood that the user will follow the
recommendation. This thesis takes into account the problem of framing the explanations provided
to the pilots from a human-computer interaction point of view in Chapter 4 and the conclusions
reached are empirically assessed in Chapter 6.
Bilgic and Mooney [2005] take into account the cognitive aspect of generating explanations of
recommendations. In their study, three methods for explaining recommendations of content-based
2.3. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 53
and/or collaborative systems are compared. The authors show experimentally what terms each
method uses to improve the user’s estimated quality of an item.
The same benefits provided by the explanations in the DSS mentioned to this point could
be obtained in the context of IMA dynamic reconfiguration. There are considerable differences
regarding the user profile and the operating context. During avionics reconfiguration, the pilot has
a short time budget available to make a safety-critical decision; stress, frustration and cognitive
workload are all likely to emerge and potential errors can lead to catastrophic consequences. These
are only a few, perhaps only the most obvious, conditions of interaction between a self-explanatory
DSS and the human that differentiate the studies previously mentioned and this work on IMA
dynamic reconfiguration.
This thesis extends current research in the domain of DSS and RS by exploring the effect
of explanations of recommendations during IMA dynamic reconfiguration, a safety-critical scen-
ario which is quite unusual in the recommender systems literature. This work aims at providing
a contribution by giving an insight into the cognitive aspects of the interaction between a self-
explanatory DSS and an aircraft pilot. Previous results from Herlocker et al. on the effectiveness
of explanations are used as a starting point for the investigations.
2.3.6 From explanations to persuasion
Real-time fault management processes on-board modern aircraft are built around intricate statist-
ical models. Deciding what to explain and how to do so in order to provide effective support to the
pilot during dynamic reconfiguration decisions, is a complex task, which follows the preliminary
problem of extracting the relevant information from the fault management logic of the system. In
this regard, Bilgic and Mooney [2005] make an interesting observation from the generic point of
view of recommender systems engineering:
“The effectiveness of an explanation system can be measured using two fundament-
ally different approaches: the promotion approach and the satisfaction approach. For
the promotion approach, the best explanation is the one that is most successful at con-
vincing the user to adopt an item. For the satisfaction approach, the best explanation
is the one that lets the users assess the quality of the item the best. Unfortunately,
there is little existing research on explaining recommender systems.”
This is an extremely important observation for this thesis. Unlike on-line shopping assistants,
restaurant recommenders or other similar RS, a DSS for IMA dynamic reconfiguration should put
the pilot in the position of being able to make an informed and unbiased choice, i.e. choose the
best configuration with respect to the current operating conditions from those that are applicable.
However, persuasive explanations, as suggested by Bilgic and Mooney, could impair the imparti-
ality of pilot decisions. This could be an attribute of quality for certain on-line shopping assistants,
but would be dramatically counterproductive for the avionics reconfiguration problem, as it could
undermine the safety of the process itself.
The ability of self-explanatory RS to persuade the user towards erroneous choices should not
be underestimated. In a study with eighty participants, on a full mission simulation in the NASA
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Ames Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator, Skitka et al. [1999] demonstrate that an RS for crit-
ical flight decisions can persuade pilots towards wrong choices and lead to both commission and
omission errors. Evidence of the same issue in a slightly different context was previously provided
by Mosier and Skitka [1996].
The effect of computer-generated persuasive information on human decision behaviour has
been also investigated in the domain of Natural Language Processing [Guerini et al. 2003; Mazzo-
tta et al. 2007; Andrews 2008].
As the potential emergence of persuasion is most likely to hinder the reliability of IMA re-
configuration decisions, we investigate whether the explanations provided by the decision support
framework presented in Chapter 5 have the by-product effect of persuading pilots to select the
wrong avionics configurations or if they actually allow a more informed and impartial choice in
most cases. The subjects of persuasion and complacency are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
2.3.7 Conclusions
Decision Support System (DSS) technology is effectively employed in several industrial domains,
encompassing safety-critical applications. Recommender systems (RS), a specific class of DSS,
are employed in decision making problems that have similar characteristics to the SCMS dynamic
reconfiguration problem. The same benefits obtained in other fields seem to be achievable for
SCMS dynamic reconfiguration, provided that the specific characteristics of this problem are taken
into account (e.g. safety-critical context, limited decision time budget).
The definition of a user profile is critical for the effectiveness of a DSS. The majority of studies
in the RS domain aim at capturing the behavioural aspect of the decision making process. Given
the safety-critical context, which distinguishes SCMS dynamic reconfiguration from typical prob-
lems considered by the mainstream literature in the RS domain, further research seems necessary
to characterise the pilot profile, taking into account the cognitive aspect of the problem.
The type of interaction between the system and the operator allows classification of RS as
either ‘conversational’ or ‘single-shot’. Furthermore, the decision making process can be struc-
tured as a ‘selection’ or as a ‘configuration’ problem. The short decision time budget and the
complexity of modern SCMS like those on aircraft narrow the possibilities available. It seems
reasonable to structure the problem as a ‘selection’ problem and, consequently, the interaction as
‘single-shot’.
Alarms and warning messages are not sufficient to convey the information required by pilots
during IMA dynamic reconfiguration. State-of-the-art Natural Language Generation (NLG) tech-
nology allows the generation of high-level, structured dialogues. However, the text generated by
a DSS for avionics reconfiguration should have a pre-defined structure, in order to facilitate a
ready understanding in critical situations, as the text generated by sophisticated natural language
algorithms could become counterproductive in those circumstances. Moreover, further research is
required to understand how to determine and structure the content of decision support information
in a way that effectively helps pilots during reconfiguration.
Finally, explanations of recommendations have proven to improve user accuracy during de-
cisions made with the support of an automated system. The possibility of achieving similar bene-
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fits during IMA dynamic reconfiguration will be investigated. However, given the safety-critical
context, the potential by-product effect of persuasion towards the wrong recommendation, result-
ing from the exceptional trust of the user in the DSS, clearly requires investigation.
2.4 On Mental Constructs and Measurement Methods
This thesis makes use of mental constructs and principles that result from the past three decades
of research in Cognitive Psychology and Human Factors/Ergonomics (HF/E). Examples of these
constructs are mental workload (ML), situation awareness (SA) and trust in the automation (TR),
which are all defined and discussed below.
These constructs are used to put forward claims about pilot behaviour during avionics dynamic
reconfiguration decisions. A number of experiments are then designed in order to assess the claims,
and pilot responses are measured using well-established HF/E measurement methods, e.g. eye
movement analysis, decision accuracy, decision time.
Recently, Dekker and Hollnagel [2004] have criticised the use and relevance of some of these
constructs (i.e. SA, MW and TR) describing them as “folk models”, lacking strong empirical
foundations and scientific status. The authors raise three different points of criticism:
• They explain complex mechanisms by means of substitution instead of decomposition: the
explanation of complex behaviours is made by referring to another phenomenon or con-
struct that itself is in equal need of explanation. For instance, the authors point out that the
literature equates complacency with boredom [Wiener 1988]; overconfidence [Stokes and
Kite 1994]; contentment [Campbell and Bagshaw 2002]; unwarranted faith [O’Hare et al.
1992]; over-reliance [Kern and Kern 1998]; a low index of suspicion [Wiener 1988] and
self-satisfaction [Parasuraman et al. 1993].
• They cannot be falsified: linking back to Popper [1972], Dekker and Hollnagel argue that
“folk models” are under-specified, hence difficult to criticise and falsify;
• They tend to rely on over-generalisation: both ill-definition and immunity to falsification
contribute to the over-generalisation of the constructs in question.
Parasuraman et al. [2008] contrast the position of Dekker and Hollnagel on each of the three
points, gathering literature and examples of the application of the cognitive constructs and prin-
ciples in question from the past three decades. Four major conclusions from Parasuraman et al.
concerning SA, MW and TR are: (a) the three constructs have all been linked to information-
processing or other psychological processes; (b) a number of studies have identified the brain
mechanisms underlying some of them; (c) they have been modelled computationally; (d) SA,
MW and TR have proven to be highly valuable for understanding and predicting human-system
performance.
Dekker and Hollnagel [2004] also express concerns about measurement methods that have
been typically employed in HCI studies for a number of years. As shown in Figure 2.4, in the
authors’ view some methods require little effort but their theoretical basis is poor (e.g. keyboard
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interaction); other methods have strong theoretical foundations but are difficult to apply (e.g. eye
movement analysis).
Theoretical basis
(how easy & reliably can 



























Figure 2.4: Meaning of measurements (adapted from Dekker and Hollnagel [2004]).
Following these arguments, although this thesis uses “modern” mental constructs like SA,
MW and TR to make predictions about pilot behaviour during SCMS reconfiguration decisions,
particular attention is paid to empirically verifying the predictions through measurement methods
that have a strong theoretical foundation, such as eye movement and errors (performance), as
suggested by Dekker and Hollnagel [2004]. The effectiveness of the multiple-metrics validation
method we propose (Chapter 6) is advocated by the coherence amongst the heterogeneous results
obtained.
As already mentioned in Section 2.2.2, the aim of this thesis is not to draw conclusions about
the details of the brain mechanisms underlying certain pilot behaviour during SCMS dynamic
reconfiguration. Instead, a number of cognitive constructs and principles are used to make claims
about pilot behaviour. The conclusions drawn from our experimental results are only intended to
devise effective decision support technology whose positive effect on pilot behaviour is observable
(i.e. measurable).
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter covered the following topics:
• State-of-the-art technology for the dynamic reconfiguration of Safety-Critical Manned Sys-
tems from different engineering domains was reviewed, with a focus on aircraft avionics
reconfiguration. The material presented casts light on the complexity of the process and the
heterogeneous problems it encompasses.
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• Particular attention was paid to the problem of human involvement in the dynamic recon-
figuration process; several theories of naturalistic decision making were discussed, high-
lighting the critical role played by mental simulation during decisions of the type studied in
this thesis. The arguments expounded suggest that providing decision support designed to
favour mental simulation could be an effective approach to improve decision accuracy and
performance of avionics dynamic reconfiguration decisions.
• State-of-the-art decision support system (DSS) technology was reviewed and basic conclu-
sions concerning the design of a DSS for avionics dynamic reconfiguration were drawn; this
allows the research performed in this PhD programme to be positioned in the DSS domain.
The general inferences made in this chapter strongly influence the design of the technology
proposed in the remainder of this document.
• Recent controversies in the domain of Human Factors/Ergonomics regarding the application
of mental constructs and measurement methods to empirical studies have been discussed;
although this thesis uses “modern” mental constructs (e.g. situation awareness and men-
tal workload) to make predictions about pilot behaviour during avionics reconfiguration
decisions, particular attention is paid to empirically verifying the predictions through meas-
urement methods that have a strong theoretical foundation (e.g. eye movement analysis).
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Chapter 3
Reconfiguration and Automation
“As machines become more and more efficient and perfect,
so it will become clear that imperfection is the greatness of man.”
— Ernst Fischer
The previous chapter reported that the majority of current research focuses on techniques for
autonomous reconfiguration of IMA (Section 2.1.3). This chapter collects material to question
this assumption, setting up the context for and justifying a novel framework for IMA dynamic
reconfiguration which accounts for pilot involvement.
The analysis put forward in this chapter is enriched by the description of a number of ac-
cidents from the aviation domain; their discussion is used to infer a set of drawbacks of both
highly autonomous and insufficiently autonomous solutions for the avionics dynamic reconfigur-
ation process. Two mental constructs, situation awareness and decision complexity, are brought
into the discussion in order to highlight the issues with high and low autonomy from the pilots’
perspective.
The material presented in this chapter allows for an appreciation of the central research hypo-
thesis (originally introduced in Chapter 1), which is finalised at the end of the chapter.
3.1 More Autonomy, More Authority, More... Silence
Accident 3.1 On the 9th January 1997, an Embraer EMB-120RT aircraft operated by COMAIR
Airlines, Inc., as flight 3272 was flying from Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport
towards the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. Despite the icy conditions, the pilots
decided to keep the autopilot on.
At approximately 15:54 GMT the aircraft crashed during a rapid descent after an automated
(uncommanded) roll excursion near Monroe, Michigan. All twenty-six passengers and three crew
members died as a result of the accident.
National Transportation Safety Board [1998] reports:
• “Had the pilots been flying the airplane manually (without the autopilot engaged) they likely
would have noted the increased right-wing-down control wheel force needed to maintain
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the desired left bank, become aware of the airplane’s altered performance characteristics,
and increased their airspeed or otherwise altered their flight situation to avoid the loss of
control.” (page 178)
• “If the pilots of Comair flight 3272 had received a ground proximity warning system, auto-
pilot, or other system-generated cockpit warning when the airplane first exceeded the auto-
pilot’s maximum bank command limits with the autopilot activated, they might have been
able to avoid the unusual attitude condition that resulted from the autopilot’s sudden disen-
gagement”. (page 179)
In the late 1980s, it was expected that increased autonomy of on-board systems would reduce
human error and workload, whilst increasing operations performance and safety. However, during
the last couple of decades, empirical research has provided evidence that automation is not linearly
correlated to these parameters, instead it seems to provide new opportunities for different kinds of
errors [Woods 1994; Sarter et al. 1997]. It was also expected that the introduction of automation
would reduce the amount of training required by humans, but this has not been the case either
[Orlady and Orlady 2002].
Recent research reveals that reduced human physical activity in a highly automated environ-
ment does not necessarily relate to reduced perceived cognitive workload. Interestingly, in the
railway automation domain, Sharples et al. [2009] observe that in a high automation scenario, sig-
nallers may need to work harder in order to maintain situation awareness, as they not only need to
keep track of the movements of trains on the screen but also maintain an understanding of the way
in which the automation is controlling the movements.
There is a history of accidents similar to Accident 3.1 that can be traced back to the erroneous
design of highly automated safety-critical processes and systems: Ministry of Civil Aviation -
Government of India [1990]; Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport - France [1989];
Aeronautica Civil Of The Republic Of Colombia [1996]; National Transportation Safety Board
[1997; 1986]; Main Commission Aircraft Accident Investigation - Poland [1994]; Aviation Safety
Network [1993]; Fiorino [2009]; Aviation Safety Network [2009], amongst many.
The high degree of autonomy seems to play a central role in scenarios similar to Accident 3.1.
The terms ‘automation’, ‘dependability’ and ‘autonomy’ are extensively used in the literature;
however, the interpretations vary depending on the application domain. In this thesis, automation
is interpreted as the execution by a machine of a function previously carried out by humans [Para-
suraman and Riley 1997]; autonomy is regarded as the independence of the system from human
control [Visentin 2007]; authority is a property of automation that allows it to take over control
of a monitored process from the humans, if it decides that intervention is warranted, based on its
perception of the situation and its internal criteria [Sarter and Woods 1994].
Autonomy and authority are attributes of automation, i.e. automated processes can differ in
degree of autonomy and degree of authority. Accident 3.1 is representative of a case history of
mishaps in which a mixture of high autonomy and authority in a safety-critical context provides
the recipe for catastrophic consequences; Jones et al. [2010] present a detailed review of several
aviation mishaps due to onboard automation.
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Norman [1990] suggests that most of the time the issue with high autonomy systems is not
in the automation itself but in the feedback provided to the humans. In fact, feedback allows
the operator to evaluate the system state in relation to actions, goals, and expectations. Lack
of feedback forces the human into an open-loop processing situation in which performance is
generally poor [Hollands and Wickens 1999].
Similarly, Sarter and Woods [1995] express significant concerns about certain “strong and
silent” automated processes on-board modern aircraft. The risk is that the pilot loses awareness of
the way the automation changes the state of the system, an eventuality that could have catastrophic
consequences.
Given the concerns from the human factors community about highly autonomous processes
on-board modern aircraft on the one side, and the significant body of research targeting fully auto-
mated avionics reconfiguration solutions on the other side, the remainder of this chapter aims at
casting light on the question of whether a high degree of autonomy during dynamic reconfiguration
represents a step in the direction of improving the safety of next-generation aircraft or not.
3.2 Autonomy and Authority on-board Modern Aircraft
The two biggest aviation manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus, have developed two different philo-
sophies about the degree of autonomy and authority of on-board systems, which are usually re-
ferred to as soft automation and hard automation respectively.
Boeing (soft approach) gives pilots of their latest aircraft models (e.g. 777 series) high au-
thority over the automation, allowing them to override automated actions when needed. Pilots can
access the full performance envelope without being constrained by the automation. For instance,
if the pilot wishes to exceed set limits such as exceeding 3.5 degrees of bank, or pulling the yoke
back as the aircraft decelerates below the minimum manoeuvre speed, she can apply more force
than normal on the yoke and the aircraft will react accordingly [Hughes and Dornheim 1995].
On the other hand, the hard automation philosophy used by Airbus preaches that automation
technology exists to prevent the pilot from inadvertently exceeding safety limits. Airbus sys-
tems have hard speed envelope protection features that prevent pilots from stalling the aircraft;
for instance, the automation prevents pilots from pulling more than 2.5g, even in an emergency.
The automation has ultimate authority over pilot actions, hence it can override their actions; for
example, should the pilot inadvertently take the aircraft beyond its performance envelope, the
automation would prevent damage to the airframe and maintain the hard-coded flight dynamics.
Basically, automation is employed as a technique for error prevention; it creates a middle-layer
between the pilot and the avionics that filters the inputs and masks eventual non-nominal condi-
tions by compensating through automated actions.
Accident 3.2 On a non-stop China Airlines Flight 006 between Taipei and Los Angeles (Boeing
747SP-09 aircraft), flying on the 19th February 1985, the aircraft suffered significant structural
damage while losing almost 30,000 feet in an uncontrollable dive [National Transportation Safety
Board 1986]. Because the control inputs that led to the recovery exceeded the performance envel-
ope, the aircraft frame was severely damaged. However, as the avionics actually allowed the pilot
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to exceed the performance envelope, a crash was avoided and only a few injuries were reported
[Young et al. 2007].
From a different perspective, consider another case:
Accident 3.3 On the 24th April 2004, an Airbus A300 aircraft started a landing manoeuvre to-
wards the Nagoya Airport (Japan), under manual control. The First Officer inadvertently activ-
ated the GO lever, which changed the Flight Director to GO AROUND mode and caused a thrust
increase. This made the aircraft deviate above its normal glide path. The crew started the man-
oeuvre, unaware of the abnormal situation. There was no warning and recognition function to
alert the crew directly and actively to the onset of the abnormal out-of-trim condition. During
the landing, the co-pilot had to ‘fight’ against the automation, but the aircraft eventually stalled
and crashed. The Japanese Ministry of Transport reports that “the Captain’s and First Officer’s
awareness of the flight conditions, after the PIC1 took over the controls and during their recovery
operation, was inadequate respectively” [Ministry Of Transport 1994].
The fact that the co-pilot had to literally ‘fight’ against the automation raises severe concerns
about a high degree of authority for the automation. However, the two accidents reveal quite
evidently that both soft and hard automation approaches seem to have pro¯ and contra¯.
The discussion will now be brought closer to the problem of IMA dynamic reconfiguration.
3.2.1 Searching for the right degree
Sheridan et al. [1978] first proposed ten possible levels of autonomy to define the interaction
between humans and computers. More recently, Parasuraman et al. [2000] revised the original
levels in the light of a four-stage model of independent information processing functions (inform-
ation acquisition, analysis, decision making and action implementation, shown in Figure 3.1). The
autonomy levels of Parasuraman et al. are shown in Table 3.1, which is the scale used as a reference
in this thesis.
# Autonomy Levels
10 The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the human.
9 The computer informs the human only if the computer decides to.
8 The computer informs the human only if asked.
7 The computer executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human.
6 The computer allows the human a restricted time before automatic execution.
5 The computer executes the suggestion if the human approves.
4 The computer suggests an alternative.
3 The computer narrows the selection down to a few.
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision alternatives.
1 The computer offers no assistance. The human must make all the decisions
and actions.
Table 3.1: Levels of autonomy introduced by Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens (2000)
1Pilot In Command







Figure 3.1: Simple four-stage model of human information processing.
Depending on which of the four stages of the human information processing scheme shown
in Figures 3.1 is automated, the relevant system autonomy level is chosen from Table 3.1. Full
autonomy/authority leads to the automation of all four information processing stages, including
‘action implementation’, and corresponds to levels 9 or 10 of the scale. The degree of autonomy
of the function that caused the crash of the A300 aircraft involved in Accident 3.3 can be ranked
at this level.
With minimal autonomy (levels 1 and 2) the pilot would receive minimal or no support from
the system in the selection of a new configuration. After an unexpected event, the system would
prompt the pilot with a list of all the possible applicable configurations. In order to make an
informed decision, she would need to investigate the causes of the triggering unexpected event, try
to understand why the system was suggesting a specific configuration and what its consequences
would be on aircraft functionality; finally the pilot should choose the option that best fitted the
operating conditions at that time.
With this level of system autonomy the pilot would have full authority, which is theoretically a
desirable quality, but, at the same time, she would have to put in relation a vast number of hetero-
geneous information items in a short time, e.g. type of fault, type of alarm, operating conditions,
reliability of the instrumentation, implications of different actions, tactical objectives (in case of a
military aircraft), and so on. This thesis rises concerns about the ability of a pilot to solve such a
complicated problem, in real-time, without any automated decision support.
In this regard, Quesada et al. [2005] point out that Complex Problem Solving (CPS) tasks are:
1. Dynamic: early actions determine the environment in which subsequent decisions must be
made and features of the task environment may change independently of the actions of the
“solver”.
2. Time-dependent: decisions must be completed within the deadlines defined by the environ-
mental demands.
3. Relationally complex: most variables do not have a one-to-one relationship with each other.
Working memory plays a central role in complex problem solving tasks; more specifically,
the lateral prefrontal and the parietal cortices are heavily involved in tasks that require keeping a
certain number of items easily and promptly accessible at the same time. Braver et al. [1997] show
that this capability is very limited.
Halford and Wilson [1998] define relational complexity as the number of unique entities that
one must process in parallel to arrive at a solution; the authors also define working memory limits
in terms of relational complexity. Through neural network models and empirical research, they
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prove the existence of a soft limit of four parallel relations. More recently Cowan [2001] reviewed
several studies of cognitive capacity and set the limit at 3 ± 1.
Halford and Wilson assert that complex problems are characterised by numerous elements
which are related to each other and cannot be considered meaningfully in isolation. Beyond the
3 ± 1 limit, segmentation comes into action; tasks are broken into components that do not exceed
processing capacity and can be processed serially.
Segmentation is directly correlated to cognitive demand, decision time and probability of error
[Halford and Wilson 1998], which are all parameters that need to be kept as low as possible during
avionics dynamic reconfiguration (ADR) decisions. Hogarth [1975] adds that because of the limits
of information processing capacity, optimal decision time is a concave function of task complexity,
for both simple and complex tasks, decision time is relatively small. However, with very complex
problems, the probability of error drastically increases.
The aim here is not to quantify the complexity of ADR decisions. However, Quesada et al.
show quite evidently that ADR decisions have all the characteristics of a complex problem whose
solution requires a cognitive demand which is likely to exceed human capabilities in the majority
of cases.
Just to provide a picture of the relational complexity of the ADR problem, without going too
deeply into the details, the avionics of the Airbus A380 aircraft amount to 80 computing modules,
each of them can run up to 21 avionics functions which can be activated and deactivated during a
reconfiguration and are linked by inter-dependency relationships [Itier 2007]. This represents only
one dimension of the information that needs to be processed by the pilot during ADR if the system
is designed at autonomy level 2.
All the material discussed in this section supports the claim that some form of decision support
would be extremely beneficial for the pilot during safety-critical ADR decisions. The next section
elaborates this claim further, introducing an important mental construct which has acquired a lot
of attention in the aviation psychology domain in the last couple of decades: situation awareness.
3.2.2 Situation awareness
Situation awareness (SA) plays a central role during ADR (this claim is empirically verified in
Chapter 6), hence particular attention is given to the introduction and discussion of this topic.
Despite having attracted a lot of interest amongst psychology, human factors and ergonomics re-
searchers in the last couple of decades, a universally accepted definition of SA is still not available.
Three definitions seem to dominate the literature [Stanton 2001]:
1. Smith and Hancock [1995] introduce the perceptual cycle model: SA resides in the inter-
action of the human with the world, it is described both in terms of the cognitive processes
used to engineer it and the continuously updating product of SA.
2. Bedny and Meister [1999] suggest the activity theory model: SA is defined as the human’s
conscious dynamic reflection on the situation.
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3. Endsley [1999] proposes a three-stage model: SA is defined as “the perception of the
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their
meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”.
The main difference amongst the three models lies in whether SA is considered a process,
employed in achieving and maintaining a mental state, or the end product of this process.
The three-stage model by Endsley [1999] is by far the most cited in the literature and the
majority of SA measurement techniques rely on this model. The conclusions reached by this
thesis are empirically evaluated, SA is directly and indirectly assessed through qualitative and
quantitative methods in Chapter 6, therefore, Endsley’s model is used here. The three stages of the
Endsley model are as follows:
• Level 1 SA: Perception of the elements in the environment: the first step in achieving SA is
to perceive the status, attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment.
• Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the current situation: This phase is based on a synthesis
of disjoint level 1 elements. It goes beyond simply being aware of the elements that are
present, to include an understanding of the significance of those elements in the light of
pertinent goals.
• Level 3 SA: Projection of future status: This stage requires the projection of future actions
of the elements in the environment, at least in the very near term.
Endsley’s definition of SA is compatible with the RPD model (Section 2.2.2.3). In fact, the
first step of the decision problem is collecting information and recognising a situation from past
experience. This process is referred to as situation assessment. SA is the product of continual
situation assessment [Elliot 2005].
Describing the crash of the Embraer 120 RT Brasilia aircraft that happened on the 9th January
1997 (Accident 3.1 in this thesis), the National Transportation Safety Board [1998] reports the
following:
• “Had the pilots been flying the airplane manually (without the autopilot engaged) they likely
would have noted the increased right-wing-down control wheel force needed to maintain the
desired left bank, become aware of the airplane’s altered performance characteristics, and
increased their airspeed or otherwise altered their flight situation to avoid the loss of control.
Disengagement of the autopilot during all operations in icing conditions is necessary to
enable pilots to sense the aerodynamic effects of icing and enhance their ability to retain
control of the airplane”. (page 178)
• “Because the pilots of Comair flight 3272 were operating the airplane with the autopilot
engaged during a series of descents, right and left turns, power adjustments, and airspeed re-
ductions, they might not have perceived the airplane’s gradually deteriorating performance.”
(page 145)
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The Comair Flight 3272 is a clear example of loss of SA. The history of aircraft accidents
counts several mishaps due to this specific phenomenon. Endsley [1995a] performed a study
amongst the major air-carriers over a period of 4 years and found that 88% of accidents involving
human error could be attributed to problems with SA.
Another accident partially due to loss of SA concerns the American Airlines Flight 965 (Boe-
ing 757-223 aircraft) flying between Miami (Florida, USA) and Cali (Colombia) on the 20th
December 1995. Aeronautica Civil Of The Republic Of Colombia [1996] reports the following:
• “The evidence suggests several explanations for this deficiency in the flight crew’s situ-
ational awareness: [...] Terrain information was not shown on the electronic horizontal
situation indicator (EHSI) or graphically portrayed on the approach chart” (page 35)
• “Aeronautica Civil determines that the probable causes of this accident were: [...] 3. The
lack of situational awareness of the flight crew regarding vertical navigation, proximity to
terrain, and the relative location of critical radio aids” (page 57)
A detailed analysis of this accident is provided by Endsley and Strauch [1997].
Endsley [1999] posits that SA is built up in three stages, which can be associated with different
cognitive processes. We argue that the capacity of the pilot to build up SA during ADR changes,
depending on the level of autonomy of the process, as shown hereinafter.
3.2.2.1 Level 1 SA
By definition, level 1 SA implies a perception of the elements in the environment. In terms of
ADR, this means perceiving (e.g. visually, through the cockpit, and aurally, through an alarm)
the characteristics of the unexpected event that issues the reconfiguration (e.g. a fault), the char-
acteristics of the reconfiguration options generated by the system and other relevant details of the
current operating conditions (e.g. maximum time available to make a decision and complete the
reconfiguration process).
In a low-autonomy/authority design, pilots would have to process a substantial amount of rela-
tionally complex information in real-time which, as discussed earlier in this section, is realistically
impossible in the majority of the circumstances. However, in a full-autonomy design, no feedback
information is generated for the pilot, the system proceeds autonomously, hence the pilot doesn’t
have the possibility of perceiving the elements in the environment. As a result, the process of
constructing SA is affected at its roots in both the extreme cases of very low and full autonomy
and authority.
3.2.2.2 Level 2 SA
Level 2 SA implies the processing of perceived information and the generation of a mental repres-
entation of objects, events and concepts that are part of the reconfiguration scenario. Knowledge
representation is a complicated and debated area of cognitive psychology; at present no definition
has been fully accepted and most of those proposed are very technical and able to capture only
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some aspects of the general concept. In this thesis we refer to two complementary definitions. The
first provided by Smith and Kosslyn [2007]:
Definition 3.2.1 A [knowledge] representation is a physical state (such as marks on a page, mag-
netic fields in a computer, or neural connections in a brain) that stands for an object, event, or
concept. Representations also carry information about what they stand for. [...] But representation
involves more that this.
Mental representation is a complicated process that still requires scientific exploration. How-
ever, it is widely accepted that the process must meet two criteria [Smith and Kosslyn 2007]:
• Intentionality criterion: A representation must be constructed intentionally to stand for an
object, event or concept. This can happen unconsciously, because the brain at an uncon-
scious level has features designed to store in memory information about experiences of the
world, to stand for those experiences.
• Information-carrying criterion: A representation must carry information about what it
stands for.
The second definition is provided by Besnard [2004]:
Definition 3.2.2 A mental model is a scarce, goal-driven image of the world that is built to un-
derstand the current and future states of a situation.
For the sake of clarity, in the remainder of the document ‘mental representation’, ‘mental
model’ and ‘schema’ are used interchangeably.
Once the brain intentionally establishes representations that carry information about some-
thing, all sorts of sophisticated cognitive abilities become possible. However, serious issues arise
in safety-critical contexts when these models are either wrong or poor. It is worth spending a few
more words on mental models, because they are of critical importance for the conclusions that will
be drawn later.
In their day-to-day job, pilots construct homomorphic mental models [Moray 1987] of the
system, simplified models made of all the mental representations related to the system constructed
up to the present time. In contrast, an isomorphic mental model is one that would require the
pilot to have a comprehensive and correct knowledge of the system, including all its possible
states. This is not possible given the complexity of modern aircraft. For more information on
mental models, Moray [1996] provides a detailed taxonomy.
A homomorphic model is a simplified state of the system which is easily broken when new
situations and states are encountered. This situation is described by Baxter et al. [2007] as cog-
nitive mismatch, which is a disparity between the operator’s mental model of the system and the
way the system is really working. A cognitive mismatch can be considered a precursor of loss of
SA. The higher the accuracy of mental models, the lower the risk of cognitive mismatches, even
when there is significant inconsistency between the problem-solving processes of the human and
the system [Lehner and Zirk 1987; Kaber et al. 2001].
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Because of the complexity of modern aircraft, no form of training can be realistically devised
to build an isomorphic model of the system in the pilots’ brains. However, pilots’ homomorphic
models of the system can be enriched by increasing their involvement in the reconfiguration pro-
cess, for example, by questioning them before applying a new configuration, by providing them
with decision support information like fault description, implications of the current reconfigura-
tion, reasons to switch off Application A instead of Application B etc.
Fully autonomous design (autonomy levels 9 and 10 on the Parasuraman scale) do not favour
the construction of rich and correct mental models. With such a design, pilots do not receive any
feedback from the system before and/or after an ADR. The result is that the state of the system
changes during operation, but the mental model of the pilot is not updated accordingly. This is a
perfect recipe for a cognitive mismatch.
With a low autonomy level (levels 1 and 2) the pilot is provided with a vast amount of inform-
ation concerning all the applicable configurations. However, the well documented limitations of
memory and processing capabilities will eventually lead to the construction of poor homomorphic
mental models (the issues with problem complexity and cognitive limitations have already been
discussed earlier in this section). The phenomenon of poor mental models construction is exacer-
bated in situations of time pressure and stress [Zakay and Wooler 1984; Benson III and Beach
1998; Weenig and Maarleveld 2002a; Klapproth 2008].
With a medium autonomy design (between levels 3 and 6), the pilot would be actively involved
in the ADR process and, at the same time, would not be overloaded with information. The effect-
iveness of such a design in relation to the construction of correct mental models of the situation is a
function of how reasonable the exchange of information is. The number of configuration options,
with annexed attributes, that can be effectively processed by the pilot in real-time is one of the
topics investigated in the experiments described in Chapter 6.
3.2.2.3 Level 3 SA
As previously mentioned, it is not possible for the pilot to successfully achieve this SA level
without having gone through the previous steps. For instance, it is not possible to forecast the
implications of a reconfiguration if the pilot does not have the chance to construct a mental repres-
entation of the current state of the avionics. Mental simulation is a critical cognitive function for
this process and representations are an input for it.
For the moment, it is concluded that both high and low autonomy levels seem unsuitable
for ADR in the light of the material presented in this section; since they do not facilitate the
construction and real-time update of correct mental representations of the system, they are likely
to jeopardise the achievement of level 3 SA.
3.2.2.4 Automation surprises
It is a well documented fact that in highly automated processes under human control, lack of SA
and cognitive mismatches can easily lead to automation surprises, failures of the human operator
to track, monitor, or anticipate the actions of automated systems, leading to unintended system
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behaviour [Sarter et al. 1997].
Mumaw et al. [2001] relate automation surprises to mode errors and loss of mode awareness,
defining mode awareness as “the knowledge and understanding of the current and future state
and behaviour of the system”. They also describe mode error as an error that “occurs when the
pilot performs an action appropriate for the assumed system state but not for the actual state”.
Mode errors lead to automation surprises when the pilot notices that the automation is engaged
in activities that were not commanded. Unfortunately this phenomenon is common in cockpit
automation and despite the amount of research performed in this field so far, the problem is still
open and represents a contentious issue [Mosier 2010].
To give an idea of the incidence of the phenomenon, Olson and Sarter [2000] conducted a study
of automation management strategies on 206 airline pilots flying for two major U.S. air carriers.
Their sample included 59 B-757, 84 A-320, and 63 MD-11 pilots. To the question: “Have you
experienced cases in which automation did too much or too little?”, 151 pilots out of 193 (78.2%)
responded they had been surprised by the automation. More specifically, the automation did more
than expected for 39 of them, less than expected for 55 of them, both less and more for 57 of them.
Extensive research, both in the fields of aviation and medicine, reveals that the combination
of strong autonomy and poor feedback from an automated system is a precursor of automation
surprises [Van Charante et al. 1992; Woods 1996; Sarter et al. 1997; Billings 1997; Woods et al.
2002]. There seem to be no reasons why a high autonomy ADR design should be an exception.
In fact, reconfigurable avionics are designed to continuously adapt to changing operating con-
ditions. In full autonomy and authority systems, the mental representations could be correct in the
early stages of the operation but over time, after one or more reconfigurations, if the pilot is not
made aware of the characteristics and implications of each configuration in a correct and timely
manner, the mental representations eventually become obsolete and any following action could
hide a risk. In this regard, Baxter and Ritter [1999] report that during interactions with dynamic
systems, as time passes and the system is subject to degradation (e.g. due to a fault), the hu-
man mental representations get simplified and become more based on correlation between system
elements.
In conclusion, autonomy levels that do not foster the continuous update of pilots’ mental rep-
resentations (1, 2, 7–10 on the Parasuraman scale) should not be considered for ADR, as they
would most probably lead to automation surprises during operation.
3.2.2.5 Conclusions
Mark and Kobsa [2005] define a system as ‘transparent’ when the underlying reason and informa-
tion behind the behaviours of the automation are understood by the human. A reasonable degree of
transparency is vital for the efficiency of the interaction and to avoid automation surprises during
reconfiguration.
All the material in this section leads to the conclusion that both high and low autonomy levels
do not provide a reasonable degree of transparency, hence they are not suitable for ADR; given
the specific characteristics of the ADR problem, both high and low autonomy levels are likely to
jeopardise the pilot’s ability to achieve SA at each level of Endsley’s model.
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This section provides further support to the claim made in Section 3.2.1 concerning the auto-
mation of the ADR process, that there are serious concerns about the ability of pilots to perform
ADR decisions safely, without any kind of decision support, especially in harsh operating condi-
tions.
3.2.3 A note about minor and major reconfigurations
The Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor aircraft [Lockheed Martin 2010], one of the most advanced
military aircraft on the market, mounts a state-of-the-art Integrated Modular Avionics with recon-
figuration capabilities, called ‘Block 3.0 avionics’ [Caires 2001; Caires and Stout 2002].
The designers of Block 3.0 have distinguished between minor and major reconfiguration
[Spitzer 2000]:
• Minor reconfiguration: occurs due to the loss of one or more modules. A module is
reprogrammed to perform functions previously executed by other modules. When all the
spare computing modules are used, the lowest-priority function is dropped on behalf of
higher-priority functions.
• Major reconfiguration: occurs due to the loss of an entire rack of computing modules. It
can be caused by battle damage, loss of an engine and/or power generator, or overheating
due to loss of cooling. It allows reprogramming and reconfiguring an entire rack in order
to guarantee basic functionality like communication systems, basic navigation systems and
landing instruments.
Military pilots have extreme conditions of time pressure, stress and mental demand. Even
though this thesis is not focused on military aircraft, the highly disadvantageous operating condi-
tions of combat pilots can be exploited to draw out further conclusions that can be applied to the
dynamic reconfiguration of SCMS in general.
Major reconfigurations fall exactly into the type of reconfiguration discussed so far. The im-
portance of human involvement for the improvement of system dependability during such an in-
vasive process has been already elaborated. One could argue that human involvement could be
avoided during a minor reconfiguration. This seems to be true only in part. In fact, the priority of
a sub-system is defined by system engineers off-line but the knowledge they rely on is permeated
by epistemic uncertainty: only pilots know what is really high priority in relation to the current
operating conditions and their plans. During a minor reconfiguration, the system could shut down
a low-priority function which is actually high-priority for the pilot in that specific circumstance.
Human intentions are unpredictable. This argument brings the discussion back to the topic of in-
tegrity and safety (Chapter 2). In complex, manned systems like modern aircraft, integrity alone
is not enough to achieve safety.
Human involvement could be unnecessary when the functionality of the aircraft does not
change, i.e. when there are enough spare computing modules and no low-priority functionality
is dropped as a result of an ADR. However, if any ‘low-priority’ function is dropped, even during
a minor reconfiguration, then human involvement seems to be critical, in order to avoid cognitive
mismatches and automation surprises.
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3.3 Hypothesis Statement
It is now possible to identify the central hypothesis of this research:
During the process of avionics dynamic reconfiguration, decision support informa-
tion that parallels cognitive strategies by including explanations, implications and an
assessment of the uncertainty associated with the reconfiguration advice provided by
the system should have a positive effect on pilot situation awareness, workload, de-
cision accuracy and performance, thus it should improve the overall decision making
effectiveness of the pilot and, as a result, the safety of the process.
The hypothesis defines the components of the decision support information design proposed
(i.e. explanations, implications and uncertainty assessment) and the aspects of pilot behaviour that
should benefit from it (i.e. situation awareness, workload, decision accuracy and performance).
Chapter 4 provides the links between all these elements, after discussing them in detail.
In the remainder of this thesis a number of claims are raised about the behaviour of pilots
during avionics reconfiguration decisions and about how effective decision support information
should be designed. The claims are used to develop an architecture for the automated generation
of decision support information for ADR decisions, in accordance with the hypothesis. A set of
subjective and objective metrics for the assessment of the effectiveness of the decision support
will be identified and if the hypothesis is correct, a measurable improvement will be detected
throughout the series of experiments described in Chapter 6.
3.4 Chapter Summary
The superimposition of the basic four-stage human information processing scheme on the scale
proposed by Parasuraman et al. [2000] partitions the autonomy levels into four sets, as shown in
Figure 3.2.
The pro¯ and contra¯ of the degrees, grouped by low, medium and high autonomy, have been
evaluated in the light of two main arguments, problem complexity and situation awareness. The
material presented in this chapter brings a compelling amount of evidence against the applicability
of both high and low autonomy designs to the ADR process.
“Strong and silent” automation would apparently (this is discussed again, later in the thesis) re-
duce pilot problem complexity. However, the costs in terms of safety exceed the benefits. Medium
autonomy (levels 3 to 6) seems to better fit the ADR process. As a consequence, it is reasonable
to ‘break’ full autonomy at decision making level (Figure 3.2).
The material presented so far leads to the following conclusions:
• the complexity of the IMA dynamic reconfiguration problem makes automation unavoid-
able;
• however, a high autonomy/authority design constitutes a risk for the process of dynamic
reconfiguration of IMA.
72 CHAPTER 3. RECONFIGURATION AND AUTOMATION
1    The computer offers no assistance. The human must make all the 
      decisions and actions.
2     The computer offers a complete set of decision alternatives. 
6     The computer allows the human a restricted time before automatic
       execution. 
5     The computer executes the suggestion if the human approves. 
4     The computer suggests an alternative. 
3     The computer narrows the selection down to a few. 
10  The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring
      the human. 
9    The computer informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to. 
8    The computer informs the human only if asked. 
7    The computer executes automatically, then necessarily informs the










Figure 3.2: Autonomy levels defined by Parasuraman et al. [2000] divided by information processing stages.
• given the safety-critical context, and in line with the EUROCAE ED-79 standard for IMA
(see Section 2.1.3), pilots should be provided with appropriate decision support.
• humans should be involved at decision making and action implementation levels (in Paras-
uraman’s model). This means that the final decision, before performing a reconfiguration,
is up to the human (some exceptions to this conclusions are discussed further, e.g., a very
stringent decision time budget).
Having acknowledged the necessity of making the human an active part of SCMS dynamic re-
configuration, ways to effectively involve him or her in such a complicated, safety-critical process




Human decision making activity in real, complex contexts is influenced by a huge number of
factors, including emotions, stress, time pressure and the framing of the information provided to
the decision maker, to mention but a few. The list could be extended ad infinitum.
In order to provide a grounding for the design of an effective decision support system, the first
part of the chapter (Section 4.1) takes a pragmatic approach and discusses a number of factors
which are likely to have a significant impact on the type of decisions investigated in this research.
Assuming that taking into consideration all possible factors that could influence ADR decisions is
an option of dubious practicality, the analysis undertaken is set to understand the main character-
istics of ADR decisions, advance claims about how to improve safety which can be empirically
tested and draw conclusions that can also be generalised to dynamically reconfigurable SCMS.
For each factor of influence, one or more claims are made, which are used to drive the exper-
iments. When the literature relevant to a claim is in agreement, the claim is intended to motivate
empirical confirmation of known ideas in the particular context of ADR decisions. When the
literature contains contrasting positions, the claims are more speculative and aim at motivating
empirical tests that target the ADR problem specifically, to assess which, if any, of the positions
apply. The factors are not presented in any particular order.
It must be noted that, throughout the process of empirical verification presented below, the set
of brain mechanisms employed by the pilots are considered to be “black box”; however, the effects
on the overall pilot decisional behaviour are measured and discussed. In other words, this thesis
does not question the results from the cognitive psychology studies referenced; instead, it uses
them to make predictions that are empirically verified.
The second part of the chapter (Section 4.2) builds on the discussion of the factors presented in
the first part; a new set of claims about how to mitigate the impact of each factor on pilot decisions
by means of tailored decision support information is put forward. The new material is used to
define the content and structure of effective decision support information for ADR.
Finally, all the claims made in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are re-considered against the research
hypothesis originally presented in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3). This step enables a precise agenda
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for the empirical investigation of the hypothesis to be defined; each claim made throughout this
chapter is associated with one of the seven experiments that will be presented in Chapter 6. An
estimate of the work done so far and of the remaining work is also provided.
4.1 Decision Biases
4.1.1 Risk and uncertainty
Slovic [1999] argues that perception of risk is a complicated matter because there is no clear and
universally accepted definition of it. Risk is a social construct invented to cope with the dangers
and uncertainties of life. A review of the literature shows a huge number of definitions; however,
two of them are particularly appropriate to this study:
1. Slovic [1987] associates the lay concept of risk with “hazards that fill one with dread and/or
are poorly understood”.
2. Fischhoff and Lichtenstein [1984] define risk as “a multidimensional construct with dimen-
sions labelled as dread, lack of familiarity, and lack of controllability”.
Slovic’s definition brings the roots of risk back to a poor understanding of the functioning of
a system, hence it links to the discussion about the issues with a pilot’s homomorphic representa-
tions of the system (Section 3.2.2). If pilots realise their understanding of a process is poor, their
perception of risk grows.
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein identify lack of controllability as a dimension of risk. An interpret-
ation relevant to the ADR problem is that pilot perception of risk would grow when and if they
realise they are not in control of the process to the degree they feel they should be. Interestingly,
it has been demonstrated that perceived uncontrollability of adverse events is among the greatest
nonspecific human stressors, leading to a host of undesirable effects, including depression and
anxiety [Johnson and Sarason 1977] and even illness [Stern et al. 1982]. Studies from heterogen-
eous fields, including military tactics, medical, aviation, nuclear and manufacturing [Cook et al.
2007] reveal that the perception of risk influences the way humans make decisions.
In a study about strategies for risky decisions, Russo and Dosher [1983] found evidence of
the emergence of the ‘elimination by aspects’: the attributes of each choice are evaluated and the
choices whose attributes don’t match the decision maker’s criteria are eliminated.
Mellers et al. [1998] report that there is widespread agreement that risk and uncertainty lead the
decision maker to adopt a strategy of ranking the available options. They also maintain that specific
issues about the utility function and the weighting function, including shape, form (cumulative vs
noncumulative) and factors that influence it are still debatable.
Elimination by aspect and ranking are just two of several strategies that emerge when the
decision maker faces risks. There is no gain in expanding the list and investigating which specific
strategy is more likely to be adopted by pilots during ADR decisions, because it is probable that
each of them will behave slightly differently. In the context of this study, what is really interesting
to understand, regardless of the specific strategy of choice, is if the uncertainties that pilots face
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during ADR can possibly lead to a significant perception of risk that is observable as a clear bias
to their decisions.
It could be argued that, by gathering evidence of this effect, the research mentioned so far
make this conclusion obvious. However, other studies note that such behaviours are less likely to
occur with highly experienced decision makers such as aircraft pilots [Christensen-Szalanski and
Beach 1984; Fraser et al. 1992; Gigerenzer 1987; Shanteau 1992; Smith and Kida 1991].
Additionally, some research collects evidence of how analytical decision models (for example,
elimination by aspect) used in some studies fail to provide coherent answers in specific situations,
characterised by time pressure, uncertainty, complexity and high stakes (see Salas and Cannon-
Bowers [2003]; Cannon-Bowers and Salas [1998]; Salas et al. [1995] for a review). As a result,
experimental investigation is required to assess the influence of the perception of risk on ADR
decisions.
In the gambling domain, a well documented phenomenon related to risky decisions which
is called the reflection effect seems to be more or less evident in the vast majority of people
[Kahneman and Tversky 1979]: decisions are typically risk averse in the gain domain, but they are
frequently risk seeking in the loss domain. In gambling, the risk is due to potential losses; during
SCMS reconfiguration, the risk is given by the safety-critical context. It is interesting to investigate
whether the reflection effect also applies to the ADR problem or not. For instance, consider the
following two typical ADR scenarios:
1. No risk scenario: the aircraft is in ‘enroute cruise’. Previously, a fault to a power generator
led to a reconfiguration. A sub-optimal configuration was applied. Whilst flying, the ADR
system continues to work in the background and finally generates a new and optimised
configuration; it then asks the pilot whether he/she wants to apply it or not.
2. Risky scenario: the aircraft is in the ‘descent’ phase (higher risks than in ‘enroute cruise’).
A sudden fault to a power generator, three minutes before landing, results in no redundant
buses or critical functions, i.e. any critical function represents a single-point-of-failure for
the whole avionics and risks jeopardising the landing manoeuvre and the safety of the crew.
The ADR system provides one or more reconfiguration alternatives to choose from, which
entails deactivating one or more critical functions.
If the reflection effect applies to ADR decisions, then it is expected that the pilot would not
accept the ADR suggestion in the former scenario (if it works, why change it?), but they would
do so in the latter scenario. On the other hand, given the safety-critical context, changing the state
of the system in an unstable situation (e.g. before landing) could become a catalyst for potential
catastrophic consequences and pilots would probably avoid this as much as possible. This issue
is a determining factor for the definition of the autonomy of the ADR process. We now formulate
the following claim:
Claim 1 If prompted by the system, pilots would choose to reconfigure the avionics in situations
which are not particularly risky (e.g. whilst cruising). They would refrain from doing so in situ-
ations of pressing risks (e.g. before landing, when the system is more unstable and a change to the
current state could provide a catalyst for catastrophic consequences).
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This claim basically contrasts the applicability of the reflection effect to safety-critical scen-
arios.
As the perception of risk is by definition due to uncertainties and poor understanding of the
functioning of the system, the decision support information should be shaped to reduce pilot un-
certainties and improve pilot trust. In this regard, it is interesting to consider Lipshitz and Strauss
[1997], who found that decision makers distinguish between three types of uncertainty, in the de-
cision support information they obtain: (a) inadequate understanding, (b) incomplete information
and (c) undifferentiated alternatives. Inadequate understanding is primarily managed by strategies
aimed at reducing the complexity (such as searching for more information and delaying the de-
cision, if applicable); incomplete information is managed by assumption-based reasoning; conflict
amongst alternatives is managed mainly by weighing the pros and cons (i.e. choosing between
alternatives in terms of potential gains and losses).
Hence, if Claim 1 is verified, it seems reasonable to argue that an effective DSS for ADR
should:
• provide a reasonable (in cognitive terms) amount of information to be processed in real-time
but, on request, it should allow further details to be obtained in order to reduce complexity
and uncertainty (e.g. the DSS would allow the system to be queried for more information
concerning each configuration);
• generate uniform and complete information for every configuration;
• generate information such that the differences amongst any configurations are explicit to the
‘eyes’ of the pilot.
4.1.2 Time pressure
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, avionics reconfigurations can be either planned (for example, is-
sued to perform a mode change or, in the case of a military aircraft, a mission change) or un-
planned (for example, issued to mitigate the effect of a fault). Planned reconfigurations are usually
performed when operating conditions allow the pilots to concentrate on the operation, when there
is enough time and cognitive resources available. Unplanned reconfiguration, however, is usually
a response to an emergency situation. It typically happens in the worst operating conditions, when
pilots are challenged by critical tasks that require attention. In brief, unplanned ADR are a ‘bomb’
in terms of cognitive demand.
Under conditions of no time pressure, humans accumulate sensory evidence for one decision
option over another, until a fixed threshold is reached [Ratcliff and Rouder 1998; Bogacz et al.
2006]. This rarely applies to time pressure scenarios because the time available to make a decision
is not enough to reach the fixed threshold.
Several researchers have studied the effects of time pressure on complex decisions, agreeing
that this condition can lead to perceptual narrowing and thus, to a reduced utilization of avail-
able cues, decreased vigilance and reduction in working memory capacity [Janis and Mann 1977;
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Stokes et al. 1987; Orasanu and Fischer 1997; Orasanu 1997; Zsambok and Klein 1997; Klein
1997a; Klapproth 2008]. Less clear is the effect on experienced decision makers, like pilots.
It makes sense for this study to investigate whether time pressure influences the decision mak-
ing behaviour of pilots during ADR decisions and, if this were the case, it would be interesting to
understand how. The following sections address this topic in more detail.
4.1.2.1 Time pressure related strategies
Under extreme time pressure conditions, fast-and-frugal-strategies can eventually emerge. De-
cisions are made without any stimulus processing [Yellott 1971]; they are much faster than usual
decisions, but they have only a reduced probability of being correct. Gigerenzer and Todd [1999]
show that these strategies sometimes work better and faster than more complicated algorithms. For
instance, the research demonstrates how humans make accurate judgements relying on a single
piece of information, if they know that piece of information is correct.
We argue that this is not the case for ADR decisions. In fact fast-and-frugal-strategies rely on
stimulus-response habit and/or on skill learning mechanisms. Stimulus-response habits emerge
through the slow accumulation of knowledge about the predictive relation between a stimulus
and a response [Smith and Kosslyn 2007]. For ADR decisions, the stimulus is the occurrence
of an unexpected event, along with a request to apply the configuration suggested by the system,
possibly including alarms and warning messages. The characteristics of each configuration depend
on the current operating conditions; as previously mentioned, there are a huge number of events
that could trigger a reconfiguration at any time and, for each event, the system would generate one
or more bespoke applicable configurations. Given the numbers in question, it is impossible for the
pilot to establish stimulus-response habits over time.
Similar conclusions can be extended to the more general topic of skill learning, which con-
sists of three consecutive stages [Fitts and Posner 1967]. During the cognitive stage the knowledge
is declaratively represented in memory; attention demands are high at this point in the process.
With practice, the human moves towards the associative stage in which the behaviour begins to
become tuned and error rates decrease. Eventually, the decision maker could reach the autonom-
ous stage; the behaviour is highly accurate, the execution is rapid and automatic, requiring little
attention. Fast-and-frugal-strategies require reaching the autonomous stage of the skill learning
process which, for the same reasons given for the stimulus-response habit, cannot be achieved in
the context of ADR decisions.
Fast-and-frugal-strategies are extreme methods to save both decision time and cognitive re-
sources. Whilst they are not characteristic of ADR decisions for the reasons given above, other
‘less extreme’ decision behaviours could be more relevant for the decisional context examined in
this thesis.
A good portion of the literature supports that people cope with time pressure using three main
strategies, depending on the specific decision scenario, a) acceleration, b) selection of information,
and c) alteration of the information search pattern [Ben Zur and Breznitz 1981; Edland and Sven-
son 1993a; Johnson and Payne 1995]. The order of enumeration of the three strategies reflects
their hierarchy of application: acceleration is the first strategy used under time pressure; when it is
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not sufficient to meet the task demands, the decision maker switches to selection, and eventually
to alteration of the search pattern.
Acceleration means that the decision maker works faster as a result of time pressure; for
example, less time is spent on each decision option. Selection entails focusing only on a specific
portion of the available information; as a result of time pressure, people seem to concentrate only
on the most important ‘chunks’ of information. Alteration of the search pattern represents
a change in the way the available information is explored by the decision maker. This usually
involves a switch from an alternative-based to an attribute-based search strategy, which is less
cognitively demanding.
Payne and Braunstein [1978] focus on decision problems characterised by the increasing num-
ber of alternatives, which is a dimension of complexity. This type of scenario is applicable to the
ADR problem. If the autonomy level for the ADR process is set at 3 on the Parasuraman scale (Sec-
tion 3.2.1), then the pilot could be prompted with a varying number of configuration from which
the choice should be made. The participants to Payne and Braunstein’s study were found to switch
from an alternative-wise information search pattern to the less cognitive demanding attribute-wise
search pattern with an increase in the number of alternatives. Similar findings are reported by
Lohse and Johnson [1996], Cook and Swain [1993], and Weenig and Maarleveld [2002b].
An empirical study by Weenig and Maarleveld [2002a] reveals partially contrasting results: the
screening is reduced to fewer attributes and alternatives in relationally complex decisions under
time pressure, but no sign of acceleration is found.
Beach [1993] offers yet another slightly different option: in the author’s view, people seem to
cope with complex choice tasks under time pressure by screening the information about alternat-
ives for violations of the minimal level of acceptance in one or more attributes (‘cut-off points’).
A decision option is rejected if the number of violations on various attributes exceeds an indi-
vidual rejection threshold. The complexity of a decision is reduced through limiting the number
of options to choose from.
Empirical results of a study by Benson III and Beach [1998] support another variation on
the classical three-strategies theory. They focus on the differences in reactions to time pressure,
but distinguish between complex and relatively simple choices. In contrast to findings on simple
choice tasks, they found no sign of change in information selection or a switch in search strategy.
However, both Ben Zur and Breznitz [1981] and Benson III and Beach [1998] acknowledge the
possibility that it might be that the time constraint which Ben Zur et al. imposed on their parti-
cipants was not high enough to evoke one of the other two reactions to time constraint.
In the light of the material presented so far, the following three sections advance claims con-
cerning three aspects of pilot behaviour during ADR decisions: decision strategy, decision ac-
curacy and decision time. The claims advanced are then used to define the characteristics of the
decision support system proposed later in the thesis.
4.1.2.2 Effects on decision strategy
The literature reviewed above shows that the three-stage model of decision making under time
pressure provides a good approximation of what can be expected of a human facing this type of
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task. However, there is also disagreement on the hierarchy of the stages of the model and its
applicability to different decision contexts. As a result, it is not possible to make predictions on
how pilots would react under time pressure during a typical ADR, without experimental tests. The
following claim is advanced to motivate empirical investigation:
Claim 2 Pilots would react to time pressure by means of: a) acceleration, b) selection of inform-
ation, and c) alteration of information search pattern.
There is more to be said concerning the alteration of search patterns; the fact that humans tend
to concentrate on the most important attributes when they increase the selectivity of their inform-
ation search [Edland and Svenson 1993b] suggests a linear relationship between the importance
of a ‘chunk’ of information and the degree of attention to it, i.e. attention to the least important
attribute suffers first and most from time pressure and attention to the most important attributes
last and least.
However, Weenig and Maarleveld [2002a] argue that in a complex and strongly demanding
task such as ADR this relationship may be curvilinear rather than linear, with the strongest impact
of time constraint on the attributes of moderate importance. They infer that during complex tasks, it
is probable that many people ignore some information anyway, regardless of time pressure and this
will most likely concern the least important attributes. On the other hand, even under severe time
pressure, decision makers are not likely to ignore information about the most important attributes;
this is especially true in safety-critical decisions. In complex decision tasks, time pressure may
therefore have relatively little impact on attention to the most important and the least important
attributes, but would have the strongest negative impact on attributes of moderate importance.
These arguments are now brought back to the ADR problem. For reasons that will be clarified
below, we maintain that in the information generated by the proposed DSS, the implications of ap-
plying a configuration (what if...) would have highest importance; therefore, they would attract the
attention of the pilot under any circumstances. Instead, the reasons why the system reaches certain
conclusions (e.g. why does it suggests Configuration-A?) would attract the pilot’s attention
when there is no time pressure (pilots would use this information to construct situation awareness)
but would be discarded when a decision has to be made in, for example, fifteen seconds. In our
hypothesis, this type of information is of medium importance.
These arguments enrich the expectations raised by Claim 2, allowing speculation on how the
information search pattern would be altered under severe time pressure. This discussion contin-
ues in Section 4.2, when further arguments are introduced and the formulation of another, more
specific claim is made.
4.1.2.3 Effects on decision accuracy
Regardless of the strategies adopted by pilots to cope with time pressure, it is important to under-
stand whether time pressure affects decision accuracy during ADR or not. Zakay and Wooler
[1984] and Zakay [1993] collect evidence that shows how time pressure might keep decision
makers from choosing the best option, since they divide their attention between estimating the
elapsed time and selecting an alternative. The following claim needs to be empirically verified:
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Claim 3 Time pressure would decrease pilot decision accuracy.
This claim is somewhat controversial; although there is evidence that faster processing of
information sometimes correspond to less careful consideration of alternatives [Benson III and
Beach 1998], it has also been demonstrated that the application of simplified and even more ef-
fective strategies could improve decision accuracy [Staw et al. 1981].
4.1.2.4 Effects on decision time
Hogarth [1975] proposes that due to the limits of information processing capacity, the optimal
decision time is a concave function of task complexity; for both simple and extremely complex
tasks, decision time is relatively small.
Later studies on variation of decision strategies under time pressure that have been mentioned
so far are in agreement with Hogarth’s hypothesis. For instance, the decrease in decision time dur-
ing extremely complex tasks can be brought back to a variation in information selection strategy:
the number of options evaluated is drastically reduced to a few or even a single one (fast-and-
frugal-strategies) under severe time pressure. From the series of experiments performed in this
research, it is expected that information about the limit of configuration options that pilots can
process in real-time before the problem becomes intractable will be collected. This limit is expec-
ted to slide under time pressure.
During avionics reconfiguration, time pressure is provoked by showing a timer which reminds
the pilot of the approaching deadline for the completion of the reconfiguration. In this regard,
Trujillo et al. [2008] report that predictive information (e.g., a timer that informs about the im-
minent occurrence of an event with severe consequences) improves human decision performance
during real-time safety-critical processes. However, in that study, no severe time pressure condi-
tions were simulated and, in those circumstances, the difference between having and not having
predictive information was approximately 30 seconds; in this research it is more interesting to
collect information about the behaviour of pilots in extreme situations in which, for example, 30
seconds is the total amount of time available for a decision. The rationale is that this is a realistic
circumstance for ADR decisions.
This thesis aims at extending the results from past research by Hogarth, Trujillo et al. starting
with their results and looking at what happens during ADR decisions when a predictive timer is
shown, but the time available is very limited. To the best of our knowledge, this case has not yet
been investigated in the literature.
The following claim is therefore formulated and requires verification:
Claim 4 Time pressure would reduce the number of configuration options considered and the way
their information is explored.
4.1.3 Stress and Frustration
Niedenthal and Kitayama [1994] describe emotion as “a set of adaptive functions of acting or
responding to stimuli that are prewired or ‘prepared’ by biological evolution and yet at the same
time, shaped, elaborated, and finely configured by social and cultural learning”.
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Emotions in general have been found to determine people’s cognitive strategies [Mosier and
Fischer 2009]. For instance, a number of studies concerning the effect of fear and anxiety reveal
that both feelings are associated with risk-averse choices and with the perception that a situation
is not under one’s control [Isen et al. 1988; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lerner and Tiedens 2006].
Interestingly, Loewenstein and Lerner [2003] argue that fear and anxiety lead to more systematic
and comprehensive information processing.
Section 4.1.1 mentions a number of studies that support the hypothesis that decision biases are
less likely to appear in expert decision makers. In principle, this should apply also to emotional
states. However, Estrada et al. [1997] warn that this position overlooks the important distinction
between incidental (or task-irrelevant) affect and task-integral affect.
Integral affect concerns emotional responses that are elicited by the decision situation itself
or its potential consequences. Usually the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the task, or the effort
required, are considered for empirical analysis.
Incidental affect instead is not related to the decision in course, it is brought into context by
the decision maker. Estrada et al. maintain that experts are susceptible to incidental affect and,
furthermore, they may not always succeed in recognizing it. However, this type of affect is not
relevant to this study, therefore, it is not taken into consideration here.
Contrary to the position of Estrada et al., Reber [1989] elicits conclusions from empirical tests
on fire–fighters and pilots (expert decision makers in their respective contexts) arguing that being
cognisant of an immediate threat to life (which is an integral affect) may result in the optimal
arousal of the core affective circuit. Reber argue that such a psychological state may have im-
proved the ability of decision maker to solve the problem using knowledge acquired during past
experience.
Controversial positions concerning the actual impact of integral affect on expert decision
makers are also documented in neuroanatomical studies. LeDoux [1998; 2002] argues that emo-
tion and cognition operate in two distinct regions of the brain, the lower and upper cortical centres
respectively. However, more recent studies reveal that emotions are a form of cognition and since
the brain makes no distinction between them, they should be seen as complementary processes
[Duncan and Barrett 2007; Storbeck and Clore 2007].
The subject is particularly interesting for the ADR problem, especially given the contrasting
positions in the literature. However, only a single, small, aspect of such a complex topic can (start
to) be addressed. The focus here is on frustration, resulting from situations of heightened stress.
4.1.3.1 Stress and frustration during ADR
The literature contains several definitions of stress. As a matter of choice, in this research the one
proposed by Salas et al. [1996] is adopted. They define stress as “a process by which certain work
demands evoke an appraisal process in which perceived demands exceed resources and result in
undesirable physiological, emotional, cognitive and social changes”. This definition seems to be
particularly suitable to this work because ‘demand exceeding resource’ is a key factor during ADR
decisions.
Closely related to stress is frustration, the emotion that accompanies an experience of being
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thwarted in attaining certain goals [Salmon et al. 2006]. Situations of stress can possibly lead to
the emergence of frustration. We speculate that frustration is likely to emerge in extreme ADR
scenarios (e.g. after a safety-critical fault, with a very limited time budget to complete the process
before the occurrence of more severe consequences).
Despite research so far, the general feeling in the academic community is that the relationship
between frustration, stress and decision behaviour has not yet been adequately explored [Gillis
1993; Hammond 2000b; Kowalski-Trakofler et al. 2003]. Some empirical studies have proved that
negative effects like frustration can produce a narrowing of attention and a failure to search for new
alternatives [Fiedler 2001]. Luce et al. [1999] found that people in negative moods make more
attribute-based comparisons than alternative-based comparisons (the former are less demanding
in cognitive terms). In addition, Luce et al. highlight that decision makers in negative moods
make faster and less discriminate use of information that can increase accuracy in easier tasks and
decrease it in harder tasks.
As a result of an investigation into the influence of arousal states on human decision making
behaviour, Mano [1992; 1999] obtains results similar to those of Luce et al. and in line with
the ‘prospects theory’ in general. Mano asserts that decision makers in positive moods deliberate
longer, use more information, and examine the same information more times than others, whereas
those who are aroused and in unpleasant moods employ simpler decision strategies and form more
polarised judgements.
4.1.3.2 Controversy
Whilst the studies mentioned so far document the negative effects of stress and frustration, other
work focusing specifically on stress (which is a potential precursor of frustration) shows that its
effects on decision performance are not negative in all cases. It is generally accepted that both
improved and degraded performance can be associated with increased stress [Poulton 1976; Gillis
1993; Kowalski-Trakofler et al. 2003]. This relationship is described by an ‘inverted-U arousal-
performance’ model [Evans 1984]: for some individuals, heightened stress elevates decision per-
formance; other individuals are vulnerable to the negative impacts of stress, which results in di-
minished performance (Figure 4.1).
Gillis [1993] clarifies that stressful circumstances do not necessarily lead to decreased de-
cision making performance in all cases, because the ability to cope with stress is dependent on the
human’s perception and/or the interpretation of an event. In other words, the emergence of frus-
tration depends on both the specific characteristics of the stressful situation and the pilot’s mental
representation of it.
Flanagan [1954] and Kowalski-Trakofler et al. [2003] focus on situations in which time pres-
sure is combined with risk. Their studies show that the decision maker becomes more cautious
and adopts risk-avoiding behaviour, paying attention to avoid losses. In these situations, strategies
like loss avoidance, elimination by aspect and fast-and-frugal search are used. In other words, the
human focuses only on what is believed to be the most relevant portion of the information. Whilst
this can lead to gross errors, in certain situations it helps by eliminating non-essential information.














Poor performance Poor performance
Inverted-U arousal hypothesis
Figure 4.1: Inverted-U arousal-performance model [Yerkes and Dodson 1908].
Kontogiannis and Kossiavelou [1999] present slightly more negative results and demonstrate
how stress restricts cue sampling, decreases vigilance, reduces the capacity of working memory,
causes premature closure in evaluating alternative options, and results in task shedding. Similar
results, relative to both stress and frustration, are found by other researchers [Zakay and Wooler
1984; Hutchins, Kelly and Morrison 1996; Gaillard 2008].
As well as the controversy about the effects of stress and frustration on human decision beha-
viour, Dekker and Hollnagel [2004] give an even stronger criticism of the overall applicability of
the Inverted-U arousal-performance model, pointing out that it lacks precision and falsifiability.
In summary, severely stressful ADR situations could provoke frustration, but not necessarily.
Whilst stress has an effect on decision behaviour which is not necessarily negative, frustration
seems to have a negative influence in all cases. In the context of this research it is worth investig-
ating the possibility that frustration effects pilots during ADR decisions characterised by severely
stressful conditions. If this were the case, it would be interesting to address the issue of mitigating
such a negative effect.
Mitigating the effects of frustration
Rahman [2007] proposes a set of prescriptive recommendations, “the laws of High Velocity Hu-
man Factors”, which focus on emotional modulation of cognition of mission critical personnel
in nonequilibrium conditions. The seven HVHF laws proposed by Rahman are briefly described
here:
1. Law of Relevance: only provide information relevant to the event that can be used to dia-
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gnose and resolve the situation.
2. Law of Acceptance: provide information in a format that can be processed by the human
agent given the diminished cognitive capacities due to emotional arousal.
3. Law of Transparence: technology should not become a barrier to information that can be
directly perceived in the immediate environment.
4. Law of Clairvoyance: technology, where possible, should assist the human agent to predict
the immediate future course of an event.
5. Law of Absoluteness: critical functions, such as emergency call placement, should have their
own dedicated control elements that are accessible and operable in an instant.
6. Law of Intelligence: technology should be smart enough to take over operations when the
agent is overloaded with other more important tasks.
7. Law of Reliance: technology should be fail-safe & fool-proof and should accommodate
human-interaction errors caused due to high stress.
The laws have a very wide scope, covering many aspects of cognitive system engineering,
most of which are beyond the interests of this PhD programme. This thesis focuses on only a few
aspects of the laws, which are elaborated further in Section 4.2, when enough material will be
presented to shape the decision support information for ADR in more details.
For the moment, the following claim is advanced:
Claim 5 Heightened states of stress during ADR decisions can possibly lead to frustration. The
negative effect of frustration would be mitigated by providing pilots with effective decision support
information.
We claim that effective decision support information should increase pilot perception of control
during ADR. The meaning of ‘effective decision support information’, as used here, is discussed
in detail in Section 4.2.
4.1.4 Framing effect and ambiguity aversion
The first step in the decision making process is perception. According to normative decision
theories, the way information is presented and perceived is irrelevant. This principle is known as
descriptive invariance.
In real situations descriptive invariance does not hold. Depending on the way the information
is presented to the human and consequently perceived, decision biases emerge and modify the
decision maker behaviour. This phenomenon is known as the framing effect [Payne et al. 1998].
The theory in support of the framing effect is robust insomuch as neurological evidence of its
emergence has been recently documented [Gonzalez et al. 2005; Weller et al. 2007].
Given the relevance of the framing effect, it makes sense to investigate whether pilots are
susceptible to the way ADR decision support information is presented and, if this were the case,
to what extent.
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The framing effect is not only related to the graphical representation of the information, which
is beyond the scope of this thesis, but also refers to the way decision options are semantically
described. In order to better describe the concept, we first introduce the concreteness principle.
Slovic [1972] asserts that “a decision maker tends to use only the information that is explicitly
displayed in the stimulus object, and will use it only in the form in which it is displayed”. When
this principle holds, preferences for identical options with different reference points can reverse
[Fischhoff et al. 1974].
For instance, in the context of ADR, the system could equally tell the pilot that a certain sensor
reading is reliable at 70% or that the sensor reading is uncertain at 30%. According to the framing
effect, the decisions of the pilot would be influenced by giving them sensor readings in terms of
reliability or uncertainty, but how exactly?
The ambiguity aversion (also know as uncertainty aversion) is a decision making attitude
which is closely related to the framing effect. According to the theory, when a human has to choose
between two options characterised by different degrees of uncertainty, the contrast makes the more
uncertain option less attractive (or the less uncertain option more attractive) [Heath and Tversky
1991].
Fox and Tversky [1995] cite an exception to the ambiguity aversion principle: ambiguity aver-
sion applies only when options are compared; if options are evaluated singly, humans value them
impartially. In fact, when evaluating an uncertain event in isolation, humans try to assess its like-
lihood without paying too much attention to second-order characteristics such as vagueness or
weight of evidence. This principle is referred to as the principle of comparative ignorance. Tver-
sky et al. [1988] notes that the comparative ignorance effect violates the principle of procedure
invariance, which posits that strategically equivalent elicitation procedures should produce the
same preference order.
In typical ADR decisions pilots always have at least two options to compare and choose from,
at least one new configuration proposed by the system and the current one. The pilot can choose
to decline the execution of ADR and leave the state of the system unchanged. As a result, the
exception of comparative ignorance principle will not to be considered in this context.
In the gambling domain, Schie and Pligt [1995] add that the emphasis on positive features
promotes greater risk-seeking decisions in both the gain and loss domains and emphasis on neg-
ative features promotes greater risk aversion in both domains. If this also applies to the context
of ADR decisions, reliability (a positive feature) would make pilots more comfortable accepting
reconfiguration advice than uncertainty (a negative feature).
We argue that the effect of ambiguity aversion should be particularly evident in ADR decisions
because they are safety-critical and risky. Risky decisions are known to be subject to the effect of
loss aversion, which manifests itself as a tendency to favour the status quo over change [Tversky
and Kahneman 1984; 1991]. Loss aversion is a well-documented decision bias, supported by
recent investigation at the neurological level [Tom et al. 2007].
Levin et al. [1998] distinguish three forms of framing effect:
• Attribute framing effect. This occurs when evaluations of an object or event are more fa-
vourable if a key attribute is framed in positive rather than negative terms.
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• Goal framing effect. This occurs when a persuasive message has different appeal depending
on whether it stresses the positive consequences of performing an act to achieve a particular
goal or the negative consequences of not performing the act.
• Risky choice framing effect. This occurs when willingness to take a risk depends on whether
the potential outcomes are positively framed (for example in terms of success rate) or neg-
atively framed (for example in terms of failure rate).
The messages generated by the DSS being proposed in this research are not designed to per-
suade the pilot towards a specific decision alternative but to allow an informed, impartial choice.
As a consequence, the goal framing effect is not addressed here; however, both attribute and the
risky choice framing effect require attention.
Each reconfiguration alternative generated by the system is associated with a degree of ‘reli-
ability vs uncertainty’ which is calculated at run-time on the basis of the quality of the information
coming from the on-board sensors. The uncertainty value is an attribute of each decision altern-
ative (attribute framing effect) and it also contains information about the potential risks hidden
behind each option (risky choice framing effect). If the framing effect holds for ADR decisions, it
can be expected that the pilot is more comfortable accepting a configuration when it is based on
sensor readings that are, for example, ‘70% reliable’ than ‘30% uncertain’. In other words, they
would be put off by presenting the information associated with the uncertainty embedded in the
inference process that generated them. We speculate that the by-product effects could be any of the
following, a reduction of the trust in the system, emergence of indecision, frustration, increased
decision time and potential selection of wrong options.
Claim 6 The pilots’ decision behaviour during ADR would be subject to the framing effect; more
specifically, presenting ADR information in terms of its reliability instead of its uncertainty would
make pilots more comfortable accepting to apply the proposed configuration.
4.1.5 Complacency
The limitations relative to storage and retrieval of information from long-term and working memory
have been discussed on several occasions so far. The argument is re-considered here, in order to
make new claims concerning ADR decisions.
It has been proven that, as humans often cannot remember details about the past, they are
inclined to accept misinformation as accurate when it is provided by an agent they consider more
knowledgeable and/or authoritative, because they lack further memory [Skitka et al. 1999; Smith
and Kosslyn 2007]. This is risky behaviour during safety-critical decisions: if the information
generated by the system is not correct, the consequences can be catastrophic.
There is a robust body of evidence which shows that in highly automated processes, operators
may show signs of excessive trust in, and reliance on, an automated decision support system
[Lee and Moray 1992; Muir 1994; Layton et al. 1994; Endsley 1996; Parasuraman et al. 1996;
Parasuraman and Riley 1997; Dzindolet et al. 2003; Parasuraman et al. 2008]. There is also a
history of aviation accidents linked to an over-reliance on the deck automation.
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Accident 4.1 On the 26th June 1988 a brand new Airbus A320-100 crashed near to Mulhouse-
Habsheim airport (falling into neighbouring wood) in the midst of a low-flying manoeuvre over
the runaway. Three out of the 136 passengers died, 50 were severely injured. Reports acknowledge
that “the A320 has new features which may have inspired some overconfidence in the mind of the
Captain” [Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport - France 1989] (page 60).
Accident 4.2 On the 14th February 1990, Flight 605 (Airbus A320-231 aircraft) crashed on its
final approach to Bangalore airport, killing 92 people. On final approach, the aircraft descended
below the normal approach profile and kept descending until it struck the boundaries of a neigh-
bouring golf club. Ministry of Civil Aviation - Government of India [1990] (page 39) reports that
“a false sense of faith has been reposed on this system”.
This phenomenon has been defined as Automation-Induced Complacency (AIC), an uncrit-
ical reliance on the automation, resulting from an inappropriate high trust in the system’s reliability
[Bustamante et al. 2009]. AIC was first studied in the context of cockpit automation [Billings et al.
1976; Parasuraman et al. 1993], but later research also analysed it in other domains, like the de-
velopment of decision support systems [Smith and Geddes 2003].
Memory limitations are not the only cause for the emergence of AIC and are probably not
even the most influential. A relevant role is played by the phenomenon of perceived animacy,
which refers to the act of viewing automation as an independent agent [Woods 1996]. Examples of
the emergence of animacy are found in commercial airline cockpits where pilots during operation
are found to ask questions about flight management automation such as, “What is it doing?” and
“Why did it do that?” [Cummings 2006]. Evidence confirms that when humans solve a task in
collaboration with a computer, they tend to hand the responsibility to the computer, which they
tend to consider a smarter “team member” [Skitka et al. 1999; Nass et al. 1996].
Parasuraman et al. [1993] bring emotions into the discussion, another source of AIC. They
maintain that the tendency towards over-reliance on automation that has functioned safely in the
past might be heightened by positive affect. Furthermore, decision makers are implicitly reluctant
to seek out any information that might interfere with the positive mood. However, as some au-
thors argue (see Section 4.1.3), expert decision makers should be less influenced by emotions over
phenomenon like AIC.
Complacency is found to be closely related to SA. Having empirically compared full automa-
tion and interactive approaches for air traffic control tasks, Dao et al. [2009] show that SA in the
fully automated condition is weaker than in the interactive condition, because of the complacent
attitude of the pilots. The issues that can arise from loss of SA during ADR have been already
elaborated in Section 3.2.2.
The counterpart of AIC is also documented in the literature and its risks during safety-critical
processes are highlighted. More specifically, several authors have shown that experience with a
system, or a negative attitude toward modern technology, can lead pilots not to use information
provided by the system or follow its recommendations, even when it would have been in their best
interests to do so [Lee and Moray 1992; Muir 1994; Riley 1996; Endsley and Kiris 1995; Endsley
1996; Parasuraman and Riley 1997; Dzindolet et al. 2003; Lee and See 2004].
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On the basis of the material discussed so far, it is important for this thesis to understand whether
pilots are complacent towards the reconfiguration advice of the ADR decision support system or
not. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis proposes the first architecture for decision support for
ADR; therefore, no pilot has previously had the chance to try a system of this type or to construct
any sort of trust in this type of technology. This makes the investigation even more interesting, as
the complexity and novelty of the problem could lead pilots to shun the critical decision and leave
the responsibility to the system, especially in highly demanding situations. This topic is resumed
in Section 4.2.4, after more arguments are introduced.
If AIC is found to emerge during ADR decisions, then ways to mitigate this phenomenon
should be investigated. Pilots should always be able to verify what the reconfiguration system is
suggesting and why, asking for example why data bus redundancy is reduced to zero in the new
configuration. Increased transparency should reduce AIC.
The following speculative claim requires empirical investigation:
Claim 7 Pilots would be subject to Automation-Induced Complacency during highly autonomous
ADR. This phenomenon would be mitigated by increasing the degree of pilot involvement in the
process.
4.1.6 Conclusions
This section generated a first set of claims aimed at defining a permanent user profile for a DSS for
ADR decisions that takes into account cognitive aspects of the problem. The model is not meant
to be complete; the focus of this thesis is only on aspects that can either impair or improve the
safety of the process and that can be empirically and realistically verified in the context of a Ph.D.
programme.
It is reminded that the aim of this thesis is not to discredit the role of the human in the control
of complex systems in unstructured environments, on the contrary, this thesis advocates the unique
human capability to cope with unusual and unexpected situations, a capability which is missing in
modern automated system control technology to the same extent as it is present in humans. Indeed,
the analysis of the factors that can affect the human during ADR decisions is performed in order
to design decision support technology capable of mitigating the effects of undeniable weaknesses
of the human with the overall aim of achieving effective human-machine co-operation, exploiting
the strengths of both of them.
The next section uses the material presented so far to define the content of effective, tailored
decision support information for ADR decisions. A number of arguments placed on hold in this
section are resumed and further elaborated on. This represents the first step of the “content de-
termination” phase of the development of the proposed decision support framework (page 50).
The claims put forward here and in the next section are empirically evaluated in Chapter 6; all the
claims will be summarised at the end of the chapter .
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4.2 Decision Support Information Content
According to the support theory of decision making, which complements the prospect theory
(Section 2.2.2.2), humans combine beliefs from multiple sources and based on several underlying
cognitive capacities into a summary of “strength of belief” [Tversky and Koehler 1994]. The
theory posits that the strength of belief increases for decision options that are “unpacked” into
more explicit disjunctions. For instance, consider the comparison of the following two options:
1. Configuration-A is better than Configuration-B
2. Configuration-A is better than Configuration-B BECAUSE EFS is active AND EFS is
required during manual landing AND current mode is ‘manual landing’.
According to the theory, the latter option would receive a higher strength of belief than the
former.
The material discussed above casts light on the complexity of ADR decisions. The complexity
is such that usually higher-order information (e.g., the consequences of applying a certain config-
uration) is not directly available to the pilot. Valuable help would come from an intelligent system
that would “unpack” information for pilots and present it in a readily understandable format. It
must be noted that this does not necessarily mean more information, rather the right information,
as if the baseline information is unpacked in too many disjunctions, the pilot could be overloaded
with information and the decision support system would become counterproductive.
The question of how the decision support information should be “unpacked” and framed, in
order to provide effective support to pilots during ADR, does not have a straightforward answer. In
Section 2.2.2.3, having briefly introduced the five most cited descriptive cognitive models, it was
observed that mental simulation is a critical component for all of them. The approach to shaping
decision support information taken in this thesis focuses on fostering this process. We argue and
verify empirically that this approach has a positive effect on several decision biases described in
the previous section.
4.2.1 Mental simulation
Humans quite often rely on mental simulation in their day-to-day life. Evidence shows that people
reason by forming and transforming mental representations of possible actions and “observing”
the consequences of those actions. The fact that imagery and perception share most of the same
neural mechanisms supports this assertion [Smith and Kosslyn 2007].
It has been demonstrated since the early 1980s that mentally simulating an intended action
without actually performing it (motor imagery) has a positive effect on performing that action
afterwards [Feltz and Landers 1983; Woolfolk et al. 1985]. Mental simulation particularly seems
to play a critical role in experts’ decisions. Building on a naturalistic decision making study
[Lipshitz and Shaul 1997] in which the decisions of experts and novices are compared, Elliot
[2005] infers that:
• experts require more information to identify goals;
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• experts expectations are more likely to be violated;
• experts engage in mental simulation more often.
Calderwood et al. [1987] provide the empirical support for the third implication, which is
particularly relevant to this thesis. In a very recent paper on power system operators, Greitzer et al.
[2010] show further evidence in support of this idea. They report that experienced power system
operators perform a mental simulation by first retrieving relevant mental models from long-term
memory; they then use them to run a mental simulation to check if there is consistency with the
cues that are being observed.
Greitzer et al. acknowledge that quantifying the effects of the operators’ actions when the
system is in unusual operating condition can be very difficult. They maintain that the use of
a simulation or contingency analysis tool may help in constructing correct mental models and
favour the mental simulation process.
The ideas of Greitzer et al. can be extended with the conclusions of a study by Artman [1999a]
who argues that experts and novices may have the same problem solving strategies available, in-
cluding mental simulation, but experts can use them more effectively because of their superior
knowledge base and perceptual advantage. Klein [1998] interprets poor mental simulation capab-
ilities as a cause of decision errors. More specifically, Klein defines three main causes of decision
error:
• Lack of experience of the decision-maker.
• Lack of information.
• Poor mental simulation.
Interestingly for this study, Endsley [1995c] highlights the link between mental models and
situation awareness (Figure 4.2). Later studies have brought further evidence in support of the
model (e.g. Artman [1999b]; Brehmer [1990]; Elliot [2005]) which is now widely accepted in the
literature.
In Endsley’s model, the process of constructing mental representations relies on good SA
(discussed in Section 3.2.2); in turn, mental simulation (projected state) relies on both good mental
models and good SA.
In order to favour the construction of good mental models, good SA and good mental simula-
tion, and with reference to the support theory, this thesis advances the following claim:
Claim 8 Decision support information for SCMS reconfiguration should be “unpacked”/framed
so as to make the following cues readily understandable to the operators, for each reconfiguration
option:
• Explanations: why the system is making a specific suggestion.
• Implications: (what-if type of information) what the consequences of applying a specific
configuration are.
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Figure 4.2: Relationship of goals and mental models to situation awareness (adapted from Endsley [1995c]).
• Reliability: how reliable the advice generated by the system is.
The rationale for the necessity of each type of information is provided in the following sections.
4.2.2 Explanations
Some situations require the SCMS operators to perform methodical actions for which they have
been extensively trained (for example performing a manual landing manoeuvre in the case of
an aircraft pilot). On the other hand, complex reconfigurable systems, operating in unstructured
environments, sometimes require the operators to face new, unexpected problems. An ‘avionics
reconfiguration following an unexpected fault with an uncertain cause is a fitting example of the
latter case.
Studying similar complex scenarios in the aviation field, Besnard [2004] notes that such trouble-
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shooting activities, which are part of the more global objective of piloting the aircraft, “involve the
construction of an explanation in real-time”. Besnard adds that there are several factors, amongst
which limited cognitive resources, time pressure and confirmation bias (a tendency to only search
for information that supports the focal or preferred hypothesis [Klayman and Ha 1989]) can lead
pilots to the construction of erroneous explanations.
Generating wrong explanations of facts (e.g. the reasons why avionics Configuration-A
should be applied instead of Configuration-B in order to mitigate the effects of the fault which
has just happened) could have catastrophic consequences in safety-critical decisions. Explanations
are used by humans to construct a ‘story’ of the unfolding events through mental simulation; they
help to refine mental models and establish relations between facts [Zsambok et al. 2002; Greitzer
et al. 2010]. If these relationships are erroneous, the probability of making wrong inferences
increases.
Although the explanations generated by the decision maker are decisive in making correct
choices, their construction is particularly prone to errors in real, complex, time-critical decisions,
especially without any bespoke support. Kaber et al. [2001] bring this problem back to the issue of
misinterpretation, on the basis of the well documented inability of humans to assess the intention
of the computer system [Mosier and Skitka 1996; Bubb-Lewis and Scerbo 1997]. The claim made
in this thesis is that providing pilots with an explanation of the reconfiguration recommendations
produced by the system would foster the construction of better and richer mental models and, as a
consequence, the room for misinterpretations would be reduced.
Section 4.1.1 showed that perception of risk has its roots in a poor understanding of the func-
tioning of the system. Intuitively, explanations of the inferences generated by the system should
improve pilot understanding of the situation and, as a consequence, reduce the perception of risk.
We argue that explanations should also mitigate the effect of the ambiguity aversion bias (Sec-
tion 4.1.4). By explaining why the system is making each suggestion, the ambiguity associated
with the suggestions should be reduced. This should result in a more objective evaluation of the
decision alternatives and, as a consequence, the decision accuracy should improve.
Explanations should foster both mental simulation and story construction by enriching the per-
ception of the elements in the environment (see Figure 4.2). Evidence shows that both mental sim-
ulation and story construction help people to stay alert to the dangers of upcoming events [Cohen
and Freeman 1997] and organise the pieces of information in a hierarchical structure determined
by their importance [Pennington and Hastie 1988]. With reference to his model of Figure 4.2,
Endsley [1997b] maintains that “building a story corresponds to increasing the operator’s level of
SA from Level 1 through Level 3”. The positive effect on SA building is another important motiv-
ation for providing pilots with system-generated explanations; Section 3.2.2 has already discussed
the effects of loss of SA on ADR decisions.
The emergence of complacency should also be limited by explanations. Section 4.1.5 discussed
the fact that humans are inclined to accept misinformation as accurate when it is provided by an
agent they consider more knowledgeable and/or authoritative. By increasing the transparency of
the inference process, explanations should reveal potential issues with the line of reasoning of the
system and help pilots to discard wrong inferences.
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In summary, with reference to the decision biases discussed earlier in this chapter, explanations
should mitigate the negative effects of the following factors: perception of risk, ambiguity aversion,
loss of SA and complacency. There are also other general benefits of explaining the reasoning of
an automated system which would provide further value to the approach proposed by this thesis.
In the previous section, in the context of support theory, it was mentioned that “unpacking” in-
formation into more explicit disjunctions increases human confidence in the information. Koehler
[1991] shows that confidence—the overt expression of a likelihood—has a positive influence on
decision behaviour and is increased by explaining why a possibility might be true. More specific-
ally, Koehler proposes that firstly, explanations cause changes in the way the problem is perceived,
by determining which aspects are made more important; secondly, they effect the interpretation
of evidence; and, thirdly, they effect the direction and duration of the search. Altogether, these
mechanisms are found to increase the decision makers’ confidence in their decisions.
In line with Koehler, Hogarth and Kunreuther [1995] empirically demonstrate that explana-
tions increase confidence by allowing the decision makers to justify decisions to themselves.
Empirical evidence is also provided in an earlier study by Koriat et al. [1980], who show how
“reason generation” (explaining) influences confidence in a positive manner.
Another documented benefit of explanations is their potential to mitigate the effects of the
confirmation bias, a tendency to only search for information that supports the focal or preferred
hypothesis [Snyder and Swann 1978]. According to the theory, decision makers systematically
favour the decision alternative they are looking for. Explanations should bring justifications for
other alternatives to the attention of the decision maker, leading to a more impartial decision. In
other words, explanations should increase the degree of plausibility of options which, because of
the confirmation bias, would not be appropriately considered.
Interestingly, in his investigation into the potential of explanations, Koehler [1991] provides an
‘associative memory based’ interpretation of their importance during a decision making process.
The author reports that “the effects of explanation might be interpreted as a variant of the genera-
tion effect observed in many memory studies (e.g., [Slamecka and Graf 1978]) that have shown a
recall advantage for self-generated items over presented items [...] By this account, explaining or
imagining a possibility makes it easier to recall supporting facts retrieved from memory when the
actual judgment is made”.
The importance and influence of explaining the logical reasoning of on-board systems have
also been recognised by aviation authorities. For instance, after the crash of the Comair Flight
3272 (Accident 3.1), National Transportation Safety Board [1997] reports the followings:
• “Aeronautica Civil urges the FAA to evaluate the curricula and flight check requirements
used to train and certificate pilots to operate FMS1-equipped aircraft, and revise the cur-
ricula and flight check requirements to assure that pilots are fully knowledgeable in the
logic underlying the FMS or similar aircraft computer system before being granted airman
certification to operate the aircraft”;
1Flight Management System - it is a specialised computer system that automates a wide variety of in-flight tasks,
reducing the workload on the flight crew.
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• “the workload could decrease with explanations: such partially understood logic may par-
tially account for the finding that use of the FMS often increases workload during periods
of already high workload”.
This thesis also acknowledges the risks and potential drawbacks of explaining ADR options.
Given the degree of influence that explanations have on decision behaviour, different explanations
could provoke different degrees of confidence and plausibility and, as a result, could lead to the
opposite effect of mitigating the confirmation bias. Pilots could be led to choose a sub-optimal or
even wrong option which was supported by a misleading explanation. This argument introduces
the issues of correctness of the decision support information and persuasiveness of a DSS, which
leads back to the problem of complacency. This issue is empirically investigated in the series of
experiments of Chapter 6.
Intuitively, in order to limit the emergence of this effect, explanations should be equally framed
for each decision alternative and they should have a similar structure, which the pilot can readily
understand. This supports the design choice made in this research, not to use rich, natural language
framing for the ADR decision support information.
4.2.3 Implications
Mental simulation is the projection of the current state of the system into the future; this pro-
cess allows the operator to “see” the implications of current potential actions and evaluate their
applicability and/or optimality.
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, mental simulation has a positive effect on subsequent decisions.
However, Parasuraman [2000] collects a considerable number of studies that highlight the diffi-
culties humans have with simulation when interacting with an automated system. Essentially,
humans are found to be less aware of the effects of their decisions in system states when those
decisions and consequent actions are also under the control of another agent (whether that agent
is an automation or another human) than when they make the decisions and implement them com-
pletely alone. In addition, Koehler [1991] shows that the effect of simulation and estimation of
likelihood are mediated by the ease with which this imagination process takes place (cf. [Tversky
and Kahneman 1973; Kahneman and Tversky 1981]).
Regardless of the implied difficulties, evaluating the implications of decisions is critical to the
reliability of the ADR process. For instance, if pilots are provided with two applicable configur-
ations and they do not manage to foresee the consequences of applying each of them, they could
incur the risk of discarding the one whose implications are less obvious, even if it is optimal.
We argue that providing system-generated implications of each reconfiguration option would
reduce room for uncertainty. Therefore, it would have a positive effect on the perception of risk
(Section 4.1.1).
We also argue that system-generated implications should mitigate certain biases induced by
time pressure. As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, in situations of time pressure, humans tend to screen
the decision alternatives for violations of the minimal level of acceptance on one or more attributes.
In a safety-critical scenario, the consequences of a decision represent the most important attribute
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under evaluation, much more important than the attributes related to performance, for instance.
Providing pilots with readily-available implications of each decision should release the human
from the task of constructing them, which should make violations of pilots’ levels of acceptance
more evident and, as a result, should decrease both cognitive workload and the effect of time
pressure.
The construction of the implications for each decision alternative in real-time is an extremely
demanding task during ADR. On the basis of the material presented in Sections 3.2 and 4.1.3
concerning cognitive demand, problem complexity and emotion-based biases, frustration is most
likely to emerge when trying to build the implications of each decision alternative given the pecu-
liar characteristics of the decision scenario. Providing pilots with system-generated implications
would increase their sense of control over the process and, as a result, reduce the impact of frus-
tration on their decision behaviour. This conclusion is also in line with the ‘law of clairvoyance’
(Section 4.1.3.2) from the HVHF laws proposed by Rahman [2007] to avoid emotion-based biases:
“technology, where possible, should assist the human agent to predict the immediate future course
of events”.
Finally, by providing an insight into the consequences of each alternative, implications should
intuitively reduce the emergence of complacency (Section 4.1.5).
4.2.4 Trust
The literature has extensively proven the role of trust in the human reliance on automation (see
[Dzindolet et al. 2003] for a review). When a DSS for ADR generates recommendations, explan-
ations and implications of reconfigurations, it is actually making inferences that are critical for
the lives of the crew members. If the operators do not trust the logic of the system, it is probable
that they will not be comfortable basing their decisions on its suggestions. This could break the
co-operation between the human and the machine, with severe consequences in a safety-critical
environment.
Incidentally, it is not surprising that, during the 1980s, a strange series of accidents related
to the introduction of automation on-board civil aircraft occurred in France, the country in which
at that time protests and strikes against the introduction of glass cockpits—provoked by pilots’
mistrust of the automation—had been stronger than anywhere else in the world [Amalberti 1999].
Muir [1994] argues that trust declines rapidly when the system makes errors but increases
again slowly as the system keeps performing, reducing the number of errors. Thus, as interaction
with the automation takes place, the level of trust is expected to ebb and flow.
In a study on military strategy decisions supported by a decision aid, Dzindolet et al. [2003]
found that humans deem the aid trustworthy when they know a little about the automated decision
support system. When the system commits mistakes, humans move “from an unjustified high level
of trust in automation to an undeserving low level of trust and rampant disuse”. However, other
studies in the aviation field have found contrasting results. Pilots seem to have a strong mistrust
of automated aids when they are first introduced into the cockpit and they know little about them
[Olson and Sarter 2000].
Given the contrasting positions concerning human trust in this type of systems in the literature,
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it is interesting to investigate whether pilots are going to trust the recommendations of a DSS for
ADR proposed in this research.
An obvious observation is that the reliability of ADR advice would increase the trust in the
system. In order to observe an increase in trust due to reliability, the pilot must use the system for
a certain amount of time. This work explores a new technology which has not yet been introduced
on any aircraft; therefore, this type of information is not available at present.
Unrelated to the exposure time is the influence of a priori knowledge of the processes under-
lying the inferences generated by the aid on human trust. In line with the literature referenced
above, Lee and Moray [1992] show that without a good understanding of the processes that a de-
cision aid uses to make inferences, the operators are likely to deem the DSS untrustworthy from
the beginning. In particular, they find that an operator’s use of automation to control a simulated
manufacturing plant was directly related to his or her momentary trust. In a subsequent study, Lee
and Moray [1994] add empirical evidence which shows that the operators use the automation if
their trust in it exceeds their confidence in their own ability to control the plant, but otherwise they
choose manual control.
Pu and Chen [2006] recognise the importance of explanation interfaces to improve user per-
formance and build user trust in the automated system. They put forward a set of guidelines for
the development of explanation interfaces specifically aimed at trust building. This is another ar-
gument in favour of the inclusion of explanations in the ADR decision support information set; we
expect that explanations would increase pilot trust in the DSS for ADR.
In conclusion, implications are one of the most important ‘chunks’ of information for ADR
decisions; however, ADR suggestions supported by risky or unacceptable implications could pro-
voke mistrust. Mistrust could be mitigated by the availability of explanations, which provide an
insight into the assumptions at the root of the inferences made by the system. Certain risky im-
plications (e.g. switching off the auto-pilot) could apparently hide an error in the inferences made
by the system; the explanation of how the system reached that conclusion could convince the pilot
that the configuration suggested is actually the only right option given the current circumstances.
The material presented in this section leads to the following claim:
Claim 9 Pilot trust in a DSS for ADR would decrease when the system makes (apparently) unac-
ceptable inferences. This phenomenon would be mitigated by providing pilots with an explanation
of the inference process.
4.2.5 Uncertainty
“An absence of information is not the same as information about an absence”
from ‘Consciousness’ (page 88), Susan Blackmore, 2010
In broad terms, uncertainty has a two-fold nature:
• Aleatoric uncertainty: results from the fact that a system can behave in random ways.
It is also known as stochastic uncertainty, irreducible uncertainty, variability, or Type A
uncertainty.
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• Epistemic uncertainty: results from a lack of knowledge about a system and is the prop-
erty of the system engineers who design and develop the automation. It is also known as
subjective uncertainty, ignorance, reducible uncertainty, or Type B uncertainty.
Since SCMS of the type considered in this thesis operate in unstructured environments, aleat-
oric uncertainty is non-negligible in the design of on-board automation. The fact that the operating
environment is unstructured and that modern, reconfigurable SCMS such as next generation air-
craft avionics are extremely complex machines also makes epistemic uncertainty non-negligible.
In fact, it seems highly improbable (to use an euphemism) for engineers to acquire complete know-
ledge of the system and manage to forecast all the possible unexpected events that could happen
during its operation.
The result is that on-board modern aircraft, pilots must accept the uncertainties hidden in the
logic guiding the automated processes and rely upon probabilistic information to evaluate what
they cannot access directly [Wickens and Flach 1988]. Section 4.1.1 provides a description of the
effects of uncertainty on the SCMS dynamic reconfiguration process. Here the analysis returns to
the argument. It is interesting for this research to investigate what the effect of providing pilots
with figures about the uncertainty embedded in ADR inferences would be without leaving them to
guess those figures.
Finance studies demonstrate that providing decision makers with figures on the uncertainty
embedded in each decision option has a positive effect on the decision behaviour because decision
makers use this information to hedge decisions away from large losses [Reckhow 1994].
Aviation and military studies reveal compatible results. Banbury et al. [1998] conducted an
experiment asking military pilots to respond to a machine-identified target with a ‘shoot/no shoot’
decision. The experiment revealed that decision making behaviour changes when the system ex-
plicitly identifies a friendly aircraft as a secondary target. The authors noted that prior willingness
to fire on a target with a high level of uncertainty disappeared. Furthermore, the decision time was
also found to be influenced by the uncertainty of the targets.
With respect to decision time, similar conclusions are reached in a later study on a DSS for
aircraft anti-icing, in which Sarter and Schroeder [2001] found out that accurate information from
the decision aid led to improved handling of the icing encounter. However, when inaccurate or
uncertain information was presented, performance dropped below that of the baseline condition.
The availability of uncertainties embedded in automated inferences seems to make the human
more ‘cautious’ with the automation and spend more time collecting information before acting.
However, this could be difficult to assess without any automated support in a complex system
that handles information from various sources (e.g. modern sensor data-fusion) and under time
pressure.
In this regard, in a detailed analysis of the U.S.S. Vincennes accident (3rd July 1988), Gruner
[1990] reports that officers and system operators “could not make better decisions because they
did not have time to confirm or deny the information uncertainties presented to them”. On that oc-
casion the Command-And-Control team had three minutes and forty seconds to make a decision,
including the time to perceive and interpret sensor data and make judgements [Roberts and Dot-
terway 1995]. Giving a parallel to ADR decisions, the task of figuring out how reliable/uncertain
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the information generated by the system is (which is based on probabilistic processing of sensor
data) could overcome pilot cognitive capabilities in a typical ADR scenario. Providing pilots with
system-generated figures about the uncertainty (when available), embedded in the automated infer-
ence, should reduce their workload in situations in which the information available to the system
is not fully reliable (e.g. sensors readings).
Dzindolet et al. [2003] provide empirical evidence that decision makers who are given a reason
why the aid might make a mistake are likely to trust the decisions of the aid more and are more
likely to rely on the aid than decision makers who are not provided with this type of information.
The authors generalise this and previous studies, arguing that “optimising the performance of the
automated aid will not be successful in optimising human-computer team performance. Under-
standing the processes that humans use to determine whether or not to depend on their automated
aids will help to improve performance of the human-computer team”.
On the other hand, uncertainty figures represent an additional ‘chunk’ of information to process
in real-time and they could even provoke indecision and mistrust, hence, their theoretical benefit
could actually become counterproductive. It makes sense to investigate the effect of reliability
figures on pilot trust and performance during ADR decisions.
Another factor that requires attention is the way uncertainty information is framed. This sec-
tion uses the terms uncertainty and reliability about the information directed to pilots interchange-
ably, referring to the same concept but from opposite ends of the same scale; full reliability implies
no uncertainty, full uncertainty implies no reliability. The concreteness principle asserts that “a de-
cision maker tends to use only the information that is explicitly displayed in the stimulus object,
and will use it only in the form in which it is displayed” (see Section 4.1.4). Furthermore, the de-
cision maker tends to be more risk averse when negative or uncertain decision support information
is provided [Schie and Pligt 1995]. These arguments lead to the speculation that pilots would “feel
more comfortable” accepting a suggested reconfiguration accompanied by high reliability figures,
instead of low uncertainty figures. Reliability is a positive feature, uncertainty is negative (see the
discussion about the influence of emotions on ADR decisions in Section 4.1.3).
One last argument worth considering is that when testing a hypothesis, decision makers tend
to look for features that are extreme: they find it easier to process alternatives that are either
very likely or very unlikely under the focal hypothesis [Skov and Sherman 1986]. This argument
seems to suggest that pilots would find suggestions characterised by ‘medium reliability’ more
complicated to process than low or highly reliable options.
To summarise, reliability figures should mitigate the effects of the following decision biases:
trust, time pressure and complacency. The following speculating claim is made to motivate our
empirical tests:
Claim 10 Providing reliability figures would influence pilot decision making performance in the
following ways:
• the framing effect would emerge when providing pilots with reliability or uncertainty terms;
more specifically, pilots would feel more comfortable applying a configuration associated
with high reliability than with low uncertainty;
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• evidently wrong ADR suggestions, when associated with low reliability, would be more eas-
ily spotted and avoided than without any reliability figures;
• low and high reliability options would both be easier to process than medium reliability
options, i.e. the decision time would increase with medium reliability options.
4.2.6 On the number of alternatives
The previous sections define the characteristics of the decision support information that could help
in mitigating the effects of a number of decision biases that are likely to emerge during ADR. So
far, not enough attention has been paid to how many reconfiguration alternatives pilots should be
provided with during a typical ADR.
Some issues about problem complexity and cognitive limits have been already discussed in
Section 3.2. These arguments led to the conclusion that some degree of automation is necessary in
order to make the problem realistically tractable in real-time; therefore, only one or at most a few
pre-processed options should be presented to the pilot.
Naturalistic decision making models reveal that mental simulation is decisive in making correct
decisions (Section 2.2.2.3). When two or more decision alternatives are provided, pilots need to
generate explanations and then simulate the consequences of applying each of them in order to
choose the best one. Koehler [1991] (cf. [Jones and Goethals 1972; Ross et al. 1975; Nisbett
and Ross 1980]) reveals that when explanations are generated for opposite decision alternatives,
the arguments generated for the side considered first prevail. Once the first alternative acquires
enough evidence in its favour, some kind of inertia makes the implicit decision difficult to reverse.
Koehler also argues that this phenomenon is akin to the notion of mental set or fixedness found in
theories of problem solving.
It must be noted that other studies have failed to reveal the ‘primacy’ decision bias in question,
e.g. Anderson and Sechler [1986].
Empirical investigation is required to better characterise the limits of configuration options
that can be realistically handled by a pilot in real-time. This research aims at assessing the average
number of configuration options that are considered by pilots in both normal conditions (for ex-
ample, whilst in en-route cruise) and in critical, time pressure scenarios (for example, after a fault
in the descent phase). This analysis forms the necessary and currently unavailable know-how for
future, more sophisticated investigations.
4.2.7 Graphics
The focus of the material presented thus far has been on the design of effective textual decision
support information. However, there is largely accepted evidence that in certain cases, graph-
ical representations offer several advantages over the textual format, which cannot be ignored.
Amongst the advantages of graphics, most researchers agree that they require: a) a reduced amount
of mental computation to perform the task; and, b) less time spent searching for the information
needed [Larkin and Simon 1987; Mayer and Gallini 1990].
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A review of the literature returns a large amount of information concerning the development
of effective graphical information for the support of safety-critical decision making activity. In
the context of the analysis performed in this research, it is interesting to understand whether the
provision of graphical decision support information, along with textual information, influences the
ADR decision making process in any way.
The main focus of this work remains the investigation of the effects of explanations, implic-
ations and reliability figures in text format on ADR decision behaviour. However, with specific
reference to the aerospace field, it is worth noting that recent research in cockpit automation has
revealed a significant improvement in real-time, fault management decision performance when
textual information is associated with a graphical description of a fault. A relevant example is
provided by the NASA Fault Management Support System (FAMSS) [Hayashi et al. 2006; 2009;
Huemer et al. 2005; McCann and Spirkovska 2005].
Hayashi et al. [2006] describe a study on fourteen highly experienced commercial airline pilots
who assumed the role of spacecraft operator during the launch and ascent phase of eight spacecraft
missions. The simulated missions were designed to be performed by a single operator, with a
reconfigurable cockpit and no ground support. FAMSS provides a graphical representation of
the fault that assists the pilots during the troubleshooting activity. The introduction of FAMSS
resulted in improved malfunction resolution accuracy by 43%, reduced malfunction resolution
time by 54%, and decreased cognitive workload of between 27% and 37%, depending on the type
of malfunction being worked out.
The results obtained with FAMSS are in line with research on Adaptive Automation (AA)
systems by Scerbo [1996], who predicted that the success of such reconfigurable systems would
have been determined in large part by the capability of interfaces design to include all techniques
of information exchange (e.g., visual, auditory, haptic, etc.).
The literature also contains evidence of issues with graphical representation of causal informa-
tion and reconfigurable cockpit displays. Dale and Reiter [1995] notice that abstract concepts like
causality may be difficult to convey by graphical means, while it is straightforward to achieve in
text. Causality is particularly important during a real-time fault management decision process.
Petre [1995] brings attention to the fact that, although graphics are sometimes presented as an
‘easy-to-understand’ way of presenting information, research in applied psychology demonstrates
that in many cases a considerable amount of expertise and background knowledge is necessary to
interpret a graphic correctly. It can be argued that pilots are expert decision makers, so they should
not be subject to this type of issue. However, aircraft are complex machines and pilots do not
have a pervasive knowledge of each component and the interaction between them. The benefits of
graphics over textual information are not obvious.
Wiener [1988] expounds on the potential towards display clutter and ill-considered symbols,
text and colour in many graphical display designs for complex systems in many domains. Sarter
[1995] associates lack of function transparency in reconfigurable graphical displays to loss of SA.
Scerbo [1996] also provides an insight into several issues in terms of human-computer communic-
ation and overall system performance that emerge with reconfigurable graphical displays.
As previously mentioned, this research does not address the problem of efficient graphical rep-
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resentation of fault management information on modern aircraft and spacecraft. Notwithstanding,
it is interesting to collect information about the potential improvement in the decision perform-
ance of pilots during ADR decisions due to the introduction of a graphical representation of the
fault which triggers the reconfiguration. Based on previous research, we speculate that this kind of
information would favour the construction of good mental models and the process of mental simu-
lation. For the time being, the framework proposed in this thesis does not employ any sophisticated
graphic engine or design.
In conclusion, we advance the following speculating claim:
Claim 11 A graphical representation of the fault that triggers an ADR would improve decision
performance and accuracy.
4.3 Claims and Hypothesis
The hypothesis for this research was given in Section 3.3. This chapter introduces several claims
concerning the behaviour of pilots during ADR decisions and how decision support information
should be designed in order to improve the effectiveness of the interaction and the process in
general. All the claims made are consistent with the overall objective of fulfilling the hypothesis.
In order to provide the reader with a clear, comprehensive ‘picture’ of the problems addressed
in the course of this Ph.D. programme and how the claims made relate to the hypothesis, the
objective of fulfilling the hypothesis statement is dissected using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
[Kelly and Weaver 2004] as shown in Figure 4.3. For reasons of space, the GSN chart has been
divided into multiple charts, so that each strategy box in Figure 4.3 is elaborated in Figures 4.4
to 4.7. The GSN has been enriched with a coloured notation in order to signify the current state
of work. In this regard, it must be noted that when a goal is marked as ‘completed’, this is only
in relation to the objectives that were originally set for the thesis; obviously, no claims are made
about having completely understood complex phenomena as the effect of the decision support
information generated by the system proposed here on intricate human mental models like situation
awareness.
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Figure 4.3: Research hypothesis dissected using the Goal Structuring Notation [Kelly and Weaver 2004].
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Figure 4.4: Elaboration of the ‘Information content’ strategy box from the GSN chart of Figure 4.3.
The GSN charts should be used as a reference to put into context which portion of the over-
all research agenda is addressed in which portion of the remainder of the thesis. As a general
guideline, the objective of proposing a novel, effective DSS framework for automated generation
of decision support information for ADR is addressed through four main strategies (Figure 4.3):
• S1: Information content. This chapter made a number of claims about the content of the de-
cision support information generated by the proposed DSS; they are empirically investigated
in Chapter 6.
• S2: Information design. Similarly, this chapter made a number of claims about the design
and framing of the information produced by the proposed DSS; they are empirically invest-
igated in Chapter 6.
• S3: Technology. The technology required to automatically generate the type of information
implicitly defined by the claims made is discussed in Chapter 5. A series of algorithms and
methods are critically reviewed; a novel algorithm for the automated resolution of data con-
flicts during the search for applicable configurations is presented and empirically evaluated.
• S4: Validation tools. Technology to validate both the performance of SaIRA and the effect-
iveness of the decision support it provides are required. Throughout this Ph.D. programme,
the technology required to perform this task has been developed. This is the case with the
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Figure 4.6: Elaboration of the ‘Technology’ strategy box from the GSN chart of Figure 4.3.
eye-tracking system (named SaIRA Eye-Tracking System, SETS) which has specific fea-
tures that could not be found in other eye-tracking systems currently available (e.g. the
possibility to integrate the system with the flight simulation software to mention but one).
Furthermore, a new methodology for validating the performance and effectiveness of the
system has been developed (combining objective and subjective metrics), together with the
tools to analyse the data collected during the experiments (e.g. eye-movement data post-
processing). The validation tools are described throughout Chapters 5, 6 and in Appendix A.
The main goal (i.e. ‘G: Fulfil the research hypothesis’) has an associated context box, ‘Metrics
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Figure 4.7: Elaboration of the ‘Validation tools’ strategy box from the GSN chart of Figure 4.3.
of effectiveness’. In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed DSS, a number of subjective
and objective metrics of decision support effectiveness are defined and used in the experiment
presented in Chapter 6. This is necessary to quantify the improvements brought by the proposed
DSS compared to basic decision support provided by fault warning and alarms currently available
on standard cockpit.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter covered the following topics:
• The Avionics Dynamic Reconfiguration (ADR) process is considered to be a specific in-
stance of the more general SCMS dynamic reconfiguration process. A number of influential
factors from the physical, emotional and temporal domains, which could bias pilot decisions
during ADR, are discussed. Specific claims concerning the way each factor could possibly
bias pilot decisions are advanced on the basis of past and current research in cognitive psy-
chology and cognitive system engineering. These claims aim to characterise a persistent
user profile for the DSS framework for proposed ADR decisions. All the claims will be
empirically tested (Chapter 6).
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• In the light of the hypothesised user profile, it is argued that effective decision support in-
formation for ADR (i.e. able to mitigate the effects of the identified biases) should contain
the following three types of information:
– Explanations: why the system is making a specific suggestion?;
– Implications: (what-if type of information) what the consequences of applying a spe-
cific configuration are?
– Reliability: how reliable the advice generated by the system is?
• Given the extent of the problem being addressed, it is not possible to cover all the aspects
of the domain in the context of a Ph.D. programme. A GSN chart is provided which repres-
ents a snapshot of the current state of research; the chart allows the identification of which
facets of the problem have been addressed in detail and which require further work. Fur-
thermore, the chart provides an organic link between all the claims made in this chapter and
the hypothesis statement given in Chapter 3.
For the sake of clarity, the complete set of claims advanced in this chapter is gathered here.
• Claim 1 - Risk perception: If prompted by the system, pilots would reconfigure the avion-
ics in situations which are not particularly risky (e.g. whilst cruising). They would refrain
from doing so in situations of pressing risks (e.g. before landing, when the system is more
unstable and a change to the current state could become a catalyst for catastrophic con-
sequences).
• Claim 2 - Time pressure: Pilots would react to time pressure by means of a) acceleration,
b) selection of information, and c) alteration of information search pattern.
• Claim 3 - Time pressure: Time pressure would decrease pilot decision accuracy.
• Claim 4 - Time pressure: Time pressure would affect pilot decision time. Amongst the
other effects, time pressure would reduce the number of configuration options considered
and the way the option information is explored.
• Claim 5 - Stress and frustration: Heightened states of stress during ADR decisions can
possibly lead to frustration. The negative effect of frustration would be mitigated by provid-
ing pilots with effective decision support information.
• Claim 6 - Framing effect: The pilot decision behaviour during ADR would be subject to
the framing effect; more specifically, presenting ADR information in terms of its reliability
instead of its unreliability would make pilots more comfortable with accepting the proposed
configuration.
• Claim 7 - AIC: Pilots would be subject to Automation-Induced Complacency. [Dekker
2000] notices that practitioners from within the organisation that launched the Space Shuttle
Challenger in 1986 reported that on that occasion, complacency was based on a justified
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assumption of satisfactory system state, since there was no evidence of the contrary. As
a consequence, we hypothesise that reliability figures would limit the emergence of com-
placency. We expect pilots to be less complacent to wrong ADR advice when they are
associated with low reliability. During highly autonomous ADR, this phenomenon would
be mitigated by decreasing the level of autonomy of the process.
• Claim 8 - Information type: Decision support information for SCMS reconfiguration
should be “unpacked”/framed so as to make the following cues readily understandable to
the operators for each reconfiguration option:
– Explanations: why the system is making a specific suggestion;
– Implications: (what-if type of information) what the consequences of applying a spe-
cific configuration are;
– Reliability: how reliable the advice generated by the system is.
• Claim 9 - Trust: Pilot trust in a DSS for ADR would decrease when the system made
(apparently) unacceptable inferences. This phenomenon would be mitigated by providing
pilots with explanations of the inference processes.
• Claim 10 - Reliability figures: Providing reliability figures would influence pilot decision
making performance in the following ways:
– the framing effect would emerge when providing pilots with reliability or uncertainty
terms; more specifically, pilots would feel more comfortable applying a configuration
associated with high reliability than with low uncertainty;
– evidently wrong ADR suggestions, when associated with low reliability, would be
more easily spotted;
– low and high reliability options would both be easier to process than medium reliability
options, i.e. the decision time would increase with medium reliability options.
• Claim 11 - Graphics: A graphical representation of the fault that triggers an ADR would
improve decision performance and accuracy.
Chapter 5
A Framework for Interactive Dynamic
Reconfiguration
The material presented in the previous chapters fulfils three main tasks, a) it discusses the necessity
for human involvement during the SCMS dynamic reconfiguration process, b) it examines and
characterises the process in question from the point of view of naturalistic decision making, c) it
generates a set of claims about the characteristics of pilot behaviour during ADR and about the
characteristics of effective decision support information.
In order to realistically evaluate the decision making ideas proposed, technology was de-
veloped as part of this research to manage the dynamic reconfiguration process of the SCMS.
This technology is designed to perform the following two tasks autonomously:
• generating configurations for IMA equipped with multi-sensor data network technology (in-
spired by modern, real avionics);
• generating decision support information relative to the configurations proposed to the system
operator, according to the claims put forward in the previous chapters.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe both the process of design and the characteristics
of the decision support technology developed in the context of this thesis. All the proposed tech-
nology is integrated with methods and ideas (e.g. heuristics) already available in the literature
to form the Safe and Interactive Reconfiguration Architecture (SaIRA); SaIRA has been used to
perform the experiments set out in Chapter 6. Two novel algorithms for automated generation of
decision support information have been developed as part of this thesis; they are briefly and qual-
itatively described in this chapter but their details, including performance analysis, are set out in
Appendix B.
The decision support technology discussed in this chapter is based mainly on the Constraint
Programming paradigm, therefore some propaedeutic information is provided with the double
purpose of (a) explaining the design decisions taken and (b) clarifying the nature of the information
the pilots are provided with. First, an ontology for the avionics dynamic reconfiguration problem
is introduced; the ontology is subsequently translated in a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP)
which is programmatically used by SaIRA to generate decision support information. Once the
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nature of the decision support information is outlined and the constraint set by the CSP technology
are clarified, the way the user interface of SaIRA has been designed—with the support of two
pilots—is discussed in detail.
5.1 An Ontology for the Reconfiguration Problem
The analysis performed so far generated a body of knowledge that is now going to be structured
into a framework for a dynamic reconfiguration system for SCMS.
The Knowledge Engineering domain offers several tools for knowledge representation and
organisation (see DKE Committee [2010] and KER [2010] for a review of the field). The de-
velopment and use of an ontology1 for small and large-scale knowledge-based systems has been
investigated in the past [Gruber 1995; Swartout et al. 1996; Studer 1998; Staab et al. 2005; Abecker
and Elst 2009]. A consistent body of research in this field focuses on information reuse, sharing,
formalisation and encoding within ontologies.
On the basis of these studies, the effectiveness of an ontology to structure the information
required to engineer complex processes is taken for granted. As an extension to current research,
this thesis advocates the use of an ontology to proceed organically from the analysis phase towards
the development of SCMS reconfiguration management systems. More specifically, a contribution
is given by:
• producing a basic, flexible ontology for the SCMS dynamic reconfiguration problem;
• proposing an approach to translate this ontology into a Constraint Network, which rep-
resents the knowledge base of SaIRA, and which can be programmatically accessed using
Constraint Programming techniques;
• using the ontology to support the definition of the characteristics of the decision support
information directed to the operator of the system.
5.1.1 SaIRA Ontology
In information science, an ontology is usually introduced as a formal representation of knowledge,
made up of a set of concepts within a domain and the relationships between those concepts. The
SaIRA ontology can be interpreted as a meta-model for an interactive SCMS dynamic reconfigur-
ation process. It responds to the need to describe aspects of the SCMS domain that are relevant to
the construction of the framework in a format that can subsequently be represented in a computing
system. In other words, the ontology allows the mapping of human-interpretable descriptions of
the system to the Constraint Network (CN) model introduced later in this chapter (Section 5.3).
SaIRA is a generic architecture for reconfigurable SCMS. The ontology presented here is kept
simple in order to permit much stronger assumptions about the characteristics of the system being
analysed, but it can easily be extended to other systems. In this regard, it is worth noting that the
1The Greek philosopher Parmenides began the tradition of using ontology as an instrument to study the organisation
and the nature of the world independently of the form of our knowledge about it.
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CN paradigm has been purposely chosen to formally represent the knowledge-base and ‘drive’
the reconfiguration process, because it allows the introduction of new concepts at any time during
the development process, e.g. the CN-based reconfiguration algorithms used in SaIRA are not
sensitive to initial conditions and do not require setup.
In the remainder of this section, ‘concepts’ belonging to the ontology are in the following font:
CONCEPT. The concepts and the relationships between them are described, and the resulting frame-
work is then translated into a constraint network which can be implemented in a real computing
system.
5.1.1.1 Baseline ontology
Section 2.1.3 listed several definitions of ‘dynamic system reconfiguration’ from the literature,
which capture different aspects of this concept. Here, previous definitions are collated into a
general statement which allows a direct mapping to the seven ontological concepts that the SaIRA
ontology pivots around.
Definition 5.1.1 A SCMS dynamic reconfiguration is an EVENT-driven process of transitioning
between two different CONFIGURATIONS, which aims at adapting the behaviour of the system to a
change of FUNCTIONS required or RESOURCES available, whilst meeting a number of pre-defined
functional and non-functional REQUIREMENTS and the preferences of the OPERATOR.
Figure 5.1 contains a graphical representation of the baseline SaIRA ontology. Each ontolo-
gical concept is informally described hereinafter. The description provided is generic enough to
allow further specialisation, permiting the adaptation of the framework to other systems.
EVENT












Figure 5.1: Baseline, intuitive ontology of the SCMS dynamic reconfiguration problem.
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EVENT
In SaIRA, an EVENT is an observable, not necessarily extraordinary, occurrence that affects either
the set of system RESOURCES available or the system FUNCTIONS required, or both.
An EVENT can be either ‘expected’ or ‘unexpected’. An example of an expected EVENT is a
request for a change of operating mode triggered by the operator (i.e. non-extraordinary EVENT).
This kind of reconfiguration is generally referred to as planned reconfiguration in the literature, as
opposed to unplanned reconfigurations—a typical example of this is a reconfiguration triggered
automatically to recover from a fault.
An EVENT has the following properties:
• Criticality: EVENTs have different criticality which, to a certain extent, changes with the
operating conditions. For instance, a fault in the lighting system of an aircraft is less critical
than a fault in the hydraulic system. However, the criticality of a fault in the lighting system
is higher during a landing manoeuvre at night than in daylight with good weather conditions.
EVENTs with different criticalities can possibly trigger different types of reconfigurations,
with different timings. For example, a reconfiguration in response to a fault with very low
criticality can be deferred or even not performed. Criticality is a prominent property of an
EVENT in the context of an SCMS.
• Reliability (only applies to unexpected EVENTs): dynamic reconfiguration is a recovery
action, being part of the Fault Detection, Identification and Recovery (FDIR) process.
Faults must first be detected and identified by the system, before it can proceed to generate
the right configuration for the given conditions. Sensors are used to detect faults; modern
SCMS employ sensor data-fusion techniques to merge the information coming from differ-
ent sensors, characterised by different technical features and degrees of detection reliability
(this is dealt with in more detail in Section 5.5).
More specifically, in a sensor data fusion network, the same sensor can be used to detect
and identify several types of faults. However, the readings will have a different degree of
reliability, depending on how suitable that sensor is to detect/identify the fault in question
[Hall and Llinas 1997]. As a result, here reliability is intended to mean “how reliable the
assessment of an EVENT made by the system is”.
RESOURCE
A RESOURCE is any physical or virtual component of limited availability within the reconfigurable
system. A SCMS is composed of computing modules (called Line Replaceable Modules (LRM)
in the Integrated Modular Avionics literature), sensors and actuators. These can all be regarded as
specialisations of the RESOURCE concept.
In an early study in the domain of dynamic reconfiguration of safety-critical distributed sys-
tems, Nicholson [1998] introduces the dynamic reconfiguration process in terms of a General
Topology Problem (GTP). In the author’s view, a topology consists of a configured set of units,
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employed to fulfil a given set of logical control actions. In this logic, the reconfiguration pro-
cess entails: (a) determining an allocation of software units to individual hardware units, and (b)
determining which sensors and actuators may be shared by which services. Nicholson’s concept
of resource is important to this research because it highlights the link between the physical com-
ponents of the system and the function they fulfil within the overall architecture. In line with
Nicholson, each RESOURCE in SaIRA fulfils one or more functions.
The RESOURCE concept is subject to specialisation. For instance, the memory installed on an
LRM is a RESOURCE of the LRM. A fault could affect only some of the memory modules of an
LRM, but not the whole module; in such a situation the LRM could continue to operate but under
degraded functionality.
In this regard, it is worth noticing that the degree of specialisation of the ontology strongly
influences the effectiveness of the reconfiguration process. For example, a higher specialisation of
the ontological concepts generally allows the characterisation—and therefore handling—of smal-
ler changes to the state of the system.
The set of available resources can possibly be altered (i.e. restricted, expanded or modified)
at run-time by an EVENT. Consequently, the set of available RESOURCEs limits the applicability of
any CONFIGURATION to the system in the present state. For instance, after a fault to one of the
four Trent 900 engines of a Airbus A380 aircraft, all configurations that rely on four engines are
no longer applicable.
FUNCTION
A FUNCTION is a process or task performed by the system. A single FUNCTION can be accom-
plished by more than one software application. The set of applications that compose a FUNCTION
require a set of RESOURCEs in order to execute.
In this ontology, an application, or software application, follows the definition given by the
Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC-653) [2006] standard: it is computer software running
in a single partition with assured allocation of processing time and memory. Each application is
mapped to a single computing module during the reconfiguration process and is associated with a
set of sensors and actuators required for execution. Inter-dependencies exist amongst applications
and, as a result, amongst FUNCTIONs.
A FUNCTION is associated with a set of functional and non-functional REQUIREMENTs (see
the next sub-section) that must be met in order to assure its accomplishment, e.g. memory re-
quirements, inter-dependencies, timing requirements. The REQUIREMENTs associated with a single
FUNCTION are taken in consideration during the reconfiguration process only if the FUNCTION in
question is required by the target CONFIGURATION.
REQUIREMENT
The concept of REQUIREMENT in SaIRA is similar to the common interpretation from the Require-
ments Engineering domain. It is “a statement that identifies a capability or function that is needed
by a system in order to satisfy its customer’s needs” [Bahill and Dean 1999].
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A functional REQUIREMENT describes what a system must do; a non-functional REQUIREMENT
(also referred to as ‘performance requirement’ in the literature) describes how the system should
operate.
Both the reconfiguration process and the result (a configuration) must meet a set of pre-defined
functional and non-functional REQUIREMENTs. For instance, consider the following statement
taken from the Boeing 737 aircraft operations manual: “a single Flight Management Computer
is not certified as a sole source of navigation system. It is certified to navigate accurately in con-
junction with an accurate radio navaid environment” [The Boeing Company 2002] (page 672).
This statement introduces at least two safety-related REQUIREMENTs on any configuration, a) a
configuration shall have two FMCs operating, b) if only one FMC is available, then an accurate
radio navaid environment must be available. On the other hand, the ‘maximum time to complete a
reconfiguration’ is an example of a requirement on the process of reconfiguration.
The set of functional REQUIREMENTs should not be confused with the set of FUNCTIONs re-
quired by a CONFIGURATION. The former refers to the overall system, it is defined at design
time (i.e. prior to operation) and does not change at run-time. The latter refers to a single
CONFIGURATION and changes dynamically depending on the operating conditions. The set of
FUNCTIONs required are affected by both the occurrence of EVENTs and by the OPERATOR’s prefer-
ences (see Figure 5.1); in contrast, neither an EVENT nor the OPERATOR modify the REQUIREMENTs
defined by system architects.
For example, the OPERATOR (pilot) of a Boeing 737 can decide to have the Distance Measuring
Equipment (DME) active instead of the VHF Omni-directional Radio Range (VOR); however,
the pilot cannot switch off the applications handling laser gyros in a configuration that uses the
Inertial Reference System (IRS) because this FUNCTION requires them to operate (dependency
REQUIREMENT).
In summary, REQUIREMENTs, amongst other objectives such as ensuring performance, guar-
antee the integrity of the overall system. For this reason, both the set of FUNCTIONs that are
activated in a CONFIGURATION and the preferences of the OPERATOR must meet the pre-defined
REQUIREMENTs (as shown in Figure 5.1).
OPERATOR
The OPERATOR of a SCMS is the human who operates the system. In SaIRA, only one OPERATOR
is allowed to control the system and no co-operative scenarios are taken into account; furthermore,
as this framework relates to manned systems, no remote control scenario is considered.
The OPERATOR concept relates to a real human being (i.e. not a model), whose rationality
is not perfect and whose decisions are subject to a number of cognitive biases. The OPERATOR
can express preferences during the process of reconfiguration by choosing between a reduced set
of reconfiguration alternatives provided by the decision support executive of SaIRA. In order to
preserve the safety of the process, the OPERATOR must confirm the application of any configuration.
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CONFIGURATION
The CONFIGURATION concept in SaIRA gathers all the ontological concepts introduced so far as
described by Definition 5.1.1. It follows that the features of a CONFIGURATION are affected by
the RESOURCEs available at any time, the FUNCTIONS required, the pre-defined functional and
non-functional REQUIREMENTS and by the preferences elicited by the OPERATOR at run-time.
As previously seen, Nicholson [1998] introduced the concept of CONFIGURATION in the con-
text of a topology problem. Such a CONFIGURATION can be autonomously generated by a com-
puter. In SaIRA, Nicholson’s idea of CONFIGURATION is still valid but the problem of generating it
is extended by involving the OPERATOR in the process, which makes fully autonomous approaches
and algorithms inapplicable.
5.2 Configuration, Reconfiguration and Constraint Programming
The problem of configuration has its roots in the 1980s. Hadzic and Andersen [2004] trace it back
to Mittal and Frayman [1989], who defined configuration as “a design activity of assembling an
artefact that is made of a fixed set of well defined component types where components can interact
only in predefine ways”. If the configuration problem is about “assembling” an artefact, the re-
configuration problem is about transitioning between two different artefacts, usually minimising
the cost.
A review of the literature reveals that both the problem of configuration and reconfiguration
have been extensively investigated in the domain of Constraint Programming (CP). CP-based tech-
nology has been developed for configuration problems in various domains, retail product config-
uration, power supply restoration services, configuration of university degree courses, distributed
network services, aircraft furnishing, task scheduling, personal computer configuration and satel-
lite payload configuration inter alia [Mø ller et al. 2001; Van Der Linden 2002; Subbarayan et al.
2004; De Givry et al. 2002; Hadzˇic´ et al. 2005].
Part of the ADR problem concerns allocating tasks to resources in accordance with a set of
scheduling requirements and constraints on routing messages on the network data buses. A large
body of research has tackled these problems in domains other than aviation, confirming the effect-
iveness of CP-based techniques [Cambazard et al. 2004; Cheng and Smith 1997; Chun et al. 1997;
Carlsson et al. 1998; Frei and Faltings 1999; De Givry et al. 2002; Elkhyari et al. 2002; 2004;
Hladik et al. 2005; 2008; Leeuwen et al. 2002; Pang and Goodwin 1996].
Two interesting studies are proposed by Weibenbacher et al. [2005] and Frei and Faltings
[1999] who introduce a CP-based technology for reconfiguration problems in safety-critical con-
texts. Whilst these studies are interesting because they focus on the safety of the process, human
involvement is not taken into account, hence the ideas presented are not fully applicable to this
thesis.
Hladik et al. [2008] discuss the advantages of tackling complex combinatorial problems with
constraint programming, including task allocation over distributed networks. The following ad-
vantages make this technique particularly appealing for the ADR problem:
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• declarativity: the variables, domains and constraints are simply described;
• genericity: it is not a problem-dependent technique, general rules are mechanically per-
formed during the search;
• adaptability: each constraint can be considered as independent and a model could be simply
extended by merging the different constraints;
• non-parametric ability: no sensitivity to initial parameters (i.e. temperature and cooling for
Simulated Annealing), no training, easiness of extensions of the method to new models;
• completeness: if there is no solution, the CP algorithm is able to prove it (contrary to heur-
istic methods, which are unable to decide);
• utilization: CP has been effectively used for a large range of combinatorial problems;
• performance: CP has proved to perform well in task scheduling and resource allocation,
which is a fundamental part of the ADR problem.
Interactive (re)configuration technology is designed for (re)configuration problems in which
the human is actively involved in the search for a solution. More specifically, Hadzˇic´ et al. [2005]
define interactive configuration as “an application of Constraint Satisfaction Problems that assists
a user in her search for a valid variable assignment (a configuration) in a combinatorial problem”.
A relevant body of research in this domain has been published recently [Papamichail and French
1999; Frayman 2001; Jussien 2003; Madsen 2003; Jensen 2004; Hadzˇic´ et al. 2005; van der Meer
et al. 2006; Tiedemann et al. 2006].
Ideas from Constraint Programming theory, (re)configuration problem techniques and recom-
mendation technology converge in a specific class of recommenders which were briefly introduced
in Chapter 2, called Constraint-Based Recommenders, with SaIRA being classified as such a re-
commender. As well as the advantages of the CP paradigm previously listed, the rationale for this
design decision is that, unlike collaborative and content-based methods, constraint-based systems
do not suffer from cold start problems, and do not require the generation of a meaningful history of
pilots preferences; both features are necessary in the application domain pertaining to this thesis. In
fact, parameter tuning is known to be an extremely difficult and error-prone process with complex
combinatorial problems characterised by large search space [Ridge and Kudenko 2007] (which is
the case of the ADR dynamic reconfiguration problem). Furthermore, constraint-based systems al-
low the specification of preferences between the decision alternatives a priori (for example, using
pre-defined weighting functions devised by the system designers on the basis of domain-dependent
knowledge) which do not require a history of the outcome of the decision-maker’s choices in past
scenarios.
The remainder of this chapter introduces the Safe and Interactive Reconfiguration Archi-
tecture (SaIRA), developed by the author. It has three main components:
• Reconfiguration Executive (RE): this component autonomously generates a set of applic-
able system configurations designed to mitigate the effects of the event that triggered the
reconfiguration;
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• Sensor Fusion Executive (SFE): fuses the information coming from a multi-sensor data net-
work using Evidential Reasoning techniques. The inferences of the SFE provide input data
for the RE;
• Decision Support Executive (DSE): this component implements Constraint-based Recom-
mendation technology. It uses information produced by both the RE and the SFE to generate
readily understandable decision support information for the system operator.
The constraint-based recommender proposed with SaIRA is different from many other sys-
tems of this type, due to its design focus for quick, critical decisions. In fact, instead of issuing,
retracting or modifying each constraint in isolation, the user interacts with the system only by “ex-
ploring” a set of predefined and applicable solutions (i.e. configurations) and choosing the one that
is most appropriate for the current operating conditions. In other words, the user chooses between
a small number of ‘artefacts’ produced by the system.
In this regard, Frayman [2001] elaborates a list of user-interaction requirements for efficient
implementations of interactive constraint satisfaction systems. The author develops a framework
that supports the following user gestures: (a) select an item, (b) retract the selection, (c) reselect
another item, (d) specify (i.e. I do not want this item), (e) restrict range of values desired.
The model proposed by Frayman is designed for situations in which the decision maker has a
lot of time to make the choice. This is not the case for avionics reconfiguration decisions, therefore,
Frayman’s work does not fit well with this research.
To the best of our knowledge, SaIRA is innovative inasmuch as it is the first constraint-based
recommender designed to provide effective naturalistic decision support by paralleling the cognit-
ive strategies of the pilot. This is done by implementing algorithms that automatically generate
explanations and implications, as well as an assessment of the reliability of each piece of recon-
figuration advice.
5.3 Reconfiguration as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem
Slightly different notations are used in the literature to describe Constraint Satisfaction Problems
(CSP). For this reason, whilst discussing the characteristics of SaIRA and the design choices made,
this section introduces some necessary terminology, concepts and definitions.
The CSP material is intended as an introduction to SaIRA and the framework design choices.
For detailed information on CSP, the reader should refer to Tsang [1993].
A CSP can be described in terms of a constraint network:
Definition 5.3.1 A Constraint Network (CN) is defined by a triple R = (X,D,C) where:
• X is a finite set of variables;
• D is a function that maps each variable x ∈ X to a finite set of values, D(x), which it is
allowed to take. D(x) represents the domain of x, and it is sometimes denoted as Dx;
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• C is a set of constraints on the variables in X. Let S = {xk, . . . , xl} ⊆ X. Each constraint
CS ∈ C is a relation with scheme S and instance CS . The set S is the scope of the constraint.
The arity of the constraint is denoted as |S |. Each tuple in the instance CS ⊆ Dxk × . . .×Dxl
specifies a combination of values which the constraint allows.
Section 5.1.1 defines an informal ontology for SaIRA. Here the ontology is restructured around
the concept of ‘constraint’ and formalised as a CSP. As shown in Figure 5.2, each concept in the
ontology is translated into constraints. For instance, the notion that, at any time, the state of a
power generator can be either ‘on’ or ‘off’ is implemented through the following constraint:
Cp gen : p gen ∈ {0, 1} (5.1)
where 0 codifies the state of ‘off’ and 1 the state of ‘on’.
Consider the following REQUIREMENT for a generic IMA:
On any Line Replaceable Module, the sum of the memory consumption of all tasks
running at the same time must always be less than the total memory installed.
Let LRMk be a generic Line Replaceable Module, let Memk be the total memory available on
it, let ckj be a boolean value representing whether a generic task is active or inactive on LRMk, and
let m j be the memory required by the task in question. The requirement in question is translated
into the following constraint:
Memk ≥
∑
ckj × m j where ckj ∈ {0, 1} (5.2)
An EVENT in SaIRA is also modelled as a constraint. For instance, if the power generator
mentioned in Constraint 5.1 is affected by a fault, the following constraint is issued:
C f ault p gen : p gen = 0 (5.3)
meaning that the power generator in question is not working anymore.
Constraint 5.3 is restrictive to the point where the variable is limited to taking a single value.
In other words, the constraint implicitly leads to the assignment of a value to the variable. This
introduces the assignment and instantiation operations.
Definition 5.3.2 Let R = (X,D,C) be a constraint network. An assignment of the value a ∈ Dx to
the variable x ∈ X is denoted 〈x, a〉. An instantiation of a set of variables {xk, . . . , xl} ⊆ X is a sim-
ultaneous assignment of values to the variables {xk, . . . , xl} and is denoted {〈xk, ak〉, . . . , 〈xl, al〉}.
Definition 5.3.3 An instantiation a¯ satisfies a constraint CS if a¯|S ∈ CS . Let R = (X,D,C) be a
constraint network. An instantiation a¯T , where T ⊆ X, is consistent relative to R if, and only if, a¯T
satisfies all constraints CS ∈ C such that S ⊆ T.












Figure 5.2: Constraints-based ontology of the SCMS dynamic reconfiguration problem.
Constraint 5.3 makes Constraint 5.1 redundant: a constraint is redundant if its removal does
not change the set of solutions.
Constraint 5.3 represents the assignment of a single variable. When all the variables of the CN
are included in an instantiation, and a value can be successfully assigned to each and every variable,
a solution to the problem is found, which in SaIRA represents an applicable configuration. More
specifically:
Definition 5.3.4 A solution of the constraint network R = (X,D,C) is an instantiation of all the
variables in X which is consistent relative to R. Sol(R) is the set of all the solutions to a constraint
network R.
A CN is satisfiable if, and only if, Sol(R) , ∅; it is unsatisfiable if, and only if, Sol(R) = ∅.
In general, after having verified that the CN is satisfiable, finding a solution to it typically
corresponds to one of the following three problems:
a) finding a solution without any specific preference;
b) finding all the solutions (the whole set Sol(R));
c) finding one or more (sub)optimal solutions (requires an optimality function).
During ADR, it is a requirement for SaIRA to generate one or a few (if available) configuration
alternatives from which the pilot can select the one that best matches his/her preferences. As a
result, approach (c) is adopted in SaIRA.
The case in which one or more solutions that satisfy all the constraints are available translates,
in ADR terms, into what Spitzer [2000] defines as ‘minor reconfiguration’: all the requirements
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are met and the functionality of the aircraft does not change after the reconfiguration. A minor
reconfiguration is totally ‘transparent’ to the pilot, apart from a short time period due to the actual
implementation of the reconfiguration (e.g. switching off some functions in order to reload them
on different computing modules).
Clearly, there are cases in which the consequences of the EVENT are such that the resulting CN
becomes unsatisfiable. In this case, the CSP is over-constrained. There are two possibilities in
such a situation:
1. one or more constraints can be relaxed, hence a sub-optimal solution can still be found
(defined by Spitzer [2000] as ‘major reconfiguration’);
2. no constraints can be relaxed, the consequences of the EVENT are such that the functionality
of the aircraft is irremediably compromised.
A great deal of research has been conducted to develop automated techniques to handle over-
constrained CSPs. These include associating priorities with constraints (the constraint with lowest
priority is relaxed first), fuzzy logic, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory, cost functions, weighted CN
and Bayesian approaches [Schiex 2005; Felfernig and Burke 2008].
Smith et al. [2005] observe that “typically an automated algorithm is better suited to conduct-
ing repetitive search steps that are not possible for a human user, while a user typically has more
specific knowledge about the target domain that is difficult to formalize in general terms to be used
by an algorithm”.
The observation from Smith is particularly relevant in the ADR problem given its safety-
critical context. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is not possible to codify pilot intentions in the
logic of the avionics, as a certain degree of epistemic uncertainty is always going to characterise
the reconfiguration problem. As a result, over-constrained situations are the stage of the search for
applicable configurations in which full automation is “broken” and SaIRA calls upon the pilot’s
intervention.
5.3.1 Interactive Reconfiguration
The overall set of constraints forming the knowledge base of SaIRA is divided in hard and soft
constraints. Hard constraints cannot be relaxed because this would make the problem inconsistent.
An example of a hard constraint is a scheduling constraint on a flight control application. On
the other hand, soft constraints can be relaxed at run-time. An example of a soft constraint is
Elevator Feel System ACTIVE: the EFS functionality is not critical to fly the aircraft, so for
instance, it could be acceptable to disable this function in situations when there is not enough
power for all the on-board sub-systems.
On the basis of the definition of CN given in Definition 5.3.1, it is now possible to introduce
the Dynamic Constraint Network (DCN) [Amilhastre et al. 2002; Madsen 2003]:
Definition 5.3.5 A dynamic constraint network (DCN) is a quadruple ∆ = (X,D,Z,H) where
(X,D,Z) is a satisfiable constraint network with a static set of variables X, domains D and a static
set of constraints Z. The set H is a dynamic set of constraints on the variables in X.
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Definition 5.3.6 An instantiation a¯ is a solution to a DCN ∆ = (X,D,Z,H) if, and only if, a¯ is a
solution to the constraint network (X,D,Z∪H). The set of all solutions to ∆ is denoted Sol(∆). The
DCN ∆ is satisfiable (respectively unsatisfiable) if, and only if, the constraint network (X,D,Z∪H)
is satisfiable (respectively unsatisfiable).
Chapter 2 discusses the necessity of structuring the interaction between the pilot and the system
as a selection problem. With reference to the definitions given above, if the problem was structured
as a configuration problem, the pilot would have the possibility of adding, retracting and modifying
the constraints in Z directly. As already discussed, the granularity of this type of interaction is not
suitable to ADR operating conditions in the majority of situations.
A selection problem characterised by a large number of decision alternatives to choose from
is likely to become intractable for the pilot in a reasonable time. Having denoted the maximum
number of configuration alternatives that can be presented to the pilot using k, the goal of the ADR
problem can be summarised in the following two steps:
1. add all the constraints in Z to the CN;
2. repeatedly add the constraints in H to the CN until |Sol(∆)| ≤ k.
Constraints are added and retracted through the enumeration process:
Definition 5.3.7 An enumeration is a sequence of constraint additions and retractions (back-
track).
In order to guarantee that the systems proposes only applicable avionics configurations, the
CN must be designed in a way that the complete enumeration of the set of hard constraints, Z,
never leads to an unsatisfiable state. This problem has been already addressed in the literature
and several approaches have been developed (e.g. consistency checks [Tsang 1993], finite state
automata [Hadzic et al. 2007]).
A more interesting topic for this research is how to switch to degraded operating conditions
interactively, by relaxing one or more constraints belonging to H. This problem is addressed after
the general structure of the ADR problem is introduced.
5.3.2 ADR Problem Structure
The approach proposed in SaIRA to model the ADR CSP is based on Benders’ decomposition
[Benders 1962], which has already been used to structure complex combinatorial CSP [Cambaz-
ard et al. 2004]. The CSP is divided into two distinct problems (Figure 5.3). The master problem
handles hard constraints only and is tackled autonomously by the CSP solver, using constraint pro-
gramming techniques. This problem is solved first and an applicable but incomplete configuration
is produced. The incomplete configuration is refined in the sub-problem, which handles the dy-
namic constraints and is solved using a mixture of constraint programming techniques, heuristics
and and involves the pilot. A novel approach to the solution of the sub-problem is proposed later
in this chapter.
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Because of the role that the master and sub-problems play in this project, for the sake of clarity
the remainder of the thesis refers to the master problem as the Automated Problem and to the
sub-problem as the Interactive Problem (i.e. it involves the pilot). The output of the automated
problem (a partial configuration) is the input for the interactive one. It is a requirement in SaIRA
that the Automated Problem is consistent:
Definition 5.3.8 Let ∆ = (X,D,Z,H) be a dynamic constraint network (DCN). Let S (∆) be the set
of all solutions of ∆. ∆ is consistent (respectively inconsistent) iff S (∆) , ∅ (respectively = ∅).
This requirement ensures that at any time during the ADR, the solutions of the Automated
Problem are valid. In other words, only the propagation of dynamic constraints can lead to un-














Figure 5.3: Bender’s decomposition of the ADR problem. The automated problem is solved using constraint
programming techniques only; the sub-problem is solved by a combination of constraint programming techniques,
heuristics and pilot’s preferences.
5.3.3 A note about the CSP Solver
Several tools for CSP modelling and solutions are available on the internet, for example, [ILOG
2010], [ECLiPSe 2010], [SICStus Prolog 2010]. In this thesis the ADR problem is modelled
and solved using Choco [Laburthe 2000], an event-based CP solution engine based on the Claire
[Caseau et al. 2002] programming language. The reasons for choosing Choco include the fact
that it is open source and free. It is an event-driven engine (particularly suitable for modeling
fault-management systems) and it has autonomous explanation generation features that are used
in SaIRA as a baseline to generate readily understandable decision support information for the
human.
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The selection of a specific tool does not limit the generality of the model proposed in this
work. In fact, default search algorithms provided by all the solvers previously mentioned are
sufficiently similar that they provide a common context for discussing modelling choices without
losing generality [Smith 2005].
5.4 Modelling and Solution of the Automated Problem
5.4.1 A model of a small IMA system
By way of example, a model of a small IMA system is described in this section in order to show
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Figure 5.4: Simplified model of an IMA.
Variables
Line Replaceable Modules (LRM): The IMA is composed of three LRMk, each of which is
equipped with a variable number of processors (cpu). Each LRMk has a different amount of
memory Memk. A number of tasks (Ti) runs on each LRMk but, for safety reasons, only one
task can run on each cpu. In this model, cpui denotes the processor on which task Ti runs.
Tasks scheduling and allocation: Each task Ti has a start time S i, a duration pi, a deadline di
and a memory consumption mi. Tasks are considered non-preemptive.
The fact that task Ti is assigned to LRMk is represented by the boolean variable Cki .
A very simple fixed cyclic scheduling policy is implemented in this example. More soph-
isticated task scheduling and allocation approaches are adopted in real, modern IMAs (e.g. Lee
et al. [2000]; Bate and Burns [2003]), however, a cyclic executive allows a clearer exposition on
this occasion. The specific problem of applying CP techniques to more complex task scheduling
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strategies on distributed networks has been already addressed extensively (e.g. Cambazard et al.
[2004]; Hladik et al. [2005]; Weibenbacher et al. [2005]).
The directed graph in Figure 5.5 represents the major execution cycle of four hypothetical tasks
Ti running on the system. The small black circles represent a task execution at each iteration of the
schedule. The arrows between the circles represent precedence relationships, so that the second
time T1 is executed it requires input from T2; hence, T2 must have completed its first execution
before T1 can start its second execution. T ni denotes the n-th execution of Ti within the major
cycle. It follows that T 12 → T 21 .
Communication: Tasks communicate through the data bus which has maximum bandwidth






Figure 5.5: Acyclic, oriented graph representing tasks precedence relationships. Black circles represent task
execution; arrows represent precedence between two tasks, e.g. Ti → T j means that T j is dependent on Ti, hence T j
can start only after Ti has completed.
Obviously, no bus bandwidth is consumed if the two tasks that communicate reside on the
same LRM but on different processors; the variable xi j contains information about the fact that
tasks Ti and T j share the same LRM (i.e. 0 means they reside on different LRM, 1 means they
share the same LRM).
Constraints
For the sake of demonstrating the ease of handling the ADR problem through CP, a few explanatory
constraints from the overall problem are introduced here. More sophisticated relationships can be
established for real, complex systems.
Memory consumption: a constraint is defined to avoid allocating a number of tasks on a LRM
which require in sum more memory than it is available:
for each LRMk, Memk ≥
∑
ckj × m j (5.4)
Bandwidth consumption: for each task Ti the following two constraints are set up to model
the bandwidth consumption. As previously mentioned, the communication between two tasks that
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reside on the same LRM does not require any bandwidth.
hi =
∑
xi j × hi j (5.5)
cumulative((s00, d0, h0), . . . , (s
m
0 , d0, h0), . . . , (s
0
l , dl, hl), . . . , (s
m
l , dl, hl),Hbus) (5.6)
Task allocation: the fact that each task must run on a different CPU is modelled with an
allDifferent constraint (available in the majority of CSP solvers):
allDifferent (cpu1, ..., cpun) (5.7)
Task precedences: tasks are linked by inter-dependencies. If the input data for T nj is the output
of T mi , then T
n
i must be executed before T
m
j . Denoting with s
n
i the start time of the n-th execution
of task Ti (see Figure 5.5), the following constraint is set up:
sni + di ≤ smj (5.8)
Channelling constraints: finally, two channelling constraints are added:
xi j = 0 iff T j and Ti share the same LRM (5.9)
ckj = 1 iff T j is executed on LRMk (5.10)
Occurrence of a fault
An EVENT is modelled as a constraint that affects either a RESOURCE or a FUNCTION (or both) of the
IMA. If the sensors detect and identify a fault to some of the memory banks of LRM2 in Figure 5.5,
reducing the available memory from 100 Mb to 60 MB, this EVENT would be implemented by
reducing the upper bound of variable Mem2 from 100 MB to 60 MB, resulting in the following
constraint being active in the constraint network:
Mem2 = 60MB (5.11)
Following the occurrence of the EVENT, a reconfiguration is triggered and the new value of
Mem2 is taken into consideration by Constraint 5.4. If 60 MB do not suffice for all the functions
running on LRM2, the new configurations proposed will relocate some of the tasks running on
LRM2 to another LRM.
There could be situations in which the designers want specific constraints to be considered only
at the occurrence of pre-defined events. For instance, if a series of faults affects the memory banks
on Mem2 and the maximum amount of memory available falls below 30 Mb, the designers might
want to deactivate the whole LRM. In SaIRA this mechanism is implemented algorithmically
by means of a special class of constraint introduced by van der Linden [2001], dynamic meta-
constraints, which are “constraints that activate other constraints”. This functionality is easily
implemented as a set of ‘if ... then’ rules in Choco.
Up to this point, three main simplifications have been made, which require more attention:
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1. Multiple, applicable configurations available: multiple, seemingly similar (to the pilot)
and equally applicable configurations can result from solving the ADR CSP following an
unexpected EVENT; the pilot must be provided with only a few decision alternatives.
2. No configuration available: there could be no solution to the problem given the active set
of constraints;
3. Uncertainties: uncertainty was not addressed appropriately:
(a) an assumption was made that practitioners have perfect knowledge about the system
they designed and developed (i.e. epistemic uncertainty was ignored);
(b) it was assumed that all possible changes in the operating conditions could be predicted
(i.e. aleatory uncertainty was ignored);
(c) sensors and other onboard devices used to detect and identify unexpected EVENTs were
assumed to be perfectly reliable and tuned.
All the limitations listed are discussed in the following sections.
5.4.2 Multiple Configurations Available
The first simplification has a relatively trivial solution. When multiple configurations are applic-
able, by default SaIRA reduces the options to a few (i.e. two or three) configurations which carry
minimal changes to the current one. The two or three options selected are shown to the pilot, who
has the final choice on which configuration should be applied to the system.
Any solution to the problem represents an applicable configuration; the rationale for favouring
minimal changes is, intuitively, the reduction of the risk of failures during the process of trans-
itioning between two different system states.
SaIRA uses an instance of the Distance-Weighted k-Nearest Neighbour algorithm to calculate
the configurations that bring minimal changes to the system; this decision is debatable and it does
not limit the generality of the framework; other algorithms could be employed to perform the same
activity.
The algorithm assumes that all the configurations generated by the CSP solver correspond to
points in a 3-dimensional space R3. The three dimensions are: (a) number of constraints added, (b)
number of constraints retracted, and (c) the number of constraints modified. The three dimensions
are metrics that allow the ranking of configurations in terms of the degree of changes they bring to
the current set of active constraints (which represent the current configuration).
For each configuration x, a feature vector is calculated:
〈a1(x), a2(x), a3(x)〉 (5.12)
where ar(x) denotes the value of the rth attribute metric of configuration x. The standard
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Euclidean distance between two configurations xi and x j is defined as follows:




(ar(xi) − ar(x j))2 (5.13)
Let xq be the query configuration to be classified, and let f : R3 → V be the classification
function, with V = {v1, . . . , vk} is the resulting set of k configurations nearest to the current one.
For each configuration to be classified, the algorithm calculates the following:




wiδ(v, f (xi)) (5.14)
where:
δ(a, b) =
 1 if a = b0 otherwise (5.15)
and:
wi ≡ 1d(xq, xi)2 (5.16)
The term wi allows weighting the contribution of each of the k neighbour configurations ac-
cording to their distance to the current configuration, giving greater weight to closer neighbours.
In the majority of cases two or three configuration options are shown to the pilot, hence the
algorithm is configured accordingly (i.e. as 2- or 3-Nearest Neighbour).
5.4.3 No Configuration Available
In over-constrained situations, one or more constraints must be relaxed in order to find sub-optimal
solutions. Chronological backtracking is the basis of several algorithms proposed in the literat-
ure for the autonomous management of over-constrained CSP. A depth-first search is performed
through the search space and the variables are instantiated sequentially; all the relevant constraints
are checked for consistency after each variable is instantiated and, in the case of any violations, the
algorithm backtracks to the last variable that still has one or more values available [Tsang 1993].
Several improvements and alternatives to chronological backtracking have been proposed, all
of them designed for the automated management of over-constrained situations, e.g. Dynamic
Backtracking [Ginsberg 1993], Conflict-Directed BackJumping [Prossner 1995], Partial Order Dy-
namic Backtracking [Ginsberg and McAllester 1994], Dependency-Directed Backtracking [Stall-
man and Sussman 1977], Generalised Dynamic Backtracking [Bliek 1998].
One of the standpoints taken in this research is that experienced decision makers usually pos-
sess deeper knowledge of the decision options, which goes beyond system models. The decision
maker could act effectively during unforeseen situations and manage to recover from system fail-
ure, if properly informed of the specifics of the impasse that the system has encountered.
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When the constraints relative to the current operating conditions make the CSP associated with
the ADR problem over-constrained, it becomes necessary to guide the pilot through the complex
decision of selecting which constraints, amongst hundreds, should be relaxed, in order to find the
configuration that best fits the new operating conditions. In CSP terms, this corresponds to the
problem of identifying the correct repair action [Elkhyari et al. 2002].
In SaIRA, the objective of a decision support message in support of a repair action is to help the
pilot answering the question “why should I apply Configuration A instead of Configuration
B?” Accepting one configuration instead of another corresponds to accepting one repair action
instead of another (e.g. sacrifice the Elevator Feel System instead of the Waypoint Generator
System).
The constraint-based reconfiguration system must go through the following three steps in order
to provide support to the pilot:
1. Generate a number of configurations using the current active constraints;
2. Generate a set of repair actions for the inconsistencies;
3. Generate recommendations for the repair actions.
The first step has already been briefly discussed in the previous section; extensive research
has already been performed in this domain. The second and third steps are more complicated and
interesting for this thesis. The generation of recommendations for each repair action2 encompasses
the tasks of generating explanations (i.e. why should the pilot go for repair action A instead of
repair action B?) and implications (i.e. what are the consequences of going for repair action A?).
The accomplishment of these tasks required the development of two novel algorithms, namely
wsm decision-repair and SaIRA-XPlain. For reasons of clarity of exposition, the details
of the algorithms development process, the description of their features and the analysis of their
performance have been relegated to Appendix B; the focus of this chapter is on the overall design
of the system, however the details are given in the appendices for the sake of reproducibility.
The research hypothesis states that effective decision support information for ADR decisions
should include explanations, implications and an assessment of the uncertainty embedded in the re-
commendations of the system. Up to this point explanations and implications have been discussed;
Section 5.5 will focus on the last piece of information missing from the picture: the uncertainty
assessment. As with explanations and implications, the exposition will be kept qualitative in this
chapter; detailed information about the algorithms used to calculate uncertainties are provided in
Appendix C.
Figure 5.6 provides an overall view of the function of each piece of decision support inform-
ation in relation to the configuration suggestion proposed by the system. Both explanations and
the uncertainty assessment are used by the algorithms as inputs to generate the suggestion; the
implications are calculated as a result of the potential application of each configuration sugges-
tion. The research hypothesis predicts that the contemporaneous access to all the pieces of support
information should lead to an informed and effective avionics reconfiguration decision.
2Each repair action leads to a specific configuration.
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Figure 5.6: Informed avionics reconfiguration decision supported by SaIRA decision support information.
Section 5.6 will describe the overall SaIRA framework and its components. Section 5.7 will
reveal how the user interface has been designed and how explanations, implications and uncer-
tainty assessment, as generated by SaIRA, are physically presented to the pilots on the cockpit
displays.
5.5 Multi-Sensor Data Fusion and Uncertainty
Data fusion techniques combine data from multiple sensors, and related information from associ-
ated databases, to achieve improved accuracy and more specific inferences than could be achieved
by the use of a single sensor alone [Llinas and Hall 1998].
Murphy [1996] gives the following definition of intelligent sensor fusion:
Definition 5.5.1 Intelligent sensor fusion is defined as a process which can autonomously gather
observations from multiple sensors and combine them into a single, coherent percept (execution),
adapt the combination process to major environmental strategies for observing the percept (con-
figuration).
At present, multi-sensor data fusion techniques are employed in many safety-critical engineer-
ing domains, including robotics, machine vision, monitoring of manufacturing processes, medical
128 CHAPTER 5. A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERACTIVE DYNAMIC RECONFIGURATION
applications, smart weapons, fault diagnosis, satellite and aircraft avionics (see Hall and Llinas
[1997] for an extensive case history).
Besides the benefits extensively discussed in the literature, the adoption of sensor data fusion
techniques on-board modern aircraft can possibly have consequences on the avionics dynamic
reconfiguration process which require attention. Let us consider the following accident:
Accident 5.1 On the 24th August 2001 an Airbus A330-200 covering the Air Transat 236 route
between Toronto and Lisbon developed a fuel leak in a fuel line to its right engine [Aviation-
safety.net 2010]:
1. Flight TS 236 took off from Toronto at 0:52 (UTC)
2. There were 293 passengers and 13 crew members on board. The aircraft was an Airbus
A330 manufactured in 1999, configured with 362 seats and placed in service by Air Transat
in April 1999. Leaving the gate in Toronto, the aircraft had 47.9 tonnes of fuel on board, 5.5
tonnes more than required by regulations.
3. At 04:38 UTC (estimated), a fuel leak started in the area of engine no. 2 (right engine).
4. At 05:16 UTC, a cockpit warning system sounded and reported low oil temperature and
high oil pressure on engine no. 2. There is no obvious connection between oil temperature
or pressure problems and a fuel leak. At first, Captain Piche´ and co-pilot DeJager suspec-
ted these warnings were computer bugs and communicated with their maintenance control
center.
5. At 05:36 UTC, the pilots received a warning of fuel imbalance and diverted fuel from the
port (left side) wing tanks to the starboard tanks, which were showing close to empty. Be-
cause the fuel leak in the starboard engine had still not been diagnosed, this diversion had
the effect of sending fuel to the leak and causing further loss.
6. At 05:45 UTC, it became clear that fuel was dangerously low.
...
7. At 06:13 UTC, 28 minutes after the emergency declaration and 135 miles (217 km) from
Lajes, engine no. 2 on the right wing flamed out, exhausted of jet fuel.
...
8. At 06:26 UTC, engine no. 1 flamed out
...
9. Thanks to the skills of the pilots, the plane made a fortuitous emergency landing at 6:46
(UTC) with several people injured but no deaths.
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Some evidence of a fuel leak was detected by the network of sensors installed on the aircraft.
However, the information was not fused into a single, helpful fault message and too much inference
was left to the human operators. Leading aviation and space companies are investing significant
amounts of money in the development of multi-sensor information fusion systems. Examples are
the Multi-Sensor Integration (MSI) avionics software by EADS [Belz 2005] and Block 3.0 sensor
fusion avionics software by Lockheed Martin [Caires and Stout 2002].
Different sensors, characterised by different reliability, precision and fit to assess a specific
fault, could generate different, and possibly contrasting, inferences. This implicitly injects a degree
of uncertainty into the conclusions reached by the fault management logic which, as seen in the
previous chapters, drives the ADR system. In this scenario, a major avionics reconfiguration (in
which the functionality of the aircraft is changed) could be triggered on the basis of uncertain
information, depending on how the logic is implemented. In some cases, a major reconfiguration
could lead to severely degraded functional arrangements with reduced safety. Should the pilot
be informed of the degree of uncertainty embedded in a fault assessment made by the system
before triggering a reconfiguration? Would this type of information improve his or her situation
awareness?
In this regard it is interesting to mention Hunter [2006] which investigates the effects of risk
perception among general aviation pilots. Trying to explain pilot behaviours that lead to acci-
dents or incidents, Hunter brings evidence for two conclusions that are extremely relevant for our
research interest:
• One explanation for behaviour that leads to an accident or incident is that the pilot did not
perceive the risk inherent in the situation and hence, did not undertake avoidance or other
risk-mitigating actions;
• Another explanation is that when individuals correctly perceive the risks involved in a situ-
ation, some may elect to continue because the risk is not considered sufficiently threatening.
Those individuals would be described as having a greater tolerance or acceptance of risk
compared to the mainstream.
The position of this thesis is that a decision support system should quantify the uncertainty
to help the pilot cope with higher order reasoning processes in an unstructured environment. We
claim—and empirically verify in Chapter 6—that an assessment of the uncertainty (which is made
up of risk and ambiguity as shown in Section 4.1.1) embedded in safety-critical information com-
ing from the system would lead to more informed—and hence safer—decisions and would improve
pilot situation awareness.
Hidden risks were not exposed in Accident 5.1. No textual information was generated by the
system, a set of alarms was triggered and pilots were directed to the Flight Manual. To worsen the
situation, the Airbus A330 manual, when describing the procedure to reconfigure the fuel between
tanks (which is what the pilots did on that occasion), contains the following sentence:
CAUTION: do not apply this procedure if fuel leak is suspected. Refer
to FUEL LEAK procedure.
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This information could have meant that the accident was avoided, but even if it is reported in
the manual, it is presented as a caution and not as a step in the standard procedure. For this reason,
in that critical context and with a limited decision time budget, the pilots did not pay attention to
it.
If the system had been able to tell the pilots something like this:
[low oil temperature] + [high oil pressure]
↓
fuel leak [uncertainty: 30%]
It might have sowed a doubt in the pilots’ minds and, as a consequence, the accident could
have been avoided.
The problem of fusing information in multi-sensor data networks has had a lot of attention in
the aerospace and defence domains in the last couple of decades. Recently a series of criticisms of
the probabilistic characterisation of uncertainty have appeared in the literature [Sentz et al. 2002],
claiming that traditional probability theory is not capable of capturing epistemic uncertainty (see
Appendix C for more details).
The application of traditional probabilistic methods to epistemic uncertainty is often known
as Bayesian probability. Bayesian approaches to Fault Detection, Identification and Recovery
(FDIR) are widely employed in the aerospace domain [Paakko et al. 2001; Guiotto et al. 2003].
These techniques require practitioners to have precise information concerning the probability of
all events. When this is not possible, the uniform distribution function is often used, justified
by Laplace with the Principle of Insufficient Reason [Smets 1994]. This can be interpreted as,
all simple events for which a probability distribution is not known in a given sample space, are
equally likely. The result is hiding potentially dangerous information from the pilot.
In response to this problem, significant research has been performed on the application of
Evidential Reasoning (ER) techniques. ER is a reasoning framework based on the theory of belief
functions conceived by Dempster [1967] and further developed by Shafer [1976]. It is a general-
isation of probability theory that allows the specification and handling of degrees of precision as
well as degrees of uncertainty, which go beyond the limits of classic Bayesian methods.
The theory allows belief to be assigned to individual propositions in the space or to disjunctions
of propositions or both. Belief assigned to a disjunction explicitly represents a lack of sufficient
information to enable more precise distribution. This allows belief to be attributed to statements
whose granularity is appropriate to the available evidence.
Murphy [1998] investigates the application of ER-based techniques to multi-sensor data fusion
for robotics applications; Sarma and Raju [1991] apply the theory to the problem of multi-sensor
based target identification on the battlefield; Strat [1987] addresses the problem of generating ex-
planations of the ER-based reasoning of an automated system; Yu et al. [2004] focus on the prob-
lem of fusing multi-sensor information coming from airborne sensor networks for target tracking
and identification in military applications. This short list is far from being exhaustive, but it reveals
plenty of well-established work that can be applied to the problem of generating uncertainty fig-
ures related to the fault assessment information that triggers a reconfiguration and that is directed
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to the pilot for decision support.
In the experiments discussed in Chapter 6, the ER-based approach for multi-sensor fusion
introduced by Yu et al. [2004] is used to simulate sensor data fusion and generate the uncertainty
figures.
The choice of the algorithm developed by Yu et al. is not absolute, other solutions available
in the literature could be applied as well. In fact, the topic of sensor data fusion has been briefly
touched on in this section in order to introduce the necessity of providing the pilot with uncertainty
figures and to show that the technology to generate this type of information programmatically is
already available, supporting the practicality of the approach taken in SaIRA. More information
concerning how ER ideas in the literature are specifically applied to SaIRA are in Appendix C.
5.6 SaIRA
All the technology discussed in this chapter and in Appendices B and C is integrated in the ar-
chitecture presented in Figure 5.7. SaIRA comprises three main components, the Sensor Fusion
Executive (SFE), the Reconfiguration Executive (RE) and the Decision Support Executive (DSE).
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Figure 5.7: Safe and Interactive Reconfiguration Architecture (SaIRA).
The Sensor Fusion Executive receives readings from the on-board sensors and uses heuristics
based on the Evidential Reasoning paradigm (discussed in Appendix C) to merge the data and
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calculate an assessment of the reliability of the fault diagnosis. Fault diagnosis and uncertainty
information are sent to both the RE and DSE for further processing.
The main purpose of the Reconfiguration Executive is ‘generating applicable configurations’.
Fault diagnosis information obtained from the SFE is integrated with domain-dependent know-
ledge codified in the CSP associated with the ADR problem. The constraint-based solver makes a
first attempt to identify a solution (i.e. applicable configuration); in cases when it is successful (i.e.
minor reconfiguration, the system functionality is not altered), no decision support information is
generated, hence the DSE is not called and the pilot is asked to confirm a ‘transparent’ reconfigur-
ation. In cases of major reconfiguration (i.e. the current system functionality must be altered and
it is necessary to switch to a degraded operating mode), the partial solution generated by the RE is
passed to the DSE for further refinement, with the support of the pilot (Sections 5.3 and 5.4).
The Decision Support Executive receives fault diagnosis information from the SFE and
a partial configuration from the RE. Within this module, the SaIRA-XPlain algorithm (Ap-
pendix B, Section B.2.3), which embeds the wsm decision-repair algorithm (Appendix B,
Sections B.1.5.2 and B.1.6), manages the interactive process of conflict repair. The DSE generates
decision support information for the pilot and calculates applicable configurations on the basis of
the inputs coming from SFE, RE, the pilot, and a domain-dependent knowledge base, which is co-
dified in the constraints weights used by the WSMrank function (part of the wsm decision-repair
algorithm).
For the reasons given in Section 3.2.3, the pilot is required to confirm the application of the new
configuration to the system, regardless of the path followed for the generation of the configuration
to apply, i.e. either through a minor or major reconfiguration.
5.7 SaIRA Interface Design
The previous sections in this chapter along with Appendices B and C describe how the decision
support information is algorithmically generated by SaIRA. This section discusses how the inter-
face of SaIRA has been designed and the decision support information is graphically presented.
The work discussed in this section has been performed with the support of two Boeing 737-900ER
pilots; all the design decisions taken have been preventively discussed and agreed with them, a
process that led to the development of graphics which are very similar to cockpit instruments
currently available on the Boeing 737-900ER aircraft.
Modern cockpits have evolved from “clock-like” instruments to “glass cockpits”—the cock-
pit features electronic, reconfigurable instrument displays similar to the personal computer glass
monitor. Because the displays can be reconfigured, their content can be tuned whilst airborne to
show flight information as required by the phase of flight and as needed by the pilot. Like other
modern glass cockpit applications, SaIRA has been designed to temporarily replace the content of
some of the cockpit displays with its decision support information at the occurrence of an event
that triggers an avionics reconfiguration.
Some basic information about modern glass cockpit is presented hereinafter (Section 5.7.1),
in preparation for the discussion of how the interface of SaIRA has been designed (Section 5.7.2).
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5.7.1 The Electronic Flight Information System
The primary component of modern glass cockpits is the Electronic Flight Information System
(EFIS), which is responsible for the processing and display of all the flight information during
all the phases of flight. It comprises two displays: the Electronic Horizontal Simulation Display
(EHSI) and the Electronic Altitude Director Indicator (EADI). The third type of reconfigurable
display in modern glass cockpits is the the aircraft systems and engine performance information
display: this latter display is known as EICAS (Engine Indicator and Crew Alert System) on Boe-
ing aircraft and as ECAM (Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor) on Airbus aircraft. Figure 5.8
shows the glass cockpit of a real Boeing 737-900ER and the location of the displays mentioned
above. The figure shows clearly that both pilot and co-pilot have their own EHSI and EADI dis-
plays whilst they share the EICAS. Because the Boeing 737-900ER is used in the experiments
presented in this thesis, the remainder of this section refers to this aircraft specifically.
The EHSI displays the flight progress of the aircraft on a plan view map or the flight plan on
a map oriented to true north (Figure 5.9). The display can also serve as a weather radar when the
pilot activates this functionality.
The EADI displays information about attitude (pitch and roll), flight director commands, local-
iser deviation and glide slope deviation (Figure 5.9). Additionally, depending on the system mode,
the display can also show information relating to autopilot, airplane speed, pitch limit, Mach,
ground speed, radio height alert, decision height and radio altitude.
The EICAS displays engine and selected subsystems indications as well as crew alerting func-
tions. Typical engine parameters shown in this display are revolutions per minute, temperature
values, fuel flow and oil pressure.
The EFIS of the Boeing 737-900ER is called Common Display System (CDS) and is produced
by Honeywell International Inc. The CDS, shown in Figure 5.8, comprises six flat panel LCD
display units. The six identical ARINC D-size display units are 20.32 by 20.32 cm. Each display
has a 16.97- by 16.97-cm usable display area. The four display units located outboard and inboard
on the captain’s forward panel and first officer’s forward panel are the EHSI and EADI. The upper-
and lower-center display units on the central panel are the EICAS.
5.7.2 Designing the interface of SaIRA
The EFIS shows information on a “need-to-know” basis. In line with this approach, SaIRA has
been designed to display reconfiguration decision support information only when a reconfiguration
is required; in nominal conditions, no SaIRA information is displayed on the cockpit.
The first design decision taken was the choice of which displays should be used to display the
SaIRA information. A major requirement is to keep the information that is critical for the flight
always accessible, even during avionics reconfiguration. A consultation with the pilots revealed
that basic information provided by the EHSI and EADI displays is always available in their analo-
gic counterpart on the cockpit, as shown in Figure 5.9. In fact, the HSI and ADI instruments are
supposed to be used by the pilots when the EFIS fails to generate the graphics. As a result, it was
decided that when a reconfiguration is required, SaIRA temporarily replaces the content of both
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EHSI EADI
EICAS
Figure 5.8: Cockpit of the Boeing 737-900ER [original image freely available at www.flightgear.org].
the EHSI and EADI displays. The EICAS displays are not modified in any way by SaIRA, leaving
engine information and other warning from the avionics subsystems always acessible.
An analysis of the scaled pictures of the cockpit displays from the Boeing 737-900ER manual
reveals that the font size of the text shown on both EHSI and EADI ranges between 34mm to
68mm. In line with other instruments, the standard font used by SaIRA has size 60 mm; the
virtual buttons used by the pilots to select and accept the configurations (see Figure 5.11) have
size 1 cm.
The Boeing 737-900ER EFIS has the following warning colours scheme [Brady 1999]:
• White - Informative text
• Red lights - Warning - indicate a critical condition and require immediate action.
• Amber lights - Caution - require timely corrective action.
• Blue lights - Advisory - eg valve positions and unless bright blue, ie a valve/switch disagree-
ment, do not require crew action.
• Green lights - Satisfactory - indicate a satisfactory or ON condition.
The information displayed by SaIRA has been adapted to the scheme above. White is used
for the informative text. The fault description is written in red colour. The buttons to accept a
satisfactory configuration are green and the buttons to switch between the suggested configurations
are magenta, to differentiate them from the acceptance buttons.






Figure 5.9: Captain-side of the cockpit of the Boeing 737-900ER (X-Plane flight simulator). Both the Attitude
Director Indicator (ADI) and the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) have an electronic counterpart—EADI and
EHSI respectively—in modern glass cockpits.
The previous sections of this chapter discussed how the decision support information is gener-
ated in SaIRA and the importance of explanations, implications and an assessment of the reliability
of the sensor information. A way to present this information on the cockpit displays in natural lan-
guage, for each decision alternative, in an effective way, must be identified.
A review of the literature reveals that the majority of Natural Language Generation (NLG)
systems employed in interactive problems and decision support structure the information using
one of the following ways, or a combination of them:
• Elaboration: a set of messages elaborates on the information in another set of messages;
• Exemplification: a set of messages provides an example of the fact stated in another set of
messages;
• Contrast: a set of messages provides contrasting information to that provided in another set
of messages;
• Narrative sequence: a set of messages communicates a time-ordered sequence of events.
As discussed with the pilots, sophisticated constructions represent a risk for SaIRA, because
the message delivered could become too complicated to be processed in real-time. Given that
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the pilot is required to choose between two or more configurations, it was decided to structure
the messages using contrasts; the pilot is provided with the characteristics of each configurations,
facilitating an informed comparison between them.
Another important aspect of the structure of recommendations is the approach adopted for
the content design, bottom-up or top-down. In the former case, all the low-level parts of the
information that needs to be realised for the user are merged into a final message. On the constrary,
in the top-down approach, a semi-fixed pattern is superimposed and the pieces of information are
adapted to it.
The information delivered by SaIRA must have a standard structure for the reasons given
above, therefore the top-down approach is naturally more suitable. SaIRA follows a schema-based
method to structure the information. Dale and Reiter [1995] define a schema as “a pattern that
specifies how a particular document should be constructed from constituent elements, where those
constituent elements may be individual messages or, recursively, instantiations of other schemas”.
Schemas allow the enforcing of a pre-defined skeleton for the message, to deliver and refine it
at runtime; this approach is enough for the needs of the decision support information generation
mechanism of SaIRA described so far.
The schema shown in Figure 5.10 is defined for the decision support messages delivered by
SaIRA. As shown later in this section, buttons are available under the schema which allow the
pilot to switch from the description of one configuration to another, enabling them to contrast
the content of two configuration suggestion messages. The order of the pieces of information,
from the top of the schema to the bottom, was devised in collaboration with the pilots. The first
information that pilots want to read is the nature of the fault which has just happened followed by
the assessment of the reliability of the diagnosis; this allows for the rapid understanding of what
is happening to the system and enables decisions on how to handle the following information on
the display. The next preferred piece of information are implications: understanding what are the
consequences of each configuration alternative is critical to make an informed decision rapidly.
Finally, explanations should be particularly effective to increase situation awareness but they will
likely require more time to be processed (this is empirically assessed in Chapter 6), therefore it
was decided to leave them as the last piece of information presented.
The 16.97- by 16.97-cm usable display area represents a limit to the amount of text that can
be written on the display. With reference to Figure 5.10, on the top of the display one or more
evidence of fault from the sensors are connected by the “+” symbol and are linked to the fault
diagnosis using a vertical arrow to signify causality. The fault diagnosis block occupies up to 4.5
cm (vertical) of space. It was decided to display up to three implications and up to three explan-
ations for each configuration alternative. Appendix B shows that each decision alternative could
potentially have a large number of explanations and implications; the decision support information
generation algorithms developed for this thesis are designed to filter this information to extract the
most important information for the current situation and, for the experiments of Chapter 6, they
have been tuned to show up to three explanations and up to three implications.
Appendix B reveals that the DSS algorithms developed use a pre-defined number of metrics to
evaluate the impact of each configuration alternative on the system functionality. Typical metrics
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Figure 5.10: Decision support information schema used in SaIRA. The portions in red colour are filled with
information generated at run-time.
are safety, performance, instrument usability. Because of the space constraints, the algorithms
have been tuned to show up to two metrics and the direction of their impact; for example, is the
suggested configuration decreases the degree of performance of the system, the following string
will be shown: PERFORMANCE (↓).
The design described so far led to the interface shown in Figures 5.11.a and 5.11.b, which are
taken from one of the experiments discussed in Chapter 6. Figure 5.11.a represents the case in
which the pilot is provided with one configuration only: she can decide to either apply it or switch
to Safe Mode. Figure 5.11.b is representative of the case in which two configuration alternatives
are available: the decision support information is identical to the Figure 5.11.a but two magenta,
virtual buttons appear in the bottom of the display that allow the pilot to browse the characteristics
of each configuration alternative; when she is ready to reconfigure, the pilot clicks on the green
‘ACCEPT’ button to trigger the reconfiguration process.
In addition to the textual information described so far, which is shown in the EHSI, SaIRA
also provides the pilot with a graphical representation of the sub-systems affected by the fault (in
the EADI display). A typical example is provided in Figure 5.12, in which a fault caused by an
over-heat to the Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) on the left-1 engine is depicted.
Pilots stated that for complicated faults they sometimes consult the aircraft manual in order to
have a better understanding of the situation and of the consequences on other sub-systems. In this
light, SaIRA has been designed to automatically show schematics of the sub-systems affected by
the fault as they appear in the aircraft manual; actually, the schematics shown in Figure 5.12 are
taken from the Boeing 737-900ER aircraft manual. Additionally, the sub-systems directly affected
by the fault are circumscribed by a red rectangle.
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CONFIRM AVIONICS RECONFIGURATION
ACCEPT CANCEL (Switch to Safe Mode)
Fault Diagnosis:    PWR GENERATOR L.1 FAILED
Uncertainty:          79%
Implications:         Waypoint Generator → DISABLED
Impact:                 SAFETY(↓)  -  COMFORT(↓)
Explanations:
Elevator Feel System  →    REQUIRED in current mode
Bus reduncancy          →  TRIPLE (safety requirement)
(a) One ADR alternative plus Safe Mode.
CONFIRM AVIONICS RECONFIGURATION
ACCEPT
Fault Diagnosis:    PWR GENERATOR L.1 FAILED
Uncertainty:          79%
Implications:         Waypoint Generator → DISABLED
Impact:                 SAFETY(↓)  -  COMFORT(↓)
Explanations:
Elevator Feel System  →    REQUIRED in current mode
Bus reduncancy          →  TRIPLE (safety requirement)
CONFIG 2CONFIG 1
(b) Two ADR alternatives.
Figure 5.11: SaIRA decision support information on the EHSI display when the pilot get to choose between (a) one
alternative and Safe Mode, or (b) between two alternatives. The fault in question is the failure of the power generator
driven by the left engine.
5.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter deals with the following topics:
• The ‘SaIRA ontology’, a meta-model for an interactive SCMS dynamic reconfiguration pro-
cess was introduced. The ontology facilitates the mapping of a human-interpretable descrip-
tion of the ADR process onto computer-encoded information (i.e. a Constraint Network)
which is used as a knowledge-base for the ADR algorithms proposed.
• After introducing background information about state-of-the-art constraint programming
technology, the approach used in this thesis to structure and solve the ADR problem is
qualitatively discussed. For the sake of clarity of exposition, all the details about how the
ideas have been technically implemented are provided in Appendices B and C, allowing for
the reproducibility of the experiments. The details also include the presentation of two novel
algorithms for automated generation of decision support information and the performance
analysis of one of them.
• The problem of generating information about the uncertainties embedded in the fault man-
agement information produced by the system is briefly discussed; the technology required to
achieve this objective is already available in the literature but, to the best of our knowledge,
it has never been applied in the context of safety-critical decision support on-board modern
aircraft. The technology has been reviewed, discussed, adapted and integrated with SaIRA
to show the practicability of the approach proposed. Qualitative information is provided in
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FAULT DETECTED: PWR GEN L.1 FAILED
L.1 engine IDG over-heat
Figure 5.12: Schematics that describe the sub-systems mainly affected by the fault. This information is shown on the
EADI display of the Boeing 737-900ER cockpit.
this chapter; the technical details have been relegated to Appendix C.
• All the technology discussed in the chapter is organically amalgamated into the SaIRA
framework, which is finally presented from a general point of view. The functionality of
the three main components is described and linked to the material previously presented.
• The process of design of the user interface of SaIRA is discussed in detail. The representa-
tion of the decision support information on the cockpit displays has been designed with the
support of two aircraft pilots qualified to fly the Boeing 737-900 aircraft. The user interface
has been designed in accordance to the graphical shape and logic of current glass cockpit
applications in order to provide the novel decision support tool proposed in this thesis with
a realistic appeal.
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Chapter 6
Empirical Evaluation
“The most savage controversies are about matters as
to which there is no good evidence either way.”
—Bertrand Russell
‘An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish’ (1943)
6.1 Overview of the Experiments
This chapter describes the series of experiments performed to verify the claims advanced in
Chapter 4 (see Section 4.4 for the complete list) on pilot decision behaviour during ADR decisions
and the effectiveness of the decision support framework proposed in Chapter 5. The effectiveness
of the hypothesised DSS user profile is also assessed.
As mentioned in Section 4.3, we ran seven experiments, aimed at investigating different aspects
of the following general research topics:
1. How pilots respond to ADR decisions, regardless of the design of the decision support in-
formation (Experiments A, B, D and F). The experiments performed in this area examine
the following decision biases: trust, complacency, risk perception, time pressure and stress.
2. How the design of SaIRA decision support information influences the pilot response (Experi-
ments C, E and G). Different aspects of the decision support information generated by SaIRA
are manipulated in order to characterise the reactions of the pilots. The aspects manipulated
include information framing, information content, graphics availability and reliability figure
availability.
Thirteen civilian pilots from two European airlines, certified to fly the Boeing 737 aircraft,
participated in this study. At the time of writing, eleven pilots were resident in the United Kingdom
and two in Italy. One of the pilots, of Italian nationality, served as a captain on the B737 and is
now in retirement. All pilots were aged between 31 and 68 at the time of the experiment; twelve
of them are male, one is female.
Initially, two airlines were contacted and asked for their interest in participating to this study;
both of them refused. As a consequence, we proceeded to contact the pilots informally, “as indi-
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viduals”, exploiting social networks (i.e. networks of contacts, not online). Initially, before their
consent to participate to the study, pilots were provided with a overall view of the research during
informal meetings hold in public places such as pubs. All of them required complete anonymity
as a core prerequisite to their participation to the study. Only after their informal consent to par-
ticipate to the research, we proceeded to a more formal relationship and training, as explained in
detail later in this chapter.
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to find experienced pilots willing to participate in re-
search experiments. Furthermore, experiments in which objective measuring techniques like eye-
movement analysis are employed require considerable time to be performed. These are two of the
reasons why a limited number of individuals took part in this study. This is a general issue in the
research community which, on condition that the right statistical tools are employed for analysis
of the results, does not diminish the significance of the results obtained. The literature contains
many examples of research performed on a very small number of pilots, which produced well-
established results that are currently applied in the industrial arena (Sarter and Woods [1994];
Hutchins, Morrison and Kelly [1996]; Flemisch and Onken [2000]; Singer and Dekker [2000];
Mumaw et al. [2001]; Diez et al. [2001]; Arthur et al. [2003]; Huemer et al. [2005]; Hayashi et al.
[2006]; Trujillo et al. [2008]; Dao et al. [2009]; Taylor et al. [2009]; Hayashi et al. [2009] inter
alia). The majority of studies involving experienced pilots and employing eye-movement analysis
techniques seem to be based on a small number of participants.
Section 6.2 describes the metrics used. Apparatus and materials are presented in Section 6.3.
Section 6.4 accounts for the training received by the pilots for the use of the flight simulator,
SaIRA, NASA-TLX (the technique we used to assess the pilot workload) and SA-SWORD (the
technique we used to assess pilot situation awareness). The seven experiments are discussed in
Sections 6.7 to 6.13. Finally, general conclusions are drawn in Section 6.14.
6.2 Metrics
This study used a combination of four different metrics for the assessment of our claims and the
evaluation of SaIRA: a) decision performance, b) eye-movements, c) workload, and d) situation
awareness. Additionally, short open interviews were conducted at the end of each simulation,
which drew out more robust conclusions.
The metrics in question were specifically selected to collect both subjective and objective data
from the experiments. The rationale is that by correlating between subjective (workload and SA)
and objective (decision performance and eye-movements) techniques, it is possible to distinguish
between subjective impressions and the actual performance of the pilots.
6.2.1 Decision performance
In this study, decision performance is regarded as a ‘composite metric’, made up of three sub-
metrics a) decision time, b) decision accuracy and c) data exploration rate. The decision time
is the time elapsed from the instant in which ADR information is shown on the cockpit display
(demanding a decision) and the instant in which the pilot actually makes an ADR decision by
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selecting a configuration option through the SaIRA interface. Decision time is highly correlated
with task complexity [Hogarth 1975; Quesada et al. 2005].
Decision accuracy is the percentage of correct decisions made by pilots during each experi-
ment. A correct decision corresponds to applying the right configuration for the current operating
conditions.
Decision time and decision accuracy are classic metrics which have been extensively used
in the literature. We also considered another metric related to the decision performance, data
exploration rate. As SaIRA allows pilots to ‘browse’ the information related to each configuration
option using the virtual buttons on the EHSI display, in some experiments we recorded the number
of times the pilot clicked a button to switch from one description of a configuration to another or the
overall number of configurations explored before making a decision. We argue that an increased
number of switches between configurations suggested by the system or exploring an increased
number of configurations are symptom of confusion; the right decision is not immediately obvious
to the pilot and they spend time wavering from one alternative to another.
6.2.2 Eye movements
In the last decade, the study of human cognitive processes and accidents involving systems under
human control has led to the conclusion that human error is rarely random, but can be traced to
causes and contributing factors [Hutchins, Morrison and Kelly 1996]. As discussed in Chapters 3
and 4, decision complexity, loss of situation awareness and frustration are three factors which
greatly contribute to the decrease in pilot decision accuracy and performance. The two last factors
are important for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the decision support information generated
by SaIRA and in the light of the overall hypothesis of this study (Section 3.3).
The literature shows that several features of eye movement (e.g. fixation duration, saccadic
amplitude, visual attention distrubution) have been successfully used to draw conclusions con-
cerning pilot workload, loss of situation awareness and frustration, and to examine the usability of
cockpit instruments [Morrison et al. 1997; Diez et al. 2001; Merchant and Schnell 2001; Manharts-
berger and Zellhofer 2005; Hayashi et al. 2006; Duchowski 2007]. In this light, eye movement
analysis has been shown to be effective in supporting the design of new cockpit instruments cap-
able of both reducing human error (e.g. Hanson [2004]) and improving human perception and
task performance (e.g. Morrison et al. [1997]).
In this research specific features of eye movement are used to get an insight into pilot cog-
nitive demand (related to task complexity), frustration and distribution of visual attention. As
stated in the central hypothesis, the main objective is developing a framework for decision support
that improves both decision accuracy and performance. However, if the framework is also able
to reduce cognitive demand and frustration during ADR decisions, then the conclusions can go
beyond the specific conditions tested in the experiments, making the research more robust and
generally applicable. For instance, Section 3.2.1 shows that extreme decision complexity leads to
segmentation of information, which makes the overall decision more prone to errors and strongly
decreases human performance; if the decision support information generated by SaIRA is found
to reduce task complexity, then it can be argued that in general, SaIRA has a positive by-product
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effect on both decision accuracy and performance. In other words, eye movement analysis is used
to make the conclusions on decision accuracy and performance more robust. Workload and situ-
ation awareness, the two metrics discussed in the following two sections, are used in the same way
in this research.
For the sake of clarity, basic concepts and nomenclature of eye tracking methodologies are
introduced first, followed by how eye movement data is used to corroborate the results from other
objective and subjective metrics in which pilot cognitive demand and situation awareness are as-
sessed. For a complete and up-to-date discussion of eye tracking methodology, refer to Duchowski
[2007]. Further details about the eye-tracking system specifically developed and used in this re-
search are given in Appendix A.
Eye movement is a combination of two main behaviours: fixations, where the eye is relatively
still (for a period of 150-200 ms) and saccades, where the eye moves rapidly between fixations.
Due to the technical characteristics of the eye-tracking system used, the concept of fixation used
here is defined as a cluster of raw gazes falling in a squared area of 402 pixels on the screen. In
order to filter out micro-saccades resulting from moving to the periphery of the previous fixations,
a lower bound of 100 pixels (roughly 5 degrees of visual angle at 1 meter from the screen) was set
on the 46 inches screen used for the simulations. No upper bound was defined because saccades
can be quite large (e.g. up to 20 degrees).
A scanpath is a series of fixations and saccades. On an image of the aircraft cockpit, they are
represented as straight lines drawn between consecutive fixations.
A backtrack is a particular type of scanpath in which a previously fixed point is revisited.
An Area Of Interest (AOI) is a specific target of the users’ visual attention to a part of the
interface.
An AOI transition matrix contains the frequency of transition for each pair of AOIs.
On-target fixations are the fixations falling in a AOI divided by the total number of fixations.
The rate of fixations is given by the time spent fixating divided by the overall observation
time.
The saccades rate is the number of saccades per second.
The following studies are critical to understanding how eye movement data is interpreted in
this research:
• Rayner [1998] argues that mean fixation duration is representative of information complex-
ity and task difficulty.
• Nakayama et al. [2002] show that gazing time is negatively related to task difficulty and that
saccades rate decreases when task difficulty or processing demand increases.
• As well as confirming the results of the two studies above, Goldberg and Kotval [1999]
add that scanpath duration is directly related to processing demand. They also show how
transition matrices, saccadic amplitude and number of saccades can be efficiently used to
make a detailed analysis of the user visual distribution, attention and the complexity of the
information to process.
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Despite the successful history of eye movement analysis applications (see Rayner [1998] for
a review), some researchers (e.g. Flemisch and Onken [2000]) express doubts about the effective-
ness of conclusions based solely on eye-tracking techniques. For instance, they argue that fixations
in a specific area of the cockpit show that the pilot is “looking” there, but the link with the cognitive
processing of the information in that area is dubious. However, more recent studies on exogenous
attention argue that although it is possible under experimental conditions to dissociate visual atten-
tion and eye fixations, under more natural circumstances attention and eye movements are tightly
linked and may even rely on the same underlying network in the brain ([Smith and Kosslyn 2007],
cf. [Corbetta and Shulman 2002]).
This is one of the reasons why, for this research, a decision was made to merge quantitative
data coming from eye movement analysis with qualitative data coming from subjective metrics
and post-experiment interviews. This approach enabled us to check the validity of conclusions
made on the basis of eye movements against the pilots’ subjective inputs. For example, having
noticed a high concentration of fixations on a specific chunk of decision support information, the
pilot was asked after the test why he/she was looking there, whether he/she found the information
too complex to process and so on.
6.2.3 Mental workload
Mental workload (MWL) is the proportion of cognitive resources demanded by a task or set of
tasks. The most prominent subjective techniques for MWL assessment are the Cooper-Harper
Scale [Cooper and Harper 1969], the Bedford Scale [Roscoe and Ellis 1990; Roscoe 1987], the
SWAT (Subjective Assessment Technique) [Reid and Nygren 1988] and the NASA-TLX (Task
Load Index) [Hart and Staveland 1988; Hart 2006]. For a more comprehensive list, refer to Stanton
[2005].
NASA-TLX and SWAT are the most cited techniques in studies of aviation psychology. How-
ever, SWAT has been criticised on several occasions for having low sensitivity [Luximon and
Goonetilleke 2001] whilst NASA-TLX has been found to perform better, particularly in situations
of low mental workloads [Hart and Staveland 1988; Hill et al. 1992; Nygren 1991]. For these
reasons, NASA-TLX is used in this thesis.
Subjective data obtained through NASA-TLX were merged with physiological information
coming from the eye movement analysis, in order to improve the robustness of the conclusions.
As well as fixation duration, saccade length and other parameters from the list in Section 6.2.2,
endogenous blink rate has been found to decrease with increasing MWL [Wierwille and Eggemeier
1993; Salvendy 1997]. Unfortunately, the eye tracking system used is not able to detect blinks,
therefore, it was not possible to use this parameter in support of the research.
NASA-TLX can be administered as a paper/pencil version or an electronic version using the
software distributed by NASA [NASA 2010]. We found the handheld version of the NASA-TLX
software developed by Cao et al. [2009] from Wayne State University particularly useful and fast
to administer. When applicable, at the end of the experiment, pilots were required to complete the
NASA-TLX assessment on a Compaq iPaq handheld (running WindowsCE).
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6.2.4 Situation awareness
Section 3.2.2 introduces and discusses SA in relation to the SCMS dynamic reconfiguration prob-
lem. Endsley [1995b] provides a review of approaches to SA measurement which includes sub-
jective rating scales (self and observer rating), questionnaires (on trial and post-experiment), freeze
techniques (e.g. SAGAT [Endsley 1995b]), physiological techniques (e.g. eye-tracking), perform-
ance measurement, external task measurement and embedded task measures.
Some SA measurement techniques are tailored for certain specific application domains. To
mention two, the Mission Awareness Rating Scale (MARS) [Matthews and Beal 2002] was de-
veloped for military scenarios and SASHA was developed by Eurocontrol for air traffic control-
lers’ SA in automated systems [Jeannott et al. 2003]. These techniques are not suitable for this
work because they are specifically designed for contexts which are significantly different from
SCMS dynamic reconfiguration.
As an alternative, the Situation Awareness Subjective Workload Dominance (SA-SWORD)
[Vidulich and Hughes 1991] technique was adopted for this study; the technique was specifically
conceived to assess and compare pilot SA when using two or more different cockpit displays or
interfaces. SA-SWORD is a variation of the original Subjective Workload Dominance (SWORD)
technique [Vidulich et al. 1991] which rates the dominance of one task over another in terms of
the workload imposed.
SA-SWORD was first used by Vidulich and Hughes [1991] to compare two F-16 cockpit
displays (the FCR and HSF displays) in an aircraft simulator. Given the experimental similarities
with the experiments presented here, this technique seemed particularly suitable.
6.2.5 Post-experiment open interviews
Following each simulation, an open interview was conducted with each pilot. The eye-tracking
system allows access to basic statistics about the eye movements straight after a simulation, e.g.
number of fixations per AOI. This allowed the experimenter to quickly identify possible singular-
ities and further investigate them with the pilot in the interview. For instance, having noticed an
anomalous concentration of visual attention on a specific instrument, the experimenter could ask
the pilot if the information contained in that area of the cockpit was particularly difficult to process
or not easily understood.
When applicable, open interviews were used to corroborate the results obtained through SA-
SWORD. Pilots were asked questions that addressed their understanding of the situation, such as
“Why did SaIRA suggest switching off the Landing Waypoints Generator system?” or “Why did
two computing modules stop working?”
6.3 Apparatus and Materials
The architecture of the system used for this series of experiments is shown in Figure 6.1. The
bespoke software runs on two computers: the Simulation Computer (SC) runs the flight simulator,
the SaIRA inference engine and the eye-tracking system. Pilots interact with the SC. The Control
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Computer (CC) runs the SaIRA Control software which allows the experimenter to control the
experiment execution flow in real-time, e.g. issuing faults, triggering avionics reconfigurations,
activating/deactivating aircraft functions. Furthermore, the software running on the CC allows
off-line post-processing of the results.











Figure 6.1: Simulation system architecture.
The controlling system merges information about various events: a) simulator events (e.g.
alarms firing, faults), b) pilot actions (e.g. button pressing, decision support information switch,
configuration description browsing) and c) eye-tracking events (e.g. loss of eyes target). All the
events are logged with a time-stamp and integrated with eye movements coordinates in real-time.
During the simulation, events unfold and are logged in Simulation Time Units (STU). One
STU corresponds to 1/60 second. The STU is set according to the eye-tracking system unit, the
eye-tracking frequency being 60Hz.
6.3.1 Flight simulation software
A brief description of each component of the simulation system architecture depicted in Figure 6.1
is provided hereinafter.
6.3.1.1 X-Plane flight simulator
The FAA1-approved X-Plane flight simulator [Laminar Research Inc. 1993] was used in this thesis.
X-Plane was executed on the SC (AMD Athlon 64-bit, 2.4Ghz, 2Gb RAM) running Ubuntu Linux
9.10.
1Federal Aviation Administration, http://www.faa.gov
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X-Plane is not open-source but it is equipped with a rich plugins interface that provides a high
degree of customisation. All the experiments were performed using the Boeing 737-900ER aircraft
model provided by the x737 package [European Aircraft Developer Team 2010].
The flight simulation was projected on a 46 inch Toshiba Regza LCD screen; pilots were
positioned approximately 50 inches away from the screen. They used the Thrustmaster T-Flight
Hotas X joystick [Thrustmaster 2010] to control the aircraft and a classic mouse to click on the
virtual buttons on the ADR interface to select and apply an avionics configuration when requested.
6.3.1.2 ADR plugin
As part of this PhD programme, the ADR Plugin component for the Boeing 737-900ER model of
X-Plane was developed; the software reorganises the avionics so as to resemble the IMA concept
and provides avionics dynamic reconfiguration capabilities. The ADR Plugin simulates faults and
implements the SaIRA concept, including SFE, RE and DSE (Figure 5.7). The user interface of
the ADR plugin was described in detail in Section 5.7.
When a reconfiguration is issued, SaIRA temporarily replaces the contents of the Electronic
Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI) display with ADR decision support information (pilots are
still able to access basic aircraft control information from the analogue instruments). Two cases
are possible: the pilot has to choose between applying a suggested configuration or switching to
safe mode (Chapter 5, Figure 5.11(a)), or he/she has to choose between two or more configura-
tion options (Chapter 5, Figure 5.11(b)). Pilots are provided with the former or the latter type of
information depending on the needs of each experiment. Additionally, schematics about the fault
detected by the sensors temporarily replace the content of the Electronic Attitude Director Indic-
ator (EADI) display (Chapter 5, Figure 5.12). The details of the design of the information shown
by SaIRA on the cockpit displays have been already provided in Section 5.7.1.
SaIRA generates the following three cockpit conditions:
• INFO 1: Baseline condition. Only ‘Fault information’ and ‘Diagnosis’ data is displayed
(upper portion of data in Figures 5.11(a) and 5.11(b)); no ‘Reliability’ figures are shown.
The original content of the EADI display is not modified.
• INFO 2: Controlled condition. EHSI contains the same information as INFO 1 but the
EADI shows schematics about the fault detected by SaIRA (Figure 5.12).
• INFO 3: Controlled condition. Full SaIRA decision support information is displayed, in-
cluding explanation, implications and reliability figures, as shown in Figures 5.11 and 5.12.
It is worth sending out a note concerning the metrics to evaluate the configurations. In the
description of the wsm decision-repair algorithm given in Appendix B (Section B.1.5.2), the
pilot is given the opportunity to dynamically change the weights of the metrics used to evaluate
the configurations (e.g. give more importance to ‘safety’ related constraints at the expense of
‘performance’). Because of the complexity of the experiments being described in this chapter, and
the time-scale of a Ph.D. research programme, it was not possible to implement and empirically
investigate this functionality. During the experiments, the pilots are provided with up to three
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reconfiguration alternatives to choose from; the implemented SaIRA interface does not allow the
dynamic modification of the metrics used by the system.
6.3.1.3 ADR controller
The ADR Controller was designed for remote control of SaIRA during the experiments. The
ADR Controller is written in C++ and designed to run on both Linux 2.6 and Mac OS X; it
communicates with the ADR Plugin through a TCP/IP link.
The experimenter uses this tool to start and stop the simulations and to fire faults when re-
quired.
During the experiments, the ADR Controller was executed on a Apple MacBook (Intel Core 2
Duo 2.16 GHz, 2Gb RAM) running Mac OS X 10.5.
6.3.2 Eye-tracking system
The SaIRA Eye-Tracking System (SETS) uses OpenGazer [Zielinski 2009] as the eye-tracking en-
gine and extends its functionality to meet the needs of this series of experiments. Some additional
functions (e.g. interface with the X-Plane flight simulator, output data pre- and post-processing,
fixations/saccades/scanpaths processing, etc) were developed specifically for this study with the
support of the OpenCV machine vision library [Intel 1999].
SETS gives higher priority to precision than accuracy. High accuracy, commercial eye-
tracking systems are available on the market (e.g. TOBII [Tobii Technology 2010], Smart-Eye
[Smart Eye AB 2010], Eyegaze [LC Technologies 2010]).
SETS is highly sensitive to head movements. During a preliminary series of tests we experi-
enced a heavy loss of eye-tracking data. As a consequence, during formal tests, pilots were asked
to lean their head on a stable support. This configuration change gave good results.
Since OpenGazer needed to be tuned for each pilot, before starting the first experiment, SETS
went through a short calibration process which lasted approximately 2 minutes. The system
showed a grey square in nine different locations on the virtual cockpit and pilots were asked to
fixate on the object. This happened only once for each pilot.
6.3.2.1 Definition of the Areas of Interest
SETS superimposes a map of 7 AOIs on the B737 cockpit as shown in Figure 6.2. The AOIs on
the EADI and EHSI displays are juxtaposed to isolate each specific ‘chunk’ of decision support
information. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 provide a zoom on the EHSI and EADI displays respectively.
The definition of these AOIs allowed us to characterise precisely the visual attention of pi-
lots during ADR decisions. The separation of generic fault information from explanations and
implications was decisive in investigating the claims appropriately.
6.3.3 Eye-movement data analysis software
The SETS-Analyser is software designed specifically for this thesis, in order to make off-line,
post-processing analysis of the experimental data collected by SETS in real-time (e.g. backtrack
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Figure 6.2: Definition of the AOIs on the cockpit of the Boeing 737-900ER.
calculation, saccadic amplitude estimation etc). A subset of the data automatically generated by
the SETS-Analyser was used to obtain the research conclusions (i.e. fixation duration, saccadic
amplitude, number of on-target fixations); however, other parameters like hotspot maps were used
in a qualitative manner in order to provide further support for the inferences made.
Using raw gaze coordinates and additional meta-information (such as event tags) recorded by
SETS at simulation time, the software generates the following data: number of fixations, number
of saccades, raw gazes in each AOI, gazes transition matrix, fixations transition matrix, sum of
fixations time for each AOI, mean fixation duration, mean fixation duration for each AOI, rate of
fixation, on-target fixations, mean saccades length, mean raw gazes per AOI, saccades rate, num-
ber of backtracks, number of backtracks per AOI, fixations/saccades rate, scanpath maps (JPEG
image), backtrack maps (JPEG image) and hotspot maps (JPEG image).
A typical hotspot map is shown in Figure 6.5. This kind of representation provides a qualitative
but clear picture of the overall visual attention of the pilots during ADR.
Numerical data is stored in ‘Comma Separated Value’ format files that are compatible with
Microsoft Excel, OpenOffice.org and IBM SPSS. Depending on the needs, a combination of these
three tools was used to perform statistical analysis on the data generated by SETS-Analyser.
SETS-Analyser is written in C++ and it is designed to run on Linux 2.6.








(b) Two ADR alternatives.
Figure 6.3: Definition of AOIs on the EHSI display when the pilot get to choose (a) between one alternative and Safe
Mode, or (b) between two alternatives.
6.4 Pilots’ Training
None of the pilots involved in this study had prior experience with the avionics reconfiguration
technology developed in this research. Attention was given to providing all pilots with the same
degree of training and information about the system and the experiments.
All participants were provided with: a) written instructions to study before the tests; b) four
hours of training, delivered in two evening sessions, roughly one week before the start of the
experiments; c) half an hour of same-day training.
The written instructions were distributed in the form of an A4 pamphlet containing the follow-
ing information:
• general description and objectives of the experiments;
• general information about SaIRA, X-Plane and the ADR process;
• information about NASA-TLX, including a paper version of the form and instructions on
how to use the handheld version of the software;
• information about SA-SWORD, including a paper sample of the form.
All the written information delivered to the pilots was discussed during the two evening train-
ing sessions. Furthermore, in the second training session, all pilots were given the chance to attend
a preliminary, assisted flight simulation with the aim of getting acquainted with the system. On
this occasion, no SaIRA support was provided in order to preserve the integrity of the experiments
aimed at assessing pilot a priori trust in the system.
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Figure 6.4: Definition of the AOIs on the EADI display.
Finally, pilots were given a half hour recap before starting the experiment, in which they had
the opportunity to put forward any final questions.
Attention was paid to provide the pilots with a “good-enough” presentation of the system
without selling it as an infallible device. It was important to establish pilots’ trust in SaIRA without
incurring the risk of overly biasing the experimental results. The complexity of the problem being
tackled by SaIRA was clarified to pilots; they were explicitly informed that their role was critical
for the success of the reconfiguration process and that SaIRA was designed to support them, not
perform the reconfiguration for them. It was clearly stated that the pilot was always in control and
responsible for the operation of the aircraft. The fact that pilots were not overly biased by the pre-
experiments presentation of the system is confirmed by the statistically relevant results obtained in
the experiments about complacency and trust discussed later in this chapter.
One last note about training: SA-SWORD does not provide a direct measure of SA but an
assessment of the conditions in which SA is highest. It follows that a very clear understanding of
SA is required for the technique to work. Particular care was taken during all training phases to
verify that all pilots had mastered the concept of SA and how it was going to be assessed during
the study.
6.5 Design
The experiments were designed following the gold standard statistical argument [Cairns and Cox
2008]; in particular, both independent and dependent variables were identified a priori and the
expectations for the outcome of each experiment were clearly stated in advance.
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the design of the experiments. For the clarity of exposition,
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Figure 6.5: Definition of the AOIs on the EADI display.
more information about the design of each experiment, including the levels of the variables and
the expectations, are provided in the following sections, when each experiment is described in
detail.
6.6 Method
Each experiment had its own design characteristics, however, they all shared a general method
which is briefly described here. Experiment-specific differences are reported in the following
sections.
Each experiment consisted of a set of tests, each of which was usually targeted on a specific
claim. Each test comprised one or more flight simulations (also referred to as simulations, flight
scenarios, or simply scenarios in the remainder of this chapter). The subdivision of each experi-
ment into a number of tests pertains only to the organisation and description of the experiments;
the pilots were not aware of this.
During each flight simulation, pilots faced an unexpected event (e.g. a fault) which required
them to reconfigure the avionics in real-time. When prompted with a reconfiguration, pilots had
to make a decision between the available alternatives by clicking with the mouse on the virtual
buttons that appeared on the EHSI display (see Figures 5.11(a) and 5.11(b)).
Pilot behaviour was analysed under the effect of a series of condition variables, including, type
of decision support information, maximum time budget, correctness of decision suggestions and
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reconfigure
Within-subjects




Table 6.1: Design of the experiments.
information framing. Objective and subjective data was collected during and after each experi-
ment.
The pilots performed each experiment individually. Each flight simulation lasted between 3
and 6 minutes. There was a total of 25 flight simulations for the whole study (including all seven
experiments), adding up to an overall average testing time of two hours (excluding configuration
and scenario switching time). The seven experiments were split into two sessions which took place
on two different days.
The risk of carry-over effect was minimised by differentiating the characteristics of each re-
configuration (e.g. different types of fault) whilst keeping similar operating conditions in the set
of simulations, according to the requirements of each experiment (e.g. weather conditions, time of
day).
The eye-tracking system was calibrated before each pilot started using the system on each day.
The simulation was stopped and the system was reset between consecutive flight simulations
(the SETS calibration was not lost during this operation). The X-Plane flight simulator allows the
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configuration of scenarios; scenarios allow the simulation to be started at any phase of flight, e.g.
it was possible to run a set of tests starting in mid-air, without the need for take-off each time. All
the scenarios used in an experiment were configured prior to the start of the experiment.
It is helpful to give a few notes before presenting the detailed discussion of each experiment.
Either because it was not possible to verify the parametric behaviour of the dependent variables
under consideration, or because there was simply not enough relevant knowledge (SaIRA is an
entirely new system), non-parametric tests were used to analyse the results of the experiments in
the majority of cases. Data generated through the NASA-TLX and the SA-SWORD techniques
were an exception; the parametric nature of this data was assumed due to the huge amount of
literature accrued in the last couple of decades that process this type of data using the ANOVA
method.
Finally, all pilots judged the simulations to be realistic in the light of their purpose. Further-
more, having been questioned about the workload generated by the experiments, they commented
that it was similar to the circumstances they usually face in this kind of real-time fault management
problem.
6.7 Experiment A – Information Correctness and Explanations
Description and aim
Experiment A aimed at investigating the effect of information correctness and explanations avail-
ability on pilots’ trust in a hypothetical DSS for ADR. This experiment encompasses Claim 9
which is repeated here for the sake of clarity:
Claim 9 - Trust: Pilot trust in a DSS for ADR would decrease when the system makes
(apparently) incorrect inferences. This phenomenon would be mitigated by providing
pilots with an explanation of the inference processes.
There are situations in which the solution to a problem is not straightforward and the correct
course of action might either not be clearly visible to the pilot or it might seem inapplicable or
seriously hazardous. A correct suggestion coming from the system might seem wrong for all sorts
of reasons (e.g. loss of SA, framing effect) and be erroneously avoided. For example, consider the
following case:
The pilot of a Boeing 737-900ER is preparing for landing. A series of inter-dependent
faults affects both the Fuel Monitoring Unit (FMU) and some computing modules.
The system suggests a configuration in which the way-points generator is not act-
ive. This recommendation could seem wrong, at least without knowing that a fault
to the FMU leads to the automatic disengagement of the VNAV2 and, when VNAV is
unavailable, way-points are not available either. An explanation of the reasoning of
2Vertical NAVigation – a function of the autopilot which directs vertical movement of the aircraft either according
to pre-programmed FMS flight plan (during cruise) or according to the Instrument Landing System (ILS) glideslope
(during approach).
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the system could make the recommendation more transparent and enable the pilot to
make the right decision more quickly (this example is one of the cases tested in this
experiment).
In this experiment a reconfiguration recommendation of the type just described is referred to
as ‘apparently wrong’. Here the objective is gathering empirical evidence to show that whilst
‘apparently wrong’ suggestions provoke pilots’ mistrust in the system, when explanations of those
suggestions are provided (which show their soundness), pilots’ trust in the system is restored and,
statistically, they are more prone to accept the suggestion generated by the computer.
Procedure
X-Plane was configured to run 3 tests characterised by similar flight conditions. Before starting the
experiment, the characteristics of SaIRA were briefly reviewed; the experimenter took particular
care to present the system as highly reliable, in an effort to increase the pilot’s trust in it. The
pilot was then asked to complete any potential real-time fault management procedures correctly
and in the shortest time possible, with the support of SaIRA. The three tests had the following
characteristics:
• Test 1: the system showed evidently right information of type INFO 3 without explanations
(baseline case);
• Test 2: the system showed apparently wrong information of type INFO 3 without explana-
tions;
• Test 3: the system showed apparently wrong information of type INFO 3 with explanations.
In all cases, SaIRA was configured to provide only one ADR configuration; the pilot could
either apply it or switch to safe mode.
After Test 2 a short interview was conducted with the participant, in order to understand
whether he/she had noticed anything odd about the decision support information provided or not
and to inform him/her that the following simulations would be supported by a wider range of
decision support information, including explanations.
At four pre-defined times (between the simulations, not during them), the pilot was asked to
give feedback in terms of how much he/she trusted the suggestions produced by the system on a
scale from 0 to 10, using the form displayed in Figure 6.6. The pre-defined times were as follows:
• Time 1: following the training session, after the pilot had received a complete description
of the functioning of the system, but before starting any simulations assisted by SaIRA. This
question is about a priori trust in the DSS;
• Time 2: after Test 1;
• Time 3: straight after Test 2, before the interview;
• Time 4: after Test 3.
This was a within-subjects experiment.
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Figure 6.6: Questionnaire format for the assessment of pilots’ subjective ranking of their trust in the decision support
information generated by SaIRA.
Expectations
The expectations were as follows:
• E1: pilot trust in the system would decrease at the first occurrence of a wrong ADR sugges-
tions (Time 1);
• E2: by showing why the system arrived at a ‘dubious’ conclusion, an explanation would
provide an insight into the system inference process, would reduce the feeling of uncon-
trollability over the situation and, as a result, would mitigate the effect hypothesised by E1,
partially re-establishing pilot trust in the system (Time 4);
• E3: in this experiment pilots were provided with only one configuration recommendation,
they could either apply it or refuse to apply it, instead of switching to safe mode. Explana-
tions would increase pilot acceptance of the recommendations of the system.
Results
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.7 report the descriptive statistics concerning the pilots’ subjective ranking
of their trust in the decision support information generated by SaIRA at different stages in the
experiment series.
As expected, trust strongly decreases after the wrong information is shown (E1) and is partially
recovered when explanations are provided (E2). During the short interview after Test 2, all pilots
reported that, in their opinion, the system had generated unsuitable decision suggestions.
The statistical significance of the results is proved by the Friedman’s test (χ2(3) = 30.84,
p < 0.001, N=13).
Concerning E3, the results about the number of pilots who decided to apply the configura-
tion suggested by SaIRA (nrAccept) follows the same trend of trust, as shown in Figure 6.8 and
Table 6.3. Twelve pilots applied the configuration in Test 1, none of the pilots did in Test 2 and,
as a result of increased quality of explanations, eight pilots accepted the reconfiguration in Test
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Pilot trust in the system
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Time 1 (trust a priori) 3 10 6.54 2.14
Time 2 (trust after correct info.) 5 10 8.31 1.38
Time 3 (trust after apparently wrong info, no expl.) 0 4 2.23 1.36
Time 4 (trust after apparently wrong info and expl.) 5 8 6.38 1.19
Table 6.2: Pilots’ subjective ranking of their trust in the decision support information generated by SaIRA at different
stages of the series of experiments.





































Figure 6.7: Subjective ranking of pilots’ trust in the decision support information generated by the DSS at different
stages of the series of experiments.
3. The main effect on ‘nrAccept’ is statistically significant (Cochran’s Q test: χ2(2) = 18.667,
p < 0.001, N=13).
Accepted Refused
Test 1 (Time 2) 12 1
Test 2 (Time 3) 0 13
Test 3 (Time 4) 8 5
Table 6.3: Number of pilots who accepted or refused the reconfiguration alternative suggested by SaIRA.
Interestingly, a strong correlation between pilots’ trust in the system at Time 1 and their age
was noted (Spearman’s test: ρ = −0.739, p < 0.004, N=13). In other words, older pilots were more
reluctant to trust a priori the information generated by the system than their younger colleagues.
More information concerning pilot age is shown in Table 6.4.
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation
Pilots’ age 31 68 43.31 11.43
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for pilots’ age.
The correlation between pilot age and trust was not found for the rankings recorded at Time 2
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Figure 6.8: Number of pilots who accepted the reconfiguration alternative suggested by SaIRA.
(Spearman’s test: ρ = −0.546, n.s.), Time 3 (Spearman’s test: ρ = 0.233, n.s., N=13) and Time 4
(Spearman’s test: ρ = −0.455, n.s., N=13); therefore, there is a correlation only with the a priori
trust.
Discussion
Notwithstanding how careful designers are, expert systems make mistakes. This technological
limit must be taken into consideration when developing a DSS for safety-critical applications.
The preparation of the participants in this experiment aimed at provoking a sense of a priori
trust, through a purpose-made, misleading presentation of the system as an infallible support to
safety-critical decisions. Jian et al. [2000] show that pilots usually mistrust the automation when
they do not know whether it is accurate or not. However, at least in this experiment, the high
ranking of trust at Time 1 (before using the system) shows that pilots were successfully persuaded
by the way the system was presented to them.
It is true that there is no way to tell if this result was caused by how the system was presented
to the pilots or if they were biased by the overall experience of testing novel, airborne technology.
Probably, in a real scenario their ranking of trust would be lower on average, because the perception
of risk would be stronger. However this is not important for this study, as here the aim was making
sure pilots had a reasonable trust in the system before starting the experiments.
We turn now to the impact that explanations of the automated inference process have on human
trust in the system. The results show that by explaining how and why the system reaches certain
conclusions, human trust in a DSS is enhanced and the system-human cooperation improved.
Both the ranking of trust and ‘nrAccept’ decrease from Time 2 to Time 3 (provision of ‘apparently
wrong’ suggestions) and increase from Time 3 to Time 4 (provision of explanations).
SaIRA proved effective in bringing to the attention of the pilots ADR alternatives that they
would not have considered without its support but that in a real scenario could have avoided cata-
strophic consequences.
It is worthwhile commenting on the correlation between a priori trust and pilots’ age. In this
respect, it is interesting to note the following two facts in combination, a) younger pilots seemed
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to be more ‘naively’ trusting towards SaIRA; b) post-experiment interviews revealed that neither
of the two younger pilots amongst the participants were aware of the history of protests and strikes
against the introduction of glass-cockpit automation that characterised the aviation history of the
1980s (see Amalberti [1999] for a review of the main facts) nor were they aware of the issues and
controversies that characterise this research domain and its key actors. Most probably, a better
knowledge of these facts would change their reactions.
In conclusion, the results from Experiment A provide support to the claims concerning the
importance of explanations and mental simulation during ADR decisions put forward in Chapter 4;
furthermore, they provide evidence of the overall effectiveness of SaIRA and, specifically, of the
importance of including explanations of the automated line of reasoning of a DSS for safety-critical
applications in the decision support information set.
6.8 Experiment B – Effect of Information Correctness on Compla-
cency
Description and aim
The objective of Experiment B was to assess the potential emergence of complacent behaviour by
the pilots about the ADR recommendations generated by the automation, especially in the light
of the results about trust obtained from Experiment A. The potential emergence of a complacent
behaviour is assessed by manipulating the correctness of the information provided by the system.
This experiment aimed at collecting evidence for the assessment of Claim 7, which is reported
here for the sake of clarity:
Claim 7 - AIC: Pilots would be subject to Automation-Induced Complacency during
highly autonomous ADR. This phenomenon would be mitigated by decreasing the
level of autonomy of the process.
Procedure
X-Plane was configured to run 4 similar scenarios. Before running the tests, the pilot was told that
in rare cases the system could generate wrong suggestions, due to technological limitations. If that
happened, he/she should avoid the suggestion and switch to safe mode.
The pilot was asked to complete any potential real-time fault management procedures correctly
and in the shortest time possible. The experiment was structured into two distinct tests; three
simulations were run in Test 1 and one simulation was run in Test 2. SaIRA was configured to
generate and display INFO 1 for all simulations.
This was a within-subject test, each pilot ran all the simulations listed below.
Test 1
Each pilot was asked to perform the first three scenarios.
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During each scenario, a fault was simulated between 2 and 5 minutes after the start of the
simulation.
SaIRA generated correct decision support information, suggesting an optimal configuration
that could effectively mitigate the effect of the fault in question. The right decision in these first 3
scenarios was accepting the suggested reconfiguration (not switching to safe mode).
Test 2
Each pilot was asked to perform the fourth scenario.
A fault was simulated between 2 and 5 minutes after the start of the simulation.
SaIRA generated wrong decision support information, suggesting a configuration that was
either not applicable or would evidently put the safety of the crew at risk, e.g. switching off the
external positioning systems before landing.
Expectations
As a result of the emergence of AIC, pilots were expected to accept the ADR advice in Test 2 even
if it was wrong. In other words, the decision accuracy would be lower in Test 2 than in Test 1.
Results
The primary result is that only 3 out of 13 pilots refused the wrong advice in Test 2. The results
for both tests are reported in Table 6.5; additionally, the proportion of correct decisions is given as
a percentage and interpreted as decision accuracy (DA). The decrease of DA from Test 1 to Test 2
is statistically significant (Chi Square test: χ2(1) = 13, p < 0.001, N=13).
Test Right Wrong Decision accuracy
Test 1 (3 simulations, 39 cases) 36 3 92.3% (s.d. 4.3%)
Test 2 (1 simulation, 13 cases) 3 10 23.1% (s.d. 12.2%)
Table 6.5: Right decisions, wrong decisions and decision accuracy (percentage of right decisions) for Test 1 and Test
2.
It is worth mentioning other ancillary results in support of the claim concerning complacency
regarding decision time (DT) and fixation duration (FD) (see Figures 6.9 and 6.10):
• there was no statistical effect for the correctness of the suggestion provided to pilots (i.e.
Test 1 vs Test 2) on both DT (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test: Z = −0.454, n.s., N=39) and FD
(Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test: Z = −0.105, n.s., N=39);
• within Test 2, there was a statistical effect for “spotting the incorrectness of the ADR sug-
gestion provided” on both DT (Mann-Whitney U test: Z = −2.846, p < 0.04, N=39) and
FD (Mann-Whitney U test: Z = −2.793, p < 0.05, N=39); see Table 6.6. In other words,
those pilots who made the right decision (i.e. those who spotted the wrong suggestion and
switched to safe mode) had higher DT and FD than those who made the wrong decision (i.e.
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pilots who accepted and applied the wrong configuration). There is a correlation between
DT and FD (Spearman’s test: ρ = 0.824, p < 0.001, N=13).
DT FD
Overall (52 cases) 46.12 (s.d. 16.82) 370.67 (s.d. 27.54)
Wrong decision (13 cases) 41.19 (s.d. 3.45) 361.174 (s.d. 6.2)
Right decision (39 cases) 90.1 (s.d. 8.36) 422.38 (s.d. 2.51)
Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics for DT (in seconds) and FD (in milliseconds) related to: a) all cases, b) cases in which
the pilots accepted the wrong ADR advice (wrong decision); b) cases in which the pilots refused it (right decision).























Figure 6.9: Decision time (in seconds).


























Figure 6.10: Fixation duration (in milliseconds).
Discussion
The main result is the drastic drop (−69%) of DA from the case in which the decision support
information is right and the case in which it is wrong. This result strongly supports claims con-
cerning the emergence of AIC during ADR decisions. (It is obviously assumed that pilots do not
want to make wrong decisions intentionally).
The fact that there was no statistical physiological variation (such as eye movements) in the
decision behaviour as a result of the correctness of the suggestions provided can be explained in
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two ways (a) pilots didn’t notice the wrong advice (this eventuality would support the claim of
emergence of AIC) or (b) they did notice it, but this didn’t provoke any observable physiological
reaction.
Theoretically, the latter option is possible with highly experienced decision makers like pilots;
however, it must be noted that a statistical variation of DT and FD was actually found for those
pilots who succeeded in spotting the wrong information and modified their decision behaviour
accordingly. This argument invalidates option (b) for the ADR decision scenario. Hence, the stat-
istical lack of physiological reaction to subtle, wrong information supports the claim of emergence
of AIC.
Wrong information led to lower DT and FD, probably because it made the decision problem
simpler. As soon as pilots spotted a ‘bad apple’ amongst the available reconfiguration alternatives,
they avoided it and went for the ‘safe’ backup option. This speculation is supported by the post-
experiment interviews, as seen in the following excerpts:
• “I just dropped it. I had no time to think and the machine was clearly wrong”
• “The backup mode was available” [...] “I was asked to make a quick decision and switching
off the FMC was just stupid” [...] “I couldn’t figure out why so I cut it out and kept going”.
The evidence collected in this experiment verifies Claim 7: pilots are complacent about the
ADR advice provided by SaIRA.
6.9 Experiment C – Information Type
Description and aim
Experiment C investigated the effect of different types of decision support information on pilot
decision making experience. More specifically, different sets of information, namely INFO 1,
INFO 2 and INFO 3, were empirically compared and their effect was investigated in terms of
decision accuracy, decision performance, frustration, workload and situation awareness. This ana-
lysis encompasses Claims 5, 8 and 11:
Claim 5 - Stress and frustration: Heightened states of stress during ADR decisions
can possibly lead to frustration. The negative effect of frustration would be mitigated
by providing pilots with effective decision support information.
Claim 8 - Information type: Decision support information for SCMS reconfiguration
should be “unpacked”/framed so as to make the following cues readily understood by
the operators for each reconfiguration option:
• Explanations: why the system is making a specific suggestion;
• Implications: (what-if type of information) what the consequences of applying
a specific configuration are;
• Reliability: how reliable the advice generated by the system is.
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Claim 11 - Graphics: A graphical representation of the fault that triggers an ADR
would improve decision performance and accuracy.
Unfortunately, because of a bug in SETS, the eye movement data for one of the pilots was lost.
The bug was removed but it was not possible to repeat the experiment. The eye movement analysis
performed in this experiment therefore uses the data of 12 pilots instead of 13. All the other data
(decision time, decision accuracy etc) is available for all 13 pilots.
Procedure
X-Plane was configured to run 6 similar scenarios. Similar flying conditions were set for all
the cases. The pilot was asked to complete any potential real-time fault management procedures
correctly and in the shortest time possible.
Between 30 and 120 seconds after starting the scenario, a fault was simulated and a reconfig-
uration was automatically issued.
Two reconfiguration options were provided, one of which was wrong. The two reconfiguration
options were always such that they required a choice between switching off one of two critical
functions (e.g. ’Elevator Feel System’ or ’Landing Points Generator’).
The experiment was structured into 3 distinct tests; 2 simulations were run in each test. As it
was a within-subject test, each pilots ran all the simulations listed below:
• Test 1: pilots performed the first 2 simulations. SaIRA provided the pilot with INFO 1;
• Test 2: pilots performed the following 2 simulations. SaIRA provided the pilot with INFO 2;
• Test 3: pilots performed the last 2 simulations. SaIRA provided the pilot with INFO 3
(always showing ‘FULL reliability’).
It is reminded that SaIRA is designed to generate three types of decision support information
characterised by different amount and type of information; they are referred as INFO 1, INFO 2
and INFO 3 throughout the thesis. The definition of these three types of decision support inform-
ation was given in Section 6.3.1.2.
Immediately after the final test, both the NASA-TLX and the SA-SWORD questionnaires
were submitted to the pilot. With reference to SA-SWORD, the pilots were asked to compare their
level of SA when performing an ADR with INFO 1 (baseline), INFO 2 and INFO 3 using the
questionnaire in Figure 6.11, which was purpose-made for this experiment.
Expectations
INFO 1 is the baseline condition. As a result of better decision support, the following expectations
were set:
• E1: decision accuracy (DA) would progressively improve with INFO 2 and INFO 3;
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Figure 6.11: SA-SWORD post-simulation questionnaire format for Experiment C.
• E2: it was not possible to make any precise forecast concerning the decision time (DT) when
the experiment was designed. On one hand, better decision support should reduce the time
required by pilots to complete the procedure, as found in FAMSS [Hayashi et al. 2006]; on
the other hand, having more information to process could increase the DT;
• E3: the number of clicks on the reconfiguration buttons (nrCL) would progressively decrease
with INFO 2 and INFO 3. We speculate that the number of times pilots switch from one
configuration to another to explore its characteristics would be indicative of their confusion.
Better decision support would decrease pilot confusion, therefore this value should also
decrease;
• E4: fixation duration (FD) would progressively decrease with INFO 2 and INFO 3;
• E5: workload (WL) would progressively decrease with INFO 2 and INFO 3;
• E6: frustration (FR) would progressively decrease with INFO 2 and INFO 3;
• E7: situation awareness (SA) would progressively improve with INFO 2 and INFO 3.
Altogether, expectations from E1 to E7 combine with the general expectation of obtaining
improved decision performance with INFO 2 and even more so with INFO 3.
Results
E1: decision accuracy (DA)
Cochran’s Q test reveals a statistically significant difference in terms of DA amongst INFO 1,
INFO 2 and INFO 3 (χ2(2) = 7.091, p < 0.029, N=26). A pairwise comparison using continuity-
corrected McNemar’s tests shows that the main improvement over INFO 1 (baseline) is provided
by INFO 3. This result is evident from Table 6.7, which contains the descriptive statistics.
E2: decision time (DT)
A significant effect of the type of decision support information on DT is revealed by Friedman’s
test (χ2(2) = 13, p < 0.02, N=26). A post-hoc test using Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests with
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Right Wrong Decision accuracy
INFO 1 15 11 57.69%
INFO 2 20 6 76.92%
INFO 3 22 4 84.61%
Table 6.7: Decision accuracy under the effect of different types of decision support information. Columns ‘Right’ and
‘Wrong’ contain the number of pilots who made the right or wrong decision respectively.
Bonferroni correction shows that the stronger decrease in DT is given by INFO 3 (Z = −2.984,
p < 0.003, N=26).
The descriptive statistics are provided in Table 6.8.
Decision time
INFO 1 36.78 (s.d. 6.36)
INFO 2 35.02 (s.d. 5.97)
INFO 3 28.63 (s.d. 8.61)
Table 6.8: Decision time (in seconds) under the effect of different types of decision support information.
E3: number of clicks on the reconfiguration buttons (nrCL)
The statistical difference in terms of nrCL amongst the three conditions is confirmed by Friedman’s
test (χ2(2) = 26.297, p < 0.001, N=26).
As expected, a progressive decrease of nrCL with INFO 2 and INFO 3, with respect to the
baseline (INFO 1), is revealed by a post-hoc test performed through a series of Wilcoxon Signed
Rank tests (INFO 2 vs INFO 1: Z = −3.326, p < 0.001, r = 0.652; INFO 3 vs INFO 1: Z =
−3.968, p < 0.001; INFO 3 vs INFO 2: Z = −2.057, p < 0.04). These tests show that the biggest
decrease of nrCL w.r.t the baseline is provided by INFO 3. The descriptive statistics are provided
in Table 6.9.
nrCL
INFO 1 3.81 (s.d. 1.17)
INFO 2 2.88 (s.d. 1.07)
INFO 3 2.27 (s.d. 0.72)
Table 6.9: Number of clicks on the reconfiguration buttons under the effect of different types of decision support
information.
E4: fixation duration (FD)
Friedman’s test reveals a significant influence of the independent variable on the FD (χ2(2) =
17.583, p < 0.01, N=24). The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 6.10.
The biggest decrease of FD is provided by INFO 3 over INFO 1, as statistically confirmed
by the Wilcoxon Signed Rank post-hoc test with Bonferroni correction (Z = −4.229, p < 0.001,
N=24).
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Fixation duration
INFO 1 410.01 (s.d. 10.55)
INFO 2 379.13 (s.d. 9.32)
INFO 3 354.89 (s.d. 7.04)
Table 6.10: Fixation duration (in milliseconds) under the effect of different types of decision support information.
E5 and E6: workload (WL) and frustration (FR)
Table 6.11 reports the results of the NASA-TLX test for each type of decision support information.
Workload (NASA-TLX) - Test results
INFO 1 INFO 2 INFO 3
MD 71.92 (3.42) 63.46 (3.9) 50.00 (4.38)
PD 1.92 (1.21) 1.54 (0.87) 1.15 (0.61)
TD 32.31 (3.47) 27.69 (2.81) 31.15 (3.01)
PE 54.62 (3.94) 58.08 (4.1) 78.85 (2.34)
EF 54.23 (5.71) 46.54 (3.37) 34.23 (3.66)
FR 61.23 (5.72) 52.31 (4.03) 25.00 (2.59)
OWL 52.23 (2.91) 47.15 (1.77) 39.1 (1.83)
Table 6.11: NASA-TLX data under the effect of different types of decision support information.
A one-way ANOVA test is run on each parameter of the NASA-TLX test (i.e. Mental De-
mand (MD), Physical Demand (PD), Temporal Demand (TD), Performance (PE), Effort (EF) and
Frustration (FR), and on the Overall Workload (OWL)). A strongly significant effect for the inde-
pendent variable is found on all the parameters except PD and TD (see Table 6.12).
Workload (NASA-TLX)
Workload parameter ANOVA result
MD F(2, 37) = 7.95, p < 0.001
PD F(2, 37) = 0.171, n.s.
TD F(2, 37) = 0.597, n.s.
PE F(2, 37) = 13.605, p < 0.001
EF F(2, 37) = 5.32, p < 0.009
FR F(2, 37) = 19.219, p < 0.001
OWL F(2, 37) = 8.802, p < 0.001
Table 6.12: Results of the one-way ANOVA test on the NASA-TLX results.
The Tukey HSD post-hoc test (Table 6.12) reveals that INFO 3 provides more improvement
then INFO 2 on the baseline INFO 1. Furthermore, a statistical improvement of INFO 3 is con-
firmed on INFO 2 for PE, FR and OWL.
As one of the parameters of the NASA-TLX method is frustration (FR), this technique allows
analysis concerning expectation E6. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 reveal that FR decreases statistically
with both INFO 2 and INFO 3, confirming the effectiveness of the decision support information
produced by SaIRA.
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Workload (NASA-TLX)
Workload parameter INFO 3 vs... Tukey HSD
INFO 1 M = −21.923, p < 0.01
MD
INFO 2 M = −13.462, n.s.
INFO 1 M = 24.231, p < 0.01
PE
INFO 2 M = 20.769, p < 0.01
INFO 1 M = −20, p < 0.007
EF
INFO 2 M = −12.308, n.s.
INFO 1 M = −36.231, p < 0.01
FR
INFO 2 M = 27.308, p < 0.01
INFO 1 M = −13.128, p < 0.01
OWL
INFO 2 M = −8.051, p < 0.039
Table 6.13: Results of the Tukey HSD post-hoc test for the NASA-TLX test. INFO 3 provides the biggest statistical
difference for all the combinations except w.r.t INFO 2 in relation to MD and EF.
E7: situation awareness (SA)
SA-SWORD does not provide a direct measure of SA but it is designed to give an assessment
of which type of information gives the highest SA. As expected, INFO 2 and INFO 3 provide
progressively better SA with respect to INFO 1, as shown in Figure 6.12.
INFO_1 INFO_2 INFO_3
Lower SA Higher SA
Figure 6.12: Result of SA-SWORD test for Experiment C.
A one-way ANOVA reveals the strong effect of the independent variable on the subjective
assessment of SA (F(2, 37) = 1860.943 , p < 0.001). The Tukey HSD post-hoc test shows that
INFO 3 gives the greatest improvement.
The results of this experiment are summarised in Table 6.14 and Figures from 6.13 to 6.17.
Experiment C
DA (%) DT (sec) nrCL (count) FD (msec) WL SA (ranking)
INFO 1 69% 35.22 (3.56) 3.54 (0.37) 410.01 (10.55) 52.23 (2.91) 3 rd
INFO 2 58% 35.6 (2.01) 3.08 (0.36) 379.13 (9.32) 47.15 (1.77) 2 nd
INFO 3 92% 28.52 (2.72) 2.15 (0.19) 354.89 (7.04) 39.1 (1.83) 1 st
Table 6.14: Overall results for Experiment C.




































































































Figure 6.16: Fixation duration (in milliseconds)
Discussion
The main result is that in general the effectiveness of the complete set of decision support informa-
tion generated by SaIRA (i.e. INFO 3) is strong in terms of all the dependent variables considered.
To a certain extent, DA, nrCL, FD, WL, FR and SA all behaved as expected, providing evidence
of a significant improvement in all aspects of pilot decision experience during ADR. An improve-



















Figure 6.17: Workload (‘Overall Workload’ parameter

















Figure 6.18: Frustration (as recorded by the NASA-TLX
test)
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this section.
The improvement brought by a graphical representation of the fault over the baseline textual
information set (i.e. INFO 2 versus INFO 1) is not as strong as in other studies such as Hayashi
et al. [2006], which evaluated the FAMSS architecture for the next generation spacecraft cockpit
(see Section 4.2.7). It must be noted, however, that projects like FAMSS are specifically targeted at
the design of effective graphical representations of fault management information, whilst this study
is tailored to the analysis of the effects of explanations, implications and reliability information
on the interactive fault management process. One possibility is that the graphical information
generated by SaIRA is not as sophisticated and effective as the information produced by more
advanced graphic engines like FAMSS. It would be interesting to analyse a combination of the
two approaches.
An unexpected result comes from the NASA-TLX; pilots ranked their performance higher in
the scale with INFO 3 than with other information formats. In this regard, Fox and Tversky [1995]
argue that feelings of competence occur when people have clear rather than ambiguous knowledge.
INFO 1 and INFO 2 provide less information than INFO 3, therefore, there is a possibility that the
former two types of information leave room for ambiguity in the pilots’ minds. With reference to
the support theory of reasoning [Tversky and Koehler 1994], the content of INFO 3 is “unpacked”
into more explicit disjunctions, a fact that, according to the theory, increases the “strength of
belief” of the decision maker and decreases the ambiguity. We speculate that, as a result of this
phenomenon, pilots would feel more competent and give themselves a higher performance score.
It is particularly important for this research to comment on the positive effect of INFO 3 on
frustration, which provides further support to the effectiveness of the SaIRA concept.
Finally, a remark should be made about cognitive readiness, which has been defined by Morris
and Fletcher [2002] as the mental preparation (including knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes)
an individual needs to establish to sustain competent performance in complex and unpredictable
operational environments. Morris and Fletcher identify ten psychological components or theor-
etical mechanisms underlying the concept of cognitive readiness: situation awareness, memory,
transfer of training, metacognition, automaticity, problem solving, decision-making, mental flex-
ibility and creativity, leadership and emotion. The empirical results obtained in this experiment
reveal that the decision support approach proposed for ADR decisions improves human decision
accuracy, decision performance and situation awareness. The improvement of these quantities re-
flects, by definition, a general contribution to the improvement of the cognitive readiness of the
decision maker.
It is observed that the definition of cognitive readiness previously given is applied in the lit-
erature to different stages of the preparation for a task. Several studies focus on manipulating
cognitive readiness through training the decision makers well before performing the task. Here
cognitive readiness is manipulated by means of decision support information, shown at a relat-
ively close distance from the decision-making deadline. This interpretation seems appropriate for
the domain and the problem being addressed here.
In conclusion, the full set of SaIRA decision support information is found to verify all the
claims about its effectiveness and as a consequence to provide a strong, statistical improvement
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in pilot decision experience during ADR, confirming the user profile proposed in the previous
chapters.
6.10 Experiment D – Time Pressure and Implications
Description and aim
Experiment D aimed to investigate the effect of time pressure on ADR decisions, encompassing
claims 2, 3 and 4. Furthermore, evidence was collected about the effect of the availability of the
implications of each reconfiguration alternative in time pressure circumstances. The claims are
reported below:
Claim 2 - Time pressure: Pilots would react to time pressure by means of a) accel-
eration, b) selection of information and c) alteration of information search pattern.
Claim 3 - Time pressure: Time pressure would decrease pilot decision accuracy.
Claim 4 - Time pressure: Time pressure would reduce the number of configuration
options considered and the way the information is explored.
As reported in Section 4.1.2, some studies question the order of appearance of the three
strategies mentioned by Claim 2 and even their actual appearance in real unstructured decision
contexts. This experiment does not question the conclusions of Ben Zur and Breznitz [1981];
Edland and Svenson [1993a] and Johnson and Payne [1995], which are at the basis of the claim;
instead the interest is in investigating the applicability of these ideas to the ADR problem, in order
to characterise effective decision support. In addition, this experiment only investigates the poten-
tial emergence of any of the strategies in question, not their hypothetical order of appearance.
Two independent variables were examined in this experiment: time pressure and implication
availability. The pilots performed ADR under normal conditions and under time pressure; when
under time pressure, simulations were performed with and without the availability of ‘implica-
tions’. The rationale for this decision was elaborated in Section 4.2.3. In brief, we argue that
in severe time pressure situations, pilots would discard a great portion of the decision support
information, but would look for the implications of their decisions.
The decision time, decision accuracy, fixations duration and the distribution of visual attention
on the cockpit displays (dependent variables) were used to draw conclusions about the case.
Procedure
X-Plane was configured to run three flight simulations characterised by similar flying conditions.
The pilot was asked to complete any potential real-time fault management procedures correctly, in
the shortest time possible.
In addition to full SaIRA decision support information (i.e. INFO 3), a predictive countdown
timer showing the time remaining to complete the ADR process before the advent of serious con-
sequences was shown in the top-right corner of the EHSI display. Pilots were told that missing the
deadline equated to a failure.
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Pilots were also informed that, in some cases, the system could fail to generate the whole set
of decision support information that constituted INFO 3. This didn’t necessarily mean that the
reconfiguration option suggested was wrong; it just lacked a piece of information that could not be
computed for technical reasons. Pilots did not know which chunk of information would be missing
in advance. In point of fact, for all cases, the information in question was the ‘implications’; as
mentioned in Section 4.2.3 (page 94), we argue that the implications of reconfigurations would
be particularly effective in improving the decision performance especially under time pressure
conditions.
A safety-critical fault was simulated between 1 and 2.5 minutes after the start. The system
generated 20 equally applicable reconfiguration options.
Three scenarios with the following characteristics were executed (in random order):
• Test 1: with 30 seconds of maximum decision time available (time pressure);
• Test 2: with 120 seconds of maximum decision time available (no time pressure);
• Test 3: with 30 seconds of maximum decision time available but no implications shown on
the display (time pressure and no implications).
Test 2 represents the baseline case; Test 1 investigated the effects of time pressure alone; Test
3 investigated the effects of lack of implications under time pressure. The order is mixed in order
to prevent pilots from identifying the baseline, which is of critical importance for this experiment.
This is a within-subject experiment.
Expectations
The following results were expected:
• E1: decision accuracy (DA) would decrease with time pressure; this effect would be strengthened
by the lack of implications;
• E2: pilots would react to time pressure by means of a) acceleration, b) selection of inform-
ation or c) alteration of information search pattern. More specifically:
– E2a - acceleration: the fixation duration (FD) would decrease with time pressure. It
was more difficult to make predictions concerning the effect of the availability of im-
plications. On the one hand, availability of implications should reduce the problem
complexity, therefore reducing FD; on the other hand, implications constitute an addi-
tional piece of information to look at and this could complicate matters for the pilots.
In both cases, there should be an observable effect on FD;
– E2b - selection: the distribution of visual attention (VA) would show that, in the con-
trolled simulations, pilots focus only on a specific subset of the decision support in-
formation available, which certainly includes the ‘implications’;
6.10. EXPERIMENT D – TIME PRESSURE AND IMPLICATIONS 173
– E2c - search pattern: the number of configuration options explored (nrCNF) would
be effected; furthermore, the VA would show an alteration in the way the available
information was accessed, with pilots focusing more on implications and fault de-
scription, which is symptomatic of a less cognitive demanding attribute-based search
in place of an alternative-based search.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to check any potential effect on decision time (DT) under the two
test conditions in question. E1 assesses Claim 3; E2 encompasses claims 2 and 4.
Results
E1: decision accuracy (DA)
A slight decrease of DA was found as a result of time pressure (Table 6.15 and Figure 6.19) but it
is not statistically significant (Cochran’s Q test: χ2(2) = 0.846, n.s. N=13).
Right Wrong Decision accuracy
120 seconds 10 3 76.9% (s.d. 12.2%)
30 seconds 9 4 69.2% (s.d. 9.2%)
30 seconds, no implications 9 4 69.2% (s.d. 9.2%)
Table 6.15: Decision accuracy under the effect of time pressure and implications availability.



















Figure 6.19: Decision accuracy (number of right decisions over the total number of decisions)
Whilst indicative, this result is not strong enough to support E1. The lack of a main effect on
DA is probably due to the fact that pilots are expert decision makers, particularly accustomed to
time pressure conditions, which is intrinsically part of their usual operating environment. Regard-
less of any physiological impact of time pressure, which is investigated below, pilots managed to
make the right ADR decision even with a limited time budget.
E2: fixation duration
A statistically significant effect of the test factors is found on FD (Friedman’s test: (χ2(2) = 10.308,
p < 0.006, N=13). The test results are reported in Table 6.16 and Figure 6.20.
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FD
120 seconds 408.51 (s.d. 9.39)
30 seconds 379.16 (s.d. 10.05)
30 seconds, no implications 384.64 (s.d. 10.49)
Table 6.16: Fixation duration (FD) under the effect of time pressure and implications availability.


























Figure 6.20: Fixation duration (in milliseconds)
Table 6.17 contains the result of the post-hoc test on FD (a series of Wilcoxon’s tests with
Bonferroni correction). The main discrepancy is recorded between 120 seconds and 30 seconds of
time budget. Furthermore, implications slightly increase FD under time pressure but this effect is
not statistically significant.
The tests confirm the claim concerning the emergence of the acceleration strategy as a result of
time pressure; given the small number of participants, we cannot confirm that lack of implications
has the consequence of slightly braking this effect.
120 seconds 120 seconds 30 seconds
vs vs vs
30 seconds 30 seconds, no impl. 30 seconds, no impl.
Z 1.231 0.846 0.385
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) p < 0.05 n.s. n.s.
Table 6.17: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank post-hoc test with Bonferroni correction for Friedman’s test on FD (descriptive
statistics in Table 6.16).
E2: decision time, number of configuration alternatives explored
Table 6.18 reports the statistics relative to the number of configuration alternatives (nrCNF) ex-
plored by pilots during ADR decisions and the decision time (DT).
Friedman’s test reveals a statistical difference between the three experimental conditions for
both nrCNF (χ2(2) = 17.915, p < 0.01, N=13) and DT (χ2(2) = 14.308, p < 0.01, N=13).
A follow-up test using a series of Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests with Bonferroni correction (see
Table 6.19) shows that, whilst both ‘30 seconds’ and ‘30 seconds, no implications’ both differ
statistically from the baseline, the difference between them is not statistically significant. In other
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words, implications seem not to affect the time spent by pilots reaching a decision, even if as seen
in the previous section with FD, there is some evidence of increased problem complexity.
nrCNF DT
120 seconds 3.77 (s.d. 0.28) 49.12 (s.d. 4.6)
30 seconds 2.00 (s.d. 0.11) 27.33 (s.d. 0.65)
30 seconds, no implications 2.85 (s.d. 0.15) 27.15 (s.d. 0.5)
Table 6.18: Number of configuration alternatives explored under the effect of time pressure and implications
availability.
120 seconds 120 seconds 30 seconds
vs vs vs
30 seconds 30 seconds, no impl. 30 seconds, no impl.
Z -3.11 -3.04 -0.035
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) p < 0.001 p < 0.001 n.s.
Table 6.19: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank post-hoc test with Bonferroni correction for the Friedman’s test on DT
(descriptive statistics in Table 6.18).
It is worth noticing that the standard deviation for DT is very small for Test 2 and Test 3,
whilst it is larger for Test 1, which has a greater time budget. Evidently, pilots intentionally use
the full 30 second window that is available to them to complete the task; the button that confirms
their decision is clicked at the very last second. None of the pilots missed the deadline in any test.
These results are expected from skilled and expert decision makers like pilots. They exploit all the
available time and still rarely miss the deadline.
A correlation is found between nrCNF and DT (Spearman’s test: ρ = 0.519, p < 0.001, N=13)
which is evident looking at Figures 6.21 and 6.22. This correlation reinforces our interpretation of
nrCNF as a measure of indecision.





















Figure 6.21: Decision time (in seconds).
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Figure 6.22: Number of configuration options explored.
E2: distribution of visual attention
Figure 6.23 and Table 6.20 describe the trend of pilots’ visual attention on five relevant AOIs in the
cockpit. Note that EHSI 2 contains the implications of the configuration alternatives, and EADI 1
contains the graphics, which are both under analysis in this experiment.


























Figure 6.23: Percentage of on-target fixations relative to each AOI.
We ran five different Friedman’s tests on the data related to each AOI. The results, reported in
Table 6.21, show a statistically significant effect on each AOI.
Discussion
The first encouraging result is that in the specific conditions tested, pilot decision accuracy seems
not to be statistically influenced by time pressure or by lack of implications, as predicted by E1.
However, decision performance and physiological reactions are both significant and follow the
predictions of claims 2, 3 and 4. This general result leads us to leave open the possibility that
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120 seconds 30 seconds 30 seconds, no implications
EHSI 1 3.0 (s.d. 0.16) 18.48 (s.d. 0.83) 10.57 (s.d. 0.86)
EHSI 2 15.53 (s.d. 1.49) 13.92 (s.d. 0.83) 8.25 (s.d. 0.73)
EADI 1 21.04 (s.d. 1.63) 10.75 (s.d. 0.74) 22.02 (s.d. 0.94)
EADI 2 10.67 (s.d. 0.84) 15.67 (s.d. 0.99) 13.82 (s.d. 0.62)
ELSEWHERE 49.75 (s.d. 2.34) 41.19 (s.d. 1.73) 45.33 (s.d. 1.24)
Table 6.20: Percentage of on-target fixations relative to each AOI.
Friedman’s test (N=13)
EHSI 1 χ2(2) = 24.154, p < 0.01
EHSI 2 χ2(2) = 14.308, p < 0.01
EADI 1 χ2(2) = 16.615, p < 0.01
EADI 2 χ2(2) = 6, p < 0.05
ELSEWHERE χ2(2) = 7.538, p < 0.023
Table 6.21: Results from five different Friendman’s tests related to each AOI under analysis.
in more complex and realistic situations, considering a wider number of pilots, time pressure and
lack of implications could also impact on DA.
Concerning E2, the results of the FD, DT, VA and nrCNF analyses confirm claims about ac-
celeration, selection and search pattern. The results from VA confirm that pilots value implications
during the decision process, and nrCNF confirms that a lack of implications increases pilots con-
fusion, making them jump between roughly 3 alternatives instead of 2 (note that in this experiment
all configuration alternatives provided by SaIRA are correct and equally applicable).
With reference to Figure 6.23, the first clear result is the inversion of the convexity of the VA
curves of the three test conditions from EHSI 1 up to EADI 1. When pilots have more time (120
seconds) they concentrate more on explanations, implications and graphical information (EHSI 2
and EADI 1) whilst under time pressure most of the VA on the graphical information (EADI 1) is
distributed elsewhere.
EHSI 2 (implications and explanations) is steadily used in all three test conditions; there are
no significant drops in attention in this area. Obviously, the VA is slightly lower during Test 3
because implications are not available, hence part of the attention is driven away from this AOI;
however, explanations keep attracting the participants. This result suggests that pilots actually
value explanations and implications during ADR decisions.
VA is higher on the EHSI 1 during the two tests characterised by time pressure (i.e. Test 1 and
Test 3). The most probable explanation is that this AOI contains the timer and evidently, pilots
make more intensive use of it when the time budget is very limited. A similar effect was noticed
in a study on decision making under time pressure by Zakay [1993], in which also a decrease in
accuracy was also found.
The facts that (a) the VA on the ELSEWHERE AOI is statistically different under the three
test conditions and (b) the mean of VA on ELSEWHERE is lower under time pressure, both seem
to suggest that, in proportion, pilots use the decision support information more intensively when
the time budget is limited. More time to make a decision allows them to concentrate on other
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information elsewhere in the cockpit.
In conclusion, the effect of time pressure is confirmed and it follows the behaviour predicted
in the claims. Explanations and implications are found to be intensively used by pilots during
ADR under all conditions, reducing attention to graphical information during the occurrence of
severe time pressure. Implications are found to decrease decision uncertainties, confirming their
importance and effectiveness. More pilots and a more realistic scenario are required to draw robust
conclusions concerning the effects on decision accuracy.
6.11 Experiment E – Information Correctness and Reliability
Description and aim
Section 4.1.4 (page 84) discussed the framing effect, ambiguity aversion and loss aversion phe-
nomena. In the light of these decision biases, we previously argue that the degree of reliability
associated with decision support information would influence pilot decision behaviour. More spe-
cifically, as part of the definition of the user profile for SaIRA, we speculated that reconfiguration
suggestions characterised by medium reliability would be more difficult to process than those
presented as either strongly or poorly reliable.
As discussed in Appendix C, SaIRA associates four levels of reliability with the decision
support it generates, on the basis of the reliability of the data sources: LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH,
FULL. In all the experiments except this one, SaIRA was manipulated to either not show reliability
information or, when shown, it was always set to FULL. Here this simplification no longer holds.
In this experiment LOW or MEDIUM reliability is associated with the fault management in-
formation presented to pilots in order to prompt them to use their judgement; this scenario sim-
ulates the case in which the system recognised that, given the characteristics of the input data
available, the inferences made are not robust, therefore it is mandatory for pilots to consider the
suggestions more carefully.
The aim was to collect information about the potential effect of the different degrees of re-
liability (degREL) associated with decision support information of dubious authenticity on pilot
decision behaviour. In particular, we argue that LOW reliability would ease the process of identi-
fying and discarding wrong decision suggestions, whilst MEDIUM reliability would increase the
complexity of the decision even beyond the baseline (i.e. right information, fully reliable), with
the potential by-product effect of impairing the decision performance.
The claim of reference is Claim 10:
Claim 10 - Reliability figures: Providing reliability figures would influence pilot
decision-making performance in the following ways:
• the framing effect would emerge when providing pilots with reliable or uncertain
information; more specifically, pilots would feel more comfortable applying a
configuration associated with high reliability than with low uncertainty;
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• evidently wrong ADR suggestions, when associated with low reliability, would
be more easily spotted;
• low and high reliability options would both be easier to process than medium
reliability options, i.e. the decision time would increase with medium reliability
options.
The first point is elaborated in more detail by Claim 10; the analysis of this claim is described
later in this chapter in Experiment G.
Procedure
X-Plane was configured to run 3 scenarios. Similar flight conditions were set for all cases.
In the other experiments, the pilot was told, before undertaking the tests, that in case of fault
he/she would be supported by SaIRA, in order to efficiently solve the problem. The pilot was
also informed that the system could potentially generate wrong decision support information, as a
result of technological limitations.
The pilot was asked to complete any potential real-time fault management procedure correctly
and in the shortest time possible.
A safety-critical fault was simulated between 30 and 120 seconds after the start. The system
was configured to generate only one configuration option; the pilot could either accept it or switch
to safe mode.
Pilots were divided into two groups: Group A and Group B. All pilots performed Test 1; then
Group A performed Test 2a and Group B performed Test 2b, as follows:
• Test 1 - both Group A and Group B: SaIRA generated the correct decision support in-
formation characterised by FULL reliability. This was the baseline test, aimed at building
pilot confidence in the system before providing them with the wrong information;
• Test 2a - Group A only: SaIRA generated the wrong decision support information charac-
terised by LOW reliability;
• Test 2b - Group B only: SaIRA generated the wrong decision support information charac-
terised by MEDIUM reliability;
The selection of pilots for Group A or B was randomised.
Expectations
The following results were expected:
• E1: workload (WL) would be higher with MEDIUM reliability than with LOW or FULL
reliability;
• E2: fixation duration (FD) would be higher with MEDIUM reliability than with LOW or
FULL reliability;
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• E3: decision time (DT) would be higher with MEDIUM reliability than with LOW or FULL
reliability.
E1 and E2 have the common aim of characterising the workload from both a subjective and
objective (physiological) perspective.
The three expectations put forward cover all the points of Claim 10 apart from decision accur-
acy (DA) (DA is supposed to decrease with MEDIUM reliability). The rationale for excluding DA
from this analysis is that the number of pilots and simulations in question, combined with the level
of measurement of this variable (DA is nominal, i.e. a decision can either be right or wrong in
this experiment) make the statistical power insufficient to provide significant results (each group is
made of 6 pilots, each of them has 50% probability of avoiding the wrong suggestion by chance,
instead of as a consequence of the system presenting it with LOW reliability).
Results
This experiment has a mixed factorial design. The two independent variables are the correctness
of decision support information (which can be either ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, with the former being
the baseline condition) and its reliability (either ‘LOW’, ‘MEDIUM’ or ‘FULL’, with FULL being
the baseline condition). Correctness is the within-subject independent variable (i.e. all pilots test
both its conditions) and reliability is the between-subjects independent variable (so that Group A is
tested with the ‘LOW’ reliability condition and Group B is tested with the ‘MEDIUM’ condition).
For FD and DT, the main effect of both correctness (C) and reliability (R) is assessed. When
ANOVA is used (for WL), the interaction between the correctness and reliability factors is also
assessed (CR).
It must be noted that the main objective of this experiment, as previously stated, is to invest-
igate the effect of the ‘reliability’ factor. However, because of the nature of the decision support
information, it was not possible to design this experiment without using both correct and incorrect
information. Hence, although the focus is on the main effect of reliability, the impact of correctness
can be used to enrich the conclusions about complacency obtained from Experiment B.
E1: workload (WL)
WL was measured by means of the NASA-TLX technique. The results of the analysis are shown
in Table 6.22. The factor ‘Group’ tests for the difference in reliability (degREL) whilst ‘Test’
examines the effect of the correctness of the information provided. Physical demand is not reported
because it was rated null by all pilots.
A two-way split-plot ANOVA was performed on each parameter of the NASA-TLX test except
PD. The results for the main effect of correctness (C) and reliability (R), and for their interaction
(CR) are reported in Tables 6.23, 6.24 and 6.25.
In line with E1, WL with MEDIUM reliability is higher than in the other two cases. It must be
noted that WL is also higher than the baseline with LOW reliability.
Interestingly, a peak of temporal demand (TD) is recorded with MEDIUM reliability. This
is an unexpected result because no time limits for decisions were set for this experiment. We
6.11. EXPERIMENT E – INFORMATION CORRECTNESS AND RELIABILITY 181
Workload (NASA-TLX) - Test results
Test 1 Test 2 Group A Group B
MD 66.67 (2.07) 74.14 (3.83) 64.58 (2.71) 76.25 (2.83)
TD 35.42 (4.15) 45.42 (4.01) 34.17 (3.53) 46.67 (4.28)
PE 83.33 (2.56) 59.17 (2.88) 71.25 (3.8) 71.25 (5.19)
EF 54.25 (2.85) 67.5 (5.06) 57.17 (4.39) 64.58 (4.46)
FR 25.83 (2.74) 61.67 (7.24) 34.58 (2.85) 52.92 (9.74)
OWL 43.26 (2.23) 59.25 (3.56) 47.2 (1.51) 55.31 (4.9)
Table 6.22: NASA-TLX data under the effect of different degREL.
Workload (NASA-TLX)
Workload parameter Effect of ‘correctness’ (C)
MD F(1, 10) = 5.031, p < 0.049
TD F(1, 10) = 5.294, p < 0.044
PE F(1, 10) = 40.239, p < 0.001
EF F(1, 10) = 7.28, p < 0.022
FR F(1, 10) = 80.742, p < 0.001
OWL F(1, 10) = 66.87, p < 0.001
Table 6.23: Main effect of ‘correctness’ of the decision support information (two-way split-plot ANOVA).
speculate that the increased perception of TD is a by-product of the increased frustration and
cognitive demand. NASA-TLX data was not processed in real-time (as was eye movement data),
therefore it was not possible to question pilots about this result in the post-experiment interviews.
Another interesting outcome is the negative effect of LOW reliability on pilot perception of
their performance. In practice, the decision accuracy (DA) results show that contrary to participant
perception, performance was not statistically worse than in the baseline case. The DA results are
reported in Figure 6.24 in the form of percentages.
E2: fixation duration (FD)
Table 6.26 reports the descriptive statistics concerning FD for Experiment E.
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test reveals no statistical effect for ‘correctness’ of decision sup-
port information on pilot FD (Z = 0.706, n.s., N=13). Either the pilots did not notice the incorrect
Workload (NASA-TLX)
Workload parameter Effect of ‘reliability’ (R)
MD F(1, 10) = 13.517, p < 0.004
TD F(1, 10) = 4.556, n.s.
PE F(1, 10) = 1.722, n.s.
EF F(1, 10) = 1.686, n.s.
FR F(1, 10) = 30.062, p < 0.001
OWL F(1, 10) = 7.026, p < 0.024
Table 6.24: Main effect of ‘reliability’ of the decision support information (two-way split-plot ANOVA).
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Workload (NASA-TLX)
Workload parameter Correctness/reliability interaction (CR)
MD F(1, 10) = 6.211, p < 0.032
TD F(1, 10) = 2.353, n.s.
PE F(1, 10) = 1.722, n.s.
EF F(1, 10) = 4.941, p < 0.05
FR F(1, 10) = 44.716, p < 0.001
OWL F(1, 10) = 51.563, p < 0.001
Table 6.25: Interaction between ‘correctness’ and ‘reliability’ of the decision support information (two-way split-plot
ANOVA).
















Figure 6.24: Decision accuracy (percentage of pilots who made the right decision)
information (which supports the results on complacency discussed in relation to Experiment B) or
they did not have any observable physiological reactions in terms of FD.
On the other hand, the Mann-Whitney U test reveals the strong effect of the ‘reliability’ factor
(Z = 2.882, p < 0.004, N=13); this test compares Group A and Group B within Test 2. The FD
analysis confirms the increased complexity of processing MEDIUM reliability information.
E3: decision time (DT)
Similar results to FD were found for DT. The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test shows no statistical
effect for ‘correctness’ of decision support information on pilot DT (Z = 1.883, n.s., N=13).
However, the Mann-Whitney U test reveals the statistically significant effect of the ‘reliability’
Fixation duration
Test 1 384.83 (s.d. 10.61)
Test 2 409.53 (s.d. 20.93)
Group A 371.52 (s.d. 8.56)
Group B 421.84 (s.d. 19.86)
Table 6.26: Fixation duration (in milliseconds) under the effect of ‘correctness of information’ (Test 1 vs Test 2) and
‘reliability of information’ (Group A vs Group B).
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factor (Z = 2.722, p < 0.006, N=13). Table 6.27 reports the statistics.
Decision time
Test 1 31.65 (s.d. 2.32)
Test 2 42.85 (s.d. 4.47)
Group A 32.57 (s.d. 1.8)
Group B 41.93 (s.d. 4.89)
Table 6.27: Decision time (in seconds) under the effect of ‘correctness of information’ (Test 1 vs Test 2) and
‘reliability of information’ (Group A vs Group B).
A correlation is found between FD and DT (Spearman’s test: ρ = 0.509, p < 0.011, N=24),
which is evident in Figure 6.26.
The results for Experiment E are summarised in Table 6.28 and Figures 6.25 and 6.26.
Experiment E
WL DT (sec) FD (msec)
Test 1 43.25 (s.d. 2.23) 31.68 (s.d. 2.32) 384.83 (s.d. 10.62)
Test 2a 48.28 (s.d. 1.23) 30.76 (s.d. 1.98) 352.78 (s.d. 7.18)
Test 2b 70.22 (s.d. 2.44) 50.95 (s.d. 5.03) 466.28 (s.d. 24.24)
Table 6.28: Overall results for Experiment E.





















Figure 6.25: Workload (‘Overall workload’ parameter of the NASA-TLX test).
Discussion
All three claims are confirmed by the experimental results. The main conclusions are that (a)
MEDIUM reliability worsens ADR decision performance and (b) LOW reliability improves pilot
performance in discarding erroneous information. In both cases, reliability information has shown
to allow pilots to make a more informed decision, which is a determining element in the design of
a safety-critical system.
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Figure 6.26: Decision time (DT) and fixation duration (FD).
Experiment B reveals that, in certain circumstances, pilots can be complacent about erroneous
ADR decision support information. This experiment shows that reliability information has an
effect on pilot decision performance, but no conclusions can be drawn about accuracy. Taken alto-
gether, these conclusions give rise to a new question: can ‘reliability’ become a bias during ADR
decisions? For instance, if SaIRA generates a correct configuration alternative, but erroneously
associates it with LOW reliability, what is the reaction of the pilot? Will the pilot spend time in-
vestigating why a seemingly good suggestion is not viewed as reliable or would they be persuaded
to apply another, possibly sub-optimal configuration? This is probably material for future investig-
ation and these questions would require a new set of experiments that build on the results obtained
here, so we leave them for future work.
6.12 Experiment F – Perception of Risk
Description and aim
Experiment F focuses on the effect of pilot perception of risk on ADR decisions, encompassing
Claim 1 which is reported here for the sake of clarity:
Claim 1 - Risk perception: If prompted by the system, pilots would accept a recon-
figuration of the avionics in situations which are not particularly risky (e.g. whilst
cruising). They would refrain from doing so in situations of pressing risk (e.g. before
landing, when the system is more unstable and a change to the current state could
become a catalyst for catastrophic consequences).
This is a within-subjects experiment.
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Procedure
X-Plane was configured to run four simulations with similar flight conditions. The pilot was asked
to complete any potential real-time fault management procedures correctly and in the shortest time
possible.
The participant was also told that for technical reasons, the aircraft would have started the
simulations with a sub-optimal avionics configuration, characterised by no bus redundancy and no
application redundancy. As a result, both buses and LRUs constituted a single point of failure in
all tests. The pilots were also told that they could improve the current state of the avionics in-flight
through ADR, but only if they considered that action appropriate for current operating conditions.
The four simulations in question are associated with the following tests:
• Test 1: the pilot was required to take-off from Innsbruck International Airport, reach an
altitude of 20,000 feet and hold it for 5 minutes of cruise. Between 2 and 3 minutes after
reaching the target altitude, the participant was prompted with an ADR aimed at optimising
the current avionics configuration.
• Test 2: the simulation started in the cruise phase, at an altitude of 35,000 feet, heading to San
Francisco International Airport (SFO). The pilot’s objective was to land at SFO. Roughly 2
minutes after starting the descent, the pilot was prompted with an ADR aimed at optimising
the current avionics configuration.
• Test 3: identical conditions to Test 1 but taking off from London Stansted International
Airport.
• Test 4: identical conditions to Test 2 but landing at Perscara International Airport.
Tests 1 and 3 represent the no-risk condition; Tests 2 and 4 represent the risky condition.
In all cases, SaIRA was configured to provide only one ADR alternative. During each test a
similar fault was simulated (i.e. loss of a LRU) and a similar target configuration was suggested
(i.e. switching off certain non-critical applications and changing the allocation of the critical soft-
ware on the LRUs available). The pilot could either apply the suggested configuration or refuse to
apply it, maintaining the current state of the system.
Expectations
The risks associated with the landing phase are intrinsically higher than those associated with
the cruise phase. As a result, the number of pilots that would accept the application of a new
configuration during Tests 2 and 4 should have been lower than during Tests 1 and 3, which take
place during more relaxed phases of flight.
Results
The results, reported in Table 6.29, follow the expectations. The main effect is statistically signi-
ficant (McNemar’s test: χ2(1,N = 26) = 8.643, p < 0.002, N=26).
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Accepted Refused % of Accepted
Test 1 9 4
Test 3 10 3
69.2%
Test 2 2 11
Test 4 4 9
23.8%
Table 6.29: Descriptive statistics concerning the number of pilots who accepted/refused to proceed with the ADR.
Test 1 and 3 are high-risk scenarios; Test 2 and 4 are low-risk scenarios.
Discussion
The evidence from this experiment is very important in relation to the design of the ADR process
and related DSS technology. The main result is that when the perception of risk is high, pilots are
not in a position to make a timely informed choice; they are over-cautious and, if a reconfiguration
is really mandatory in those circumstances, then their attitude could have serious consequences.
On a civil aircraft, typical situations of this type are take-off and landing. The problem becomes
more complicated in the military domain, which entails much more risky situations that are difficult
to define and detect in real-time.
The aim of this work is not to define all possible situations that would impair pilot ability to
supervise the ADR process; rather, the objective is to understand the nature of the effects generated
by heightened levels of risk. As already discussed, the reflection effect (Section 4.1.1), which is
the basis of several studies on decision making under risk and uncertainties, does not apply in this
specific decisional context.
A potential way to address the issue for ADR can be found in adaptive automation (AA),
a form of automation that allows for dynamic changes in control function allocations between a
machine and an operator, based on states of the collective human-machine system [Hilburn et al.
1997; Kaber and Endsley 2004].
According to AA theory, the degree of automation of the system should vary in proportion to
the cognitive load of the operator. The theory has been developed to moderate operator workload
or maintain it within predetermined acceptable limits and to preserve good SA. A very basic form
of AA is currently available on modern aircraft in the form of a switch from manual to automatic
pilot.
6.13 Experiment G – Reliability Framing
Description and aim
The objective of Experiment G was to investigate the potential consequences of framing the reli-
ability portion of the decision support information generated by SaIRA in different ways. More
specifically, Claim 6 is assessed:
Claim 6 - Framing effect: Pilot decision behaviour during ADR would be subject to
the framing effect; more specifically, presenting ADR information in terms of its reli-
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ability instead of its uncertainty would make pilots more comfortable with accepting
the application of the proposed configuration.
This is a within-subjects experiment.
Procedure
X-Plane was configured to run two tests with similar flight conditions. The pilot was asked to
complete any potential real-time fault management procedures correctly and in the shortest time
possible.
SaIRA was configured to show decision support information in INFO 3 format and to provide
pilots with only one configuration option; the pilot could either apply the suggested configuration
or refuse to apply it, switching to safe mode.
The two tests had the following characteristics:
• Test 1: a fault was simulated between 2 and 3 minutes after the start of the simulation; the
pilot was prompted with an ADR request characterised by 70% reliability;
• Test 2: a fault was simulated between 2 and 3 minutes after the start of the simulation; the
pilot was prompted with an ADR request characterised by 30% uncertainty;
The usual nominal scale used by SaIRA to present reliability information (i.e. ranging from
‘LOW’ to ‘FULL’ reliability) was replaced by percentage values for this experiment in order to
make sure that exactly the same value was expressed both in terms of reliability and its opposite
(see Section 4.1.4, page 84).
After Test 2 the pilot was asked to answer the question on the form shown in Figure 6.27.
In which test did you feel more comfortable applying the 
recommendation generated by SaIRA?
Experiment G
Test 1 Test 2 No difference between Test 1 and Test 2
Figure 6.27: Format of the question submitted to pilots after Test 2.
Expectations
Due to the framing effect and loss aversion phenomena, the number of pilots that would accept the
application of the reconfiguration should have been higher in Test 1 than in Test 2.
Results
In agreement with the expectations, 11 pilots accepted the reconfiguration in Test 1 and 5 pilots
did so in Test 2 (see Table 6.30). McNemar’s test reveals the statistical significance of this result
(χ2(1,N = 13) = 4.167, p < 0.031).
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Accepted Refused
Test 1 (with reliability) 11 2
Test 2 (with uncertainty) 5 8
Table 6.30: Number of pilots who accepted or refused to reconfigure during Test 1 and Test 2.
Interestingly, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test also reveals an effect on the on-target fixation
duration (FD) relative to the EHSI 1 AOI, which contains the reliability/unreliability information
(Z = 2.83, p < 0.005, N=13); see Figure 6.28.
The descriptive statistics concerning fixation duration are reported in Table 6.31.
FD
Test 1 (with reliability) 362.31 (s.d. 25.23)
Test 2 (with unreliability) 403.97 (s.d. 34.11)
Table 6.31: Descriptive statistics for Experiment G.



























Figure 6.28: Fixation duration (in milliseconds).
The results from the question put forward after Test 2 are reported in Table 6.32. The framing





Table 6.32: Results of the question: In which test did you feel more comfortable applying the recommendation
generated by SaIRA?
Discussion
The main result is the statistical confirmation of the emergence of the framing effect in relation
to reliability figures associated with ADR decision support information; pilots are more likely to
apply a reconfiguration when it is associated with high reliability than with low uncertainty.
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This result is backed by the increased FD with ‘unreliable’ information, which is symptomatic
of increased difficulty in processing the information in question.
The results suggest that particular attention should be paid when shaping the format of decision
support information for safety-critical decisions like those used in the ADR process.
Furthermore, the results of the question submitted after Test 2 provide further support to the
claim related to the framing effect of the reliability figures. Pilots should be trained not to be
susceptible to the framing effect, each portion of the information provided by the system should be
unequivocally explained and the scale used by the system to represent measures should be made
clear.
6.14 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes seven experiments conducted with civil pilots which address different as-
pects of two main topics:
1. How pilots respond to ADR decisions, regardless of the design of the decision support in-
formation (Experiments A, B, D and F);
2. How the design of SaIRA decision support information influences the response of the pilots
(Experiments C, E and G).
With regard to the first topic, the following material was covered:
• Trust. The results of Experiment A show that explaining how and why the system reaches
certain conclusions enhances human trust in a DSS and system-human cooperation im-
proves. More specifically, trust decreases the first time the system provides ‘apparently
wrong’ suggestions, but increases again when explanations are provided. Younger pilots
seem to have a higher a priori trust in the automated system.
• Complacency. Pilots were found to be complacent about basic reconfiguration decision
support information (which does not include explanations, implications and uncertainty fig-
ures). In Experiment B, when provided with wrong decision suggestions, circa 77% of
decisions taken by the pilots were wrong (i.e. erroneously complacent).
• Time pressure. Experiment D reveals that pilots use the decision support information more
intensely when the time budget is narrow; having more time to make a decision allows them
to concentrate on other information elsewhere in the cockpit. Explanations and implications
are found to be intensively used by pilots during ADR under all conditions, reducing atten-
tion to graphical information during the occurrence of severe time pressure. Implications
were found to decrease decision uncertainties, confirming their importance and effective-
ness.
• Perception of risk. Experiment F shows that when the perception of risk is high (such as
during a landing manoeuvre), pilots become over-cautious with respect to reconfigurations.
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This attitude could have serious consequences when a reconfiguration is mandatory in risky
circumstances.
Concerning the second main topic, the following conclusions were reached:
• Availability of explanations and implications. The SaIRA decision support information
design, which includes explanations and implications of the decision alternatives, was found
to improve decision accuracy and situation awareness, decrease decision time and reduce
workload and frustration. The overall improvement in the decision making activity can be
interpreted as a result of the improved cognitive readiness of the pilots.
• Information reliability. The availability of an assessment of the reliability of the fault
information leads to a more informed choice and reduces complacency. However, despite the
benefits, when the figures are in the middle of the scale, decision performance is decreased
as a result of increased decision complexity.
• Framing effect. The emergence of the framing effect in relation to reliability figures as-
sociated with ADR decision support information was shown statistically. Pilots are more
prone to apply a reconfiguration when it is associated with high reliability than with low
uncertainty.
Table 6.33 provides a summary of the findings from all the experiments described in this
chapter.













Wrong decision support information
decreases pilots’ trust in the system.
Subsequent provision of explanations for
each recommendation option partially
restores the trust.
Experiment B InformationCorrectness Decision accuracy
Pilots show a complacent behaviour to
reconfiguration suggestions when no
decision support information is provided











SaIRA decision support information (i.e.
graphics, explanations, implications,
reliability) has the following effects:
complacency decrease (i.e. improved
decision accuracy), decision time
decrease, decision complexity decrease
(i.e. decreased fixation duration),
workload and frustration decrease. The
improvement provided by graphics alone











Decision accuracy is not impaired by time
pressure nor lack of implications.
Implications are extensively used under
time pressure and their unavailability
increases pilots’ hesitation. With more










When a medium value of reliability is
associated to the recommendations, ADR
decision performance decreases (i.e. the
task becomes more complex). Low
reliability values improve pilot
performance in discarding erroneous
information.
Experiment F Perception ofRisk
Pilot accept/refuse to
reconfigure
Pilots are more reluctant to accept a
reconfiguration in risky scenarios (e.g.
just before landing) even if they would






Pilots are more likely to apply a
reconfiguration when it is associated with
high reliability than with low uncertainty
Table 6.33: Summary of the findings of the experiments.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
“Man is too quick at forming conclusions”
—Edward Emerson Barnard, Astronomer (1857-1923)
7.1 Overview and Main Contributions
This thesis investigates the problem of human involvement in the dynamic reconfiguration process
of Safety-Critical Manned Systems (SCMS). In light of the complexity of the process, the current
focus of mainstream research on dynamic reconfiguration of next-generation SCMS is on full
autonomy and full authority solutions, which are capable of making the process as transparent to
the operator as possible. This approach has inherent drawbacks which are explored in the thesis,
drawing on ideas from Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Engineering and Human Factors.
After questioning the viability and safety of fully automated dynamic reconfiguration solutions
for next-generation SCMS, this thesis proposes a pragmatic but effective human-centred alternat-
ive: in the proposed framework, the operator is involved in the dynamic reconfiguration process by
making critical decisions, but is assisted by a novel Decision Support System (DSS), specifically
designed to parallel human cognitive strategies, as a means of addressing the complexity of the
decision-making problem.
It must be noted that this thesis does not support the case for a reduction in the degree of
automation on-board modern SCMS; instead it argues for the design of highly-automated systems
in which the operator’s role is properly taken into account early in the design phase, especially for
invasive, safety-critical processes, which change the functionality of the system at run-time (e.g.
dynamic reconfiguration).
Four main contributions stem from the research as a whole, summarised as follows:
1. Literature review. The design, development and validation of the technology proposed in
this thesis required a nexus between ideas from diverse domains, including Cognitive Psy-
chology and Engineering, Decision Support Systems Engineering, Aerospace Engineering,
Human Factors, Computer Science, Human-Computer Interaction.
The exercise of organic information synthesis presented in the first part of the thesis brings
to light (a) issues with modern safety-critical technology and engineering praxis (e.g. the
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drawbacks of full autonomy/authority SCMS fault management solutions) which had gone
almost unnoticed in the literature up to the present day, and (b) dimensions of improvement
which benefit from the coalescence of ideas from diverse domains. The review of the current
state of the research and the cross-fertilisation of ideas from different disciplines paved the
way for the development of SaIRA, a novel and effective cognitive engineering product.
2. SaIRA. All the novel algorithms and heuristics proposed in this thesis have been implemen-
ted in, and validated through, a real technology demonstrator called SaIRA. To the best of
our knowledge, SaIRA is the first DSS prototype for SCMS dynamic reconfiguration prob-
lems. The framework has two main objectives: (a) generating applicable configurations for
modern SCMS (such as Integrated Modular Avionics) whilst the system is operational and
(b) generating effective decision support information for the operator. SaIRA represents
proof of the viability and practicability of the ideas proposed in this thesis.
Regardless of the application domain, the DSS technology is novel inasmuch as it is de-
signed around the verified hypothesis that the accuracy and performance of the decision-
makers can be improved by providing them with specific support information which paral-
lels human cognitive strategies, such as favouring mental simulation.
3. Experimental results. The claims advanced in the first part of the thesis about both hu-
man behaviour during SCMS dynamic reconfiguration decisions and about the effectiveness
of SaIRA were verified through a series of human-computer interaction experiments. The
results reveal that SaIRA improves pilot decision accuracy, decision performance, situation
awareness and more generally their cognitive readiness, whilst reducing cognitive workload
and frustration under heavy time pressure.
Regarding what concerns the novel algorithms proposed, the empirical evaluation performed
against state-of-the-art methods reveals the superiority of wsm decision-repair in the
specific context of combinatorial problems with similar structure and complexity to SCMS
dynamic reconfiguration.
4. Experimental methodology. A significant contribution of this thesis is the development
of a methodology for the assessment of the effectiveness of a decision support system that
goes beyond classic measures (such as F-measure or ROC-measure) and merges sophistic-
ated subjective and objective techniques. This approach allows for robust conclusions to
be made about the effectiveness of the DSS, which not only take the decision results into
consideration, but also human behaviour during the decision making process.
The experimental methodology developed in this thesis was designed in the light of recent
criticism against the validity of a number of mental constructs and metrics (e.g. situation
awareness) which have been used in Human Factors and Human-Computer Interaction stud-
ies over the last two decades (Section 2.4). The novel approach proposed here allows for
inferences that rest on coherence amongst several specifically-selected metrics of a hetero-
geneous nature. None of the major claims relies on a single source of data (e.g. situation
awareness is assessed using a merging of eye-movement analysis data with the results of
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the SA-SWORD test). The successful application of this approach, which is general enough
to be extended to other human-computer interaction studies (not necessarily from the avi-
ation domain), makes it a robust option for future HCI studies, as it is more resilient to the
criticism mentioned above than mainstream methods.
In addition to the four main contributions described here, a number of additional achievements
are made by this research, which are discussed in the next section.
7.2 Additional Contributions
The following additional contributions are made by this thesis:
1. User profiling. The effectiveness of a DSS is highly dependent on the quality of the user
profile. A common modus operandi for the generation of user profiles for modern DSSs
is to capture the behavioural aspect of the decision making whilst giving little attention to
the cognitive aspect of decision support [Chen and Lee 2003], thereby neglecting the “ex-
ecutive mind-support systems” interpretation of DSSs, introduced in the early stages of this
technology by Young [1983]. This thesis proposes a pilot profile—limited to the Avionics
Dynamic Reconfiguration (ADR) scenario—which draws on ideas from the Naturalistic De-
cision Making (NDM) domain. The empirical assessment confirms the effectiveness of this
approach.
2. Situation awareness (SA). This mental construct has acquired significant importance in the
last two decades in several domains related to Human Factors/Ergonomics, inter alia mil-
itary tactics, business decisions, NDM and aviation psychology. SA is specifically targeted
in this thesis by the claims advanced and by the design of the HCI experiments. One major
contribution is the evidence of the effectiveness, in terms of SA improvement, of the type of
decision support information generated by the framework proposed. A rigorous approach to
the assessment of SA is adopted, which correlates several subjective and objective metrics.
3. Automation-Induced Complacency (AIC). AIC is a relatively new and debated area of
research in the aerospace human factors domain, which requires new contributions. The
potential emergence of this phenomenon is specifically addressed in the HCI experiments;
the contribution of this thesis is to reveal that the availability of explanations to justify each
decision alternative has a constraining effect on the emergence of AIC. This approach stems
from the original hypothesis of the effectiveness of decision support information that paral-
lels human cognitive strategies. It would be interesting to extend the investigation performed
in this research to domains other than aviation; there seems to be no reason why the results
obtained in this study could not be generalised to other decision making contexts, such as
control of nuclear power plants.
4. Constraint-based decision support generation technology. In order to prove the practic-
ability of the approach to automated decision support information generation proposed in
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this thesis, new technology aimed at producing the information in question in a program-
matic manner was investigated. In order to tackle the complexity of the problem addressed,
we propose a method in which an ontology for the ADR problem is developed first; the
ontology is then used to support the modelling of the overall ADR problem as a constraint
satisfaction problem. This approach is revealed to be effective and it is general enough to be
applied to similar problems from different domains. Two novel algorithms are proposed:
• wsm decision-repair is an algorithm designed to handle major reconfigurations
(resulting from over-constrained problems which require switching to a degraded op-
erating mode), which exploits domain-dependent knowledge encoded at design time.
The performance and scalability of the algorithm were empirically assessed and com-
pared to standard de facto algorithms designed for the same purpose. The results show
the effectiveness of the algorithm for the ADR problem. This algorithm is generic and
can be applied to different problems.
• SaIRA-XPlain is an algorithm for the automated generation of explanations and im-
plications of each reconfiguration alternative that integrates the technology discussed
in the thesis. The algorithm has the key role of showing the practicability of the ideas
developed in this thesis.
5. Information masking and data reliability. The trend towards increasing levels of autonomy
and authority of automated control systems leads to the development of control interfaces
that mask the current state of the system, filtering the raw information and providing the
operator with only the ‘most salient’ portion of the data. A definition of what is ‘salient’
for an operator is both hard to find and controversial. This thesis maintains that whenever
appropriate the operator should be informed about the degree of uncertainty hidden in the
input data used by the system to perform its inferences. A major contribution of this work is
to provide empirical evidence that unmasking this type of information enables the human to
spot wrong conclusions of the system under control and, as a result, reduces the emergence
of complacent behaviour, thereby improving safety.
7.3 Limits and Further Work
The problem addressed by this research is vast and has facets of a diverse nature; despite its
effectiveness, the approach proposed to handle the SCMS dynamic reconfiguration process and to
generate decision support information has also revealed a number of limitations and opportunities
for further work which are indicated hereinafter. Some limitations of the adopted research method
are also discussed.
1. Experiments. A number of decision biases which are relevant for the ADR problem are
discussed in Chapter 4. The chapter sets up a research agenda but the list of decision biases is
not intended to be comprehensive and, despite the statistical significance of the experimental
results, some of the biases have only just begun to be examined; this is the case of the issues
with pilot trust in the on-board automation.
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There is plenty of room for more experiments which cover a larger number of aspects of
the decision-making activity and provide a more in-depth examination of any facet of the
human-computer interaction process being studied.
2. SaIRA technology. SaIRA is a novel technology. It should be regarded as a first prototype
of a new class of constraint-based DSSs designed to parallel human cognitive strategies.
There is room for improvement in almost every aspect of the system, including performance,
content and framing of the information generated and type of interaction established with
the human.
3. Simulated environment. A review of the literature shows that the use of simulators is
becoming more and more common in studies of aviation psychology and Human Factor-
s/Ergonomics. In spite of the documented benefits brought to the research community by
this technology (such as cost reduction and accessibility), it seems reasonable to assume
that certain aspects of the flight experience cannot be reproduced in a simulated environ-
ment, regardless of the quality of the simulation. The emotional responses generated by real
flight experience cannot be reproduced in a laboratory for several reasons, the absence of a
life threatening risk being one of the more influential. A comprehensive study of the effects
experienced by participants in different types of virtual reality systems and viewing different
virtual environments is presented by Sharples et al. [2008].
The absence of life threatening risks poses limits for the examination of three factors,
amongst those addressed by Chapter 4, primarily:
• Risk perception. In Experiment F, risk is simulated by making pilots perform those
manoeuvres that in reality are characterised by the highest degree of risk during the
overall flight. The simulation should induce the feeling of a risky situation; thus, the
pilots are asked to empathise with the role and with the flight scenario; however, a real
scenario could alter the results. The analysis performed in this experiment should be
considered as a precursor to a new experiment characterised by a more ecologically
valid setting.
• Frustration. By definition, frustration arises from the perceived resistance to the ful-
filment of individual will; in a controlled experiment, this can be achieved in an infinite
number of ways, each of them leading to a different set of secondary emotions. The
well-established NASA-TLX technique is used to assess frustration during Experiment
C and a statistically significant effect is recorded. However, the relevance of the results
obtained is related to the simulated scenario; there is no guarantee that a real setting
would not generate a set of secondary emotional responses that could potentially lead
to different results.
• Trust. Trust is affected by the same issues; in a real scenario pilots could show more
cautious behaviour and be less trusting of the automated system.
4. Multiple operators. SaIRA is designed to interact with one operator. A natural continu-
ation of the research path is to extend the framework to support multiple operators, possibly
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located in different places and with different degrees and areas of accountability. This could
be the case in the control of a nuclear power plant or the control of a satellite from a ground
station.
The problem is not new and has acquired increasing interest in the last decade especially in
the domain of situation awareness; Endsley [1997a] introduces the concept of team situ-
ation awareness—“the degree to which each team member has the information needed for
his/her job”—whilst Kaber et al. [2001] propose the concept of shared situation aware-
ness—“the degree to which team members have the same awareness of information require-
ments for team performance”. Cox et al. [2007] study distributed cognition—“a theoretical
and methodological framework that moves away from looking at the individual and instead
focuses on larger socio-technical systems”—in the context of flightdeck collaboration and
air-traffic control. Saikayasit and Sharples [2009] study the influence and effects of shared-
representation facilities on collaboration and shared mental models development. The above
research provides a good starting point for extending the functionality of SaIRA.
5. Real-time performance. Bespoke technology for the interactive management of the ADR
process has been developed in the context of this thesis. Whilst the performance of wsm
decision-repair is empirically examined, no claims are made concerning the applicabil-
ity of the approach proposed, ‘as is’, for a hard real-time computing environment.
In SaIRA a single ADR CSP is defined to handle all aspects of the reconfiguration problem,
including the problem of task scheduling over the distributed network of computing mod-
ules. Whilst the efficiency of CP-based algorithms to solve this type of combinatorial prob-
lems has been demonstrated already [Cambazard et al. 2004; Hladik et al. 2008], bespoke
algorithms, heuristics and schedulability analysis tools (which feature an impressive per-
formance) have been specifically developed for modern Integrated Modular Avionics archi-
tectures, drawing on years of experience in the on-board software engineering domain [Lee
et al. 2000]. An interesting opportunity for further research would be to exploit Bender’s
decomposition, introduced in Section 5.3.2, to integrate state-of-the-art algorithms for task
scheduling within SaIRA.
6. Information framing. The way the decision support information is conveyed to the oper-
ator has a strong influence on the decision performance and accuracy, as demonstrated in
Experiment G. This thesis focuses mainly on textual information. The framing chosen to
display the information and the schema used for the text are basic; improving the current
information design is a problem that could provide enough workload for a Ph.D. project on
its own. In this regard, it would be interesting to investigate the effect of different textual in-
formation framing, different schemas and more sophisticated solutions which, for instance,
integrate more powerful graphics. An interesting starting point could be providing pilots
with a hierarchical representation of the explanations and implications, capable of capturing
prospective causal relationships between them.
7. Decision context. All the experiments performed assume a safety-critical scenario with
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a limited decision time budget. The experiments show that explanations are particularly
effective at improving pilot situation awareness when the decision time budget is slightly
increased. It would be interesting to study the effect of the decision support information
generated by SaIRA in different decision contexts, characterised by longer time budgets.
This is a promising direction of investigation, as intuitively, more time available to establish
causal relationships should improve pilot situation awareness and decision accuracy.
8. Adaptive Automation Technology. Adaptive automation (AA) is a form of automation that
allows for dynamic changes in control function allocations between a machine and an oper-
ator based on the states of the collective human-machine system [Hilburn et al. 1997; Kaber
and Endsley 2004]. This concept was briefly mentioned during the discussion of Experiment
F (Section 6.12) in relation to the perception of risk. It would be interesting to investigate—
and to look at the effects of—dynamic changes to the type and amount of decision support
information delivered to the operator during SCMS dynamic reconfiguration on the basis of
the current operating conditions.
9. Predicting pilot behaviour. Lawson et al. [2009] investigate the problem of predicting
human responses to an emergency situation. The authors use a talk-through method in which
participants are asked to describe their actions in response to a scenario. An interesting
extension of this research would be to adapt the method developed by Lawson et al. to
SaIRA and use the predictions to improve the content of the decision support information
directed to the pilots. The method used by Lawson et al. is interesting, as it would provide
an additional framework to empirically verify the assumptions on mental simulation made
at the beginning of this thesis.
10. Experimental methodology. The development of a robust experimental methodology for
the type of study presented in this thesis is amongst the four main objectives achieved.
Whilst the experimental results obtained are sound and show the effectiveness of the ap-
proach, several aspects of the method should be investigated further and possibly improved.
It would be interesting to add new HCI techniques and metrics into the framework and exam-
ine how they correlate with the other constructs. Additionally, it would also be interesting to
act on the power of the experiments, for example by increasing the number of participants,
an option which was not available in the context of this research.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
The research performed for this thesis reveals, on one hand, that the exclusion of the operator
of a safety-critical manned system from the system dynamic reconfiguration process represents
a threat to the safety of the humans interacting with it; on the other hand, the risks of leaving
too much control in the hands of the operator, without appropriate automated support, are also
theoretically and empirically acknowledged. The problem of human involvement during dynamic
reconfiguration, which at least in the aviation literature has gone mainly unnoticed so far, cannot be
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neglected and on-board technology should be designed and developed accordingly. This problem
represents the motivation for this research.
In Chapter 3 the following hypothesis was stated:
During the process of avionics dynamic reconfiguration, decision support informa-
tion that parallels cognitive strategies by including explanations, implications and an
assessment of the uncertainty associated with the reconfiguration advice provided by
the system should have a positive effect on pilot situation awareness, workload, de-
cision accuracy and performance, thus it should improve the overall decision making
effectiveness of the pilot and, as a result, the safety of the process.
The hypothesis has been demonstrated by developing, and empirically assessing the effects of,
a novel decision support system framework for avionics dynamic reconfiguration named SaIRA
(Safe and Interactive Reconfiguration Architecture) which has been specifically designed in ac-
cordance with the hypothesis. In fact, SaIRA generates decision support information that parallels
human cognitive strategies and includes (a) explanations that justify each reconfiguration altern-
ative, (b) implications for each alternative and (c) an assessment of the uncertainty embedded in
the information processed by the system. The HCI experiments performed provide empirical evid-
ence of the benefits brought by SaIRA to human decision making activities during SCMS dynamic
reconfiguration. Several HCI metrics are used to assess the effectiveness of the framework; these
metrics include, and are not limited to, all the metrics mentioned in the hypothesis. As a result, all
the parts of the hypothesis are demonstrated.
The effectiveness of SaIRA is investigated in the aviation domain only. The improvement
of several additional aspects of the operator’s decision making activity (including improvement
of situation awareness, decrease of frustration and workload and, more generally, improvement of
cognitive readiness) suggests that similar benefits could be gained by adapting the decision support
strategy proposed in this thesis to other safety-critical decision making problems with comparable
characteristics, possibly in different domains.
“The noblest pleasure is the joy of understanding”






Several algorithms and software applications have been developed in the context of this Ph.D.
programme in order to validate the ideas proposed. Figure A.1 describes the human-computer
interaction framework specifically devised to perform the experiments presented in Chapter 6 and
produce the data required by the experimental design; the figure shows how the tools developed
(i.e. ADR-Plugin, SETS and SETS-Analyser) have been integrated with third-party software to












Bespoke software (developed in the context of this Ph.D. programme)
statistical data 




Figure A.1: Architecture of the framework developed for the human-computer interaction experiments described in
Chapter 6.
Chapter 5 described the algorithms developed for the generation of decision support inform-
ation together with an assessment of their performance; these algorithms are implemented in the
ADR-Plugin. Chapter 6 provided an overview of the tools developed to perform the experiments
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with the pilots but the exposition was purposely kept generic to favour the clarity of description
of the experiments design and of the results obtained. In order to support the reproducibility of
the experiments, this appendix expands the description of both SETS and SETS-Analyser systems
started in Chapter 6.
A.1 SaIRA Eye-Tracking System (SETS)
SETS is designed to produce a streamlined set of data in real-time, integrating eye-movement
coordinates localised on the cockpit display with simulation events (e.g. fault firing, change of
information displayed on the cockpit, gaze out-of-screen) coming from the flight simulator. The
output of SETS is processed by SETS-Analyser, which generates the data in the form required by
our analysis. The functioning of SETS is better understood through Figure A.2, which captures




localisation of gazes on the cockpit








(i.e. eye-tracking + events)
Figure A.2: Data flow in and out of SETS.
The gaze coordinates coming from the camera placed in front of the pilot (see section 6.2.2
for more details on the experiments design) are absolute with respect to the 40-inches display;
SETS localises the coordinates on the cockpit, allowing precise characterisation of pilots’ visual
attention.
A.1. SAIRA EYE-TRACKING SYSTEM (SETS) 205
The flow of relative gaze coordinates is merged with flight simulation events generated by the
ADR-Plugin at a frequency set by Simulation Time Units (STU). All events unfold and are logged
in STU; one STU corresponds to 1/60 second.
Before presenting some of the algorithms of SETS, it is worth noting that the software in-
terfaces itself with the X-Plane flight simulator through the ADR-Plugin; the communication lo-
gic was written using the API1 provided by the X-Plane Source Development Kit [Laminar Re-
search Inc. 2009]. Furthermore, some of the functions of SETS are written with the support of the
OpenCV [Intel 1999] machine vision library (e.g. image colour adjustment, saturation manipula-
tion, coordinates calculation).
Both SETS and SETS-Analyser are written in C and C++ and are designed to run on Linux
2.6. SETS uses OpenGazer [Zielinski 2009] as eye-tracking engine and extends its functionalities
to meet the needs of the SaIRA project. In fact, OpenGazer allows capturing a streamlined series of
gazes on the screen but it has no concept of fixation, saccade, and of all the related eye movement
features which are required by our experiments design (e.g. mean fixation duration). The need
to have access to these eye movement features motivated the development of SETS and SETS-
Analyser.
Listing A.1 contains the basic interface provided by the X-Plane SDK which was used to
develop the ADR-Plugin. The XPluginStart() function, which is called once when the plugin
is loaded (it is a sort of “constructor”) is the most interesting portion of code in relation to the
eye-tracking system because it configures SETS for execution amongst other things. Listing A.2
contains a relevant portion of the XPluginStart() implemented for the ADR-Plugin.





char * outDesc) { }
PLUGIN_API void XPluginStop(void) { }
PLUGIN_API void XPluginDisable(void) { }




void * inParam) { }
In function XPluginStart, after having registered the plugin with the flight simulator engine,
the FindWindowCoordinates() function localises the position of the cockpit displays on the
LCD screen. The AOIs mask is then adjusted to the correct location of the cockpit, as previously
1Application Programming Interface
206 APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL TOOLS
shown in Figure 6.2 (page 150). The fine adjustment of the AOI grid on the cockpit is necessary
for SETS to translate absolute into relative gaze coordinates.
Afterwards, the graphics and textures used by SaIRA are loaded in memory (they are kept
ready in memory for the instant in which a reconfiguration is triggered in order to avoid execution
glitches) and the POSIX thread commandListenerThread is launched. The threaded function
commandListenerServlet() implements an UDP socket which accepts commands from the
Control Computer; a typical command triggers a fault at the hand of the operator. As mentioned
in Chapter 6, the Control Computer is connected to the ADR-Plugin through Ethernet connection
(see Figure 6.1 on page 147).
Listing A.2: A portion of the XPluginStart function of the ADR plugin.
PLUGIN_API int XPluginStart(char * outName, char * outSig, char * outDesc) {
strcpy(outName,"IMSDR");
strcpy(outSig, "xpsdk.experimental.IMSDR");
strcpy(outDesc, "SaIRA ADR plug-in (author: Giuseppe Montano, Department of Computer
Science, The University of York).");
//Find X-Plane window coordinates
if (FindWindowCoordinates()) {
printf("IMS-DR: error: impossible to find X-Plane window coordinates.\n");
return 0;
}














//Setup fault scheme (images) data
char *pFileName = "Resources/plugins/IMSDR"/";
XPLMGetSystemPath(gPluginDataFile);
strcat(gPluginDataFile, pFileName);
gExampleGaugePanelDisplayWindow = XPLMCreateWindow(768, 256, 1024, 0, 1,
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// Load the textures and bind them etc.
LoadTextures();
//Listen for remote commands
pthread_create(&commandListenerThread, 0, commandListenerServlet, NULL);
printf("ADR plugin started\n");
}
Before running any experiment, a special command is sent from the Control Computer to
the ADR-Plugin to enable SETS. The command initialises the necessary data structures and then
enables the SETS eye-tracking service, which is threaded by the gazeTrackingThreadServlet
reported in Listing A.3.
SETS is interfaced with the OpenGazer eye-tracking engine through another UDP socket. The
thread running the gazeTrackingThreadServlet function executes a loop that continuously
reads from the socket; x and y gaze coordinates are extracted from the data stream reaching the
socket.
As shown in Chapter 6, significance analysis is performed on the statistical data generated
during the HCI experiments. For significance tests, missing data in time-related series is par-
ticularly important and must be handled carefully in order to obtain genuine results. In order to
allow correct handling of missing eye-tracking data, after having extracted x and y coordinates, the
gazeTrackingThreadServlet checks whether the gaze is detected inside the flight simulation
area or outside the LCD screen; in the latter case, both coordinates values are set to -1, representing
a missing data and enabling IBM SPSS [IBM 1968] to correctly handle it at post-processing time.
Listing A.3: gazeTrackingThreadServlet
while ((bytes = read(sock, data, 1024)) > 0) {
data[bytes] = ’\0’;
// x-coordinate
char *nlIndex = strchr(data, ’\n’);
xLenght = (nlIndex - data) / sizeof(char) - 2;
char xString[xLenght];
for (int i = 0; i < xLenght; i++) {




char *endIndex = strchr(data, ’\0’);
char *yIndex = strchr(data, ’y’);
yLenght = (endIndex - yIndex) / sizeof(char) - 3;
char yString[yLenght];
for (int i = 0; i < yLenght; i++) {
yString[i] = data[xLenght + 5 + i];
}
yString[yLenght] = ’\0’;
//convert the coordinates to int
x = atoi(xString);
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y = atoi(yString);
/*
* log the coordinates if the gaze is within the X-Plane window,
* otherwise set them to -1
*/








//Check if the user is looking at...
//... the PFD?
if (x >= dsplPosAbs.PFDx && x <= dsplPosAbs.PFDx + dsplPosAbs.PFDwidth && y >=
dsplPosAbs.PFDy && y <= dsplPosAbs.PFDy + dsplPosAbs.PFDheight) {
if (currentEyesTarget != EYES_ON_PFD) {
gettimeofday(&time2, NULL);
delta_sec = time2.tv_sec - time1.tv_sec;
delta_usec = time2.tv_usec - time1.tv_usec;







} else if ....
/* check for other locations on the screen */





Whilst the execution loops inside the gazeTrackingThreadServlet function, the following
actions are performed for each gaze inside the cockpit area:
1. the AOI in which the current gaze is into is identified;
2. if the previous gaze was in the same AOI, no further actions are taken;
3. if the previous gaze was in a different AOI, a ‘change of AOI’ event is recorded: the cur-
rent time—at millisecond resolution—is logged, allowing calculation of the amount of time
spent in the AOI just left by the pilot’s visual attention;
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The ‘raw’ data stream generated by SETS is post-processed by SETS-Analyser, as described
in the next section.
A.2 SETS-Analyser
Before discussing the type of processing performed by SETS-Analyser, it is worth clarifying how
the eye movement is modelled in this software.
Eye movement is a combination of two main behaviours: first, fixations, where the eye is
relatively still (for 150-200 ms); second, saccades, where the eye moves rapidly between fixations.
SETS has a sampling rate of 60Hz. In light of this constraint, we modelled a fixation as a
series of gazes in a tiny squared area of the screen. More specifically, SETS-Analyser registers a
fixation when at least 5 consecutive gazes detected by SETS fall within a squared area of 40 pixels.
Figure A.3 provides a graphical representation of a SETS-Analyser fixation, defined as a cluster
of raw gazes falling within the area in question.
Figure A.3: Fixation cluster as defined in SETS-Analyser.
SETS-Analyser generates the following data from the raw gazes coordinates recorded in real-
time during the simulation: number of fixations, number of saccades, raw gazes in each AOI, gazes
transition matrix, fixations transition matrix, sum of fixations time for each AOI, mean fixation
duration, mean fixation duration for each AOI, rate of fixation, on-target fixations, mean saccades
length, mean raw gazes per AOI, saccades rate, number of backtracks, number of backtracks per
AOI, fixations/saccades rate, scanpath map (image), backtracks map (image), hotspot map (image).
For reasons of brevity, only some of the functions that produce this data are reported hereinafter;
the algorithms covered, however, allow exhibiting the data processing approach adopted in SETS-
Analyser.
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The first step for further processing is the calculation of fixations and saccades from the raw
streamlined data set. The class FixSacAnalyser of SETS-Analyser provides all the functionality
to handle fixations and saccades. Listing A.4 shows one of its functions, CalculateFixAndSac,
which calculates the two basic eye movement features in question. This function is called before
proceeding to any other type of processing.
In brief, an initial (x, y) coordinates pair of raw gaze coordinates (from the rawGazesVect
vector) is selected; then, the following pairs of coordinates in the vector are serially scanned
and a set of raw gazes are grouped into a single fixation—and pushed into the fixation vector
fixations—if all the raw gazes in the set fall within a squared area of pre-defined side length
FIX AREA SIDE. A very small fixed number of gazes outside the area is allowed within the set
of gazes that make up a fixation; this number is given by the constant MAX JUMPS PER FIX. The
rationale for MAX JUMPS PER FIX is to compensate for camera detection errors that we found in
the preliminary validation of the system (i.e. before starting the series of experiments); we found
out that, from time to time, a single ‘jump’ lasting less than 50 milliseconds was added to the
streamlined data set. The jump was evidently inconsistent with the visual path followed by the
pilot given its duration and length.
Besides the FIX AREA SIDE, another constraint that a set of consecutive raw gazes coordinates
must satisfy to qualify for a fixation is that their count must be higher that the value of the constant
MIN GAZES PER FIX. This constraint allows for the cancellation of noise from the eye movement
data.
If all the constraints are not satisfied by the next gaze coordinates pair in the series, the follow-
ing actions are performed: (a) the coordinates pairs scanned so far, except the last one, are stored
in a single fixation object; (b) a new saccade is defined and its data structure is created; (c) the new
saccade is added to the vector saccades.
Listing A.4: Calculation of fixations and saccades
/*
* Fixations and saccades calculation
*
* A single fixation contains gazes inside a square of FIX_AREA_SIDE side
* lenght plus a maximum of MAX_JUMPS_PER_FIX gazes outside the relevant
* area. This is to overcome cameras acquisition noise.
*/
int FixSacAnalyser::CalculateFixAndSac(DataStore& dS) {
int x1, y1, x2, y2;
unsigned index1 = 0;
unsigned index2 = 0;
int in = 0;
int out = 0;
Fixation fix;
int totalGazesPerFix = 0;
int prevIndex2;
Saccade sac;
while (index1 < dS.rawGazesVect.size()) {
x1 = ((CvPoint) dS.rawGazesVect[index1]).x;
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y1 = ((CvPoint) dS.rawGazesVect[index1]).y;
index2 = index1 + 1;
while (index2 < dS.rawGazesVect.size()) {
x2 = ((CvPoint) dS.rawGazesVect[index2]).x;
y2 = ((CvPoint) dS.rawGazesVect[index2]).y;








if (out > MAX_JUMPS_PER_FIX) {
totalGazesPerFix -= out;
index2 -= (out);
x2 = ((CvPoint) dS.rawGazesVect[index2]).x;









if (fixations.size() > 1) { //register saccade
sac.x = fix.x;
sac.y = fix.y;













Listing A.5 processes the fixations vector populated in the way shown in Listing A.4 to
calculate the total time spent by the pilot fixating each AOI. For its calculations, the functions
assumes that the camera has a sampling rate defined by SCAN FREQ. For reasons of brevity, only
three AOI are defined in Listing A.5.
Listing A.5: Calculation of fixation time within an AOI
/*
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* This function makes the assumption that the cameras take snapshots
* at the frequency specified by SCAN_FREQ. This value is used to calculate
* total time of fixations (nrRawGazes*capturePeriod)
*/




//load fixations of each AOI into the relative vector
Fixation fix;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < fixations.size(); i++) {
fix = (Fixation) fixations[i];




} else if (fix.x >= dS.pA_aoi2.x && fix.x <= dS.pB_aoi2.x && fix.y >= dS.pA_aoi2.y &&
fix.y <= dS.pB_aoi2.y) {
fixationsAOI2.push_back(fix);
all_nrOfFixationsAOI2++;
} else if (fix.x >= dS.pA_aoi3.x && fix.x <= dS.pB_aoi3.x && fix.y >= dS.pA_aoi3.y &&





float fixTimeAOI1 = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < fixationsAOI1.size(); i++) {
fixTimeAOI1 = fixTimeAOI1 + fixationsAOI1[i].nrOfGazes;
}
float fixTimeAOI2 = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < fixationsAOI2.size(); i++) {
fixTimeAOI2 = fixTimeAOI2 + fixationsAOI2[i].nrOfGazes;
}
float fixTimeAOI3 = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < fixationsAOI3.size(); i++) {







The function in Listing A.6, as its name suggests, is a simple routine to calculate the means
fixation duration of the data in vector fixations. The vector fixations contains the set of
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fixations extracted from the raw gazes but they are not necessarily all the fixations of a flight
simulation; in fact the content of the vector can be tuned by setting the portion of the simulation
to be analysed, as explained later in this section.
Listing A.6: Calculation of mean fixation durations





for (unsigned i = 0; i < fixations.size(); i++) {
totalGazes += fixations[i].nrOfGazes;
}
meanFixTime = totalGazes / SCAN_FREQ / fixations.size();
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
The way the mean saccadic amplitude is calculated is shown in Listing A.7 whilst Listing A.8
contains the algorithm to calculate backtracks.
Listing A.7: Calculation of mean saccadic amplitude
int FixSacAnalyser::CalculateMeanSacAmplitude(void) {
float x = 0;
float y = 0;




x = x / fixations.size();
y = y / fixations.size();
meanSacAmplitude = sqrt(pow(x, 2) + pow(y, 2));
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Listing A.8: Calculation of backtracks
Backtrack b;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < fsa.fixations.size() - 2; i++) {
if ((abs(fsa.fixations[i].x - fsa.fixations[i + 2].x) <= BACKTRACK_AREA || abs(fsa.
fixations[i].y - fsa.fixations[i + 2].y) <= BACKTRACK_AREA) && (abs(fsa.fixations[i
].x - fsa.fixations[i + 1].x) > BACKTRACK_AREA || abs(fsa.fixations[i].y - fsa.
fixations[i + 1].y) > BACKTRACK_AREA)) {
b.p1 = cvPoint(fsa.fixations[i].x, fsa.fixations[i].y);
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For each test, SETS generates a file named gazes xxx.txt—where xxx is the identifier of
each pilot—which contains the streamlined data set including eye-tracking coordinates and simu-
lation events. The file gazes xxx.txt is the input for SETS-Analyser.
From the input, SETS-Analyser generates the following output files (the definitions of the eye
movement features listed hereinafter were given in section 6.2.2):
a. results xxx.txt: (unique for all participants) It contains the basic descriptive statistics of
the dependent variables; its purpose is providing the experiment controller with an overview
of the results for a quick assessment of the validity of the simulation, e.g. percentage of ‘out-
of-screen’ gaze detected.
b. backtracks between AOIs xxx.csv: (unique for all participants) It contains a table listing
the backtracks amongst the pre-defined AOIs.
c. fix rates.csv: (unique for all participants) It contains the mean fixation rates.
d. mean fix durations.csv: (unique for all participants) It contains the mean fixation dura-
tions.
e. mean fix per AOI.csv: (unique for all participants) It contains the mean number of fixations
for each AOI.
f. mean on target fix per AOI.csv: (unique for all participants) It contains the mean on-
target fixations for each AOI.
g. mean raw gazes per AOI.csv: (unique for all participants) It contains the mean raw gazes
for each AOI.
h. nr backtracks.csv: (unique for all participants) It contains the number of backtracks of
each participant.
i. hotspotMap xxx.jpg: a typical hotspot map produced by SETS has already been shown in
Figure 6.5 on page 153. The file is unique for all participants. It is a JPG image representing
the areas of the cockpit that receive more visual attention. The visual attention is represented
by means of a temperature scale (shifting from green to red with increasing levels of attention).
j. scanpath xxx.jpg: (see Figure A.4(a)) the file is unique for all participants. It is a JPG
image representing the pilot’s scanpath on the cockpit.
k. backtracks xxx.jpg: (see Figure A.4(b)) the file is unique for all participants. It is a JPG
image representing the backtracks in the forms of green segments on the cockpit. The extremes
of the segments are the two points between which the visual attention is divided.
The numerical eye-tracking data is stored in .csv files (Comma-Separated Values), which are
compatible with Microsoft Excel and IBM SPSS and can be easily used for further analysis.
SETS-Analyser is launched from the Linux command line with the following mutually exclus-
ive arguments sets:
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(a) Scanpath image generated by SETS-Analyser.
(b) Backtracks image generated by SETS-Analyser.
Figure A.4: Scanpath and backtracks images generated with SETS-Analyser on a small portion of the raw gazes data
collected during a flight simulation.
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• No arguments: all the raw gazes contained in the gazes xxx.txt file of each participant
are processed;
• -timeRange <startTime> <stopTime>: the user specifies a range of time starting at
<startTime> and finishing at <stopTime>, included in the observation time. Only the raw
gazes recorded during the specified range of time are processed.
• -betweenTags <startTAG> <stopTAG>: ADR-Plugin inserts tags for events that happen
during the simulation in the list of raw gazes recorded in real-time, e.g. FAULT 1 to specify
that ‘fault-1’ has been triggered. With the -betweenTags option the user can instruct SETS-
Analyser to process only the raw gazes between the specified tags.
The -timeRange and -betweenTags arguments can be used to tune the content of the fixations
and saccades vectors, as mentioned earlier in this appendix.
Appendix B
Generating Recommendations in SaIRA
B.1 Generating Recommendations Algorithmically
Section 5.4.3 stated that, in SaIRA, the objective of a decision support message is to help the pilot
answering the question “why should I apply Configuration A instead of Configuration B?”
Accepting one configuration instead of another corresponds to accepting one repair action instead
of another (e.g. sacrifice the Elevator Feel System instead of the Waypoint Generator System).
The constraint-based reconfiguration system must go through the following three steps in order
to provide support to the pilot:
1. Generate a number of configurations using the current active constraints;
2. Generate a set of repair actions for the inconsistencies;
3. Generate recommendations for the repair actions.
The first step has already been discussed in detail through an example in Section 5.4. The
second and third steps are dealt with in this appendix. The problem being examined here can be
described as follows:
Let ∆ = (X,D,Z,H) be the dynamic constraint network associated with the ADR
problem. Initially, the partial assignment ρ of the variables in X is empty: ρ =
∅. At each iteration of the enumeration process, for each unassigned variable xi ∈
X \ dom(ρ), a valid domain Dρi ⊆ Di is computed. Then, a value vi ∈ Dρi is selected
for the variable xi.
After a number of iterations, the problem becomes over-constrained and no solution
is available given the current set of constraints.
Through repair actions, SaIRA must be able to generate one or two recommendations
for the solution of ∆ which enable the pilot to make an informed decision.
Current research in the recommendation technology domain focuses mainly on product and
configuration recommendation in the retail industry field, e.g. book selling, camera configuration.
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To the best of our knowledge there are no studies on the application of constraint-based recom-
mendation technology to safety-critical decisions in the aerospace arena. Indeed, as discussed in
more detail in the following sections, this domain has specific requirements in terms of recom-
mendation features that limit the applicability of standard methods and lead to the development
of a new, bespoke, constraint-based explanation algorithm, which is introduced and empirically
evaluated afterwards.
First, state-of-the-art constraint-based recommendation technology is reviewed. Then two
novel algorithms for automated generation of explanations and implications are presented and
the performance of the core algorithm is empirically assessed. Subsequently, a method to translate
the computer-encoded recommendations in natural language messages for the pilots is discussed.
The technology expounded in this appendix was used to produce the information displayed in the
SaIRA user interface described in Section 5.7.2.
B.1.1 Recommendations with Explanation-based Constraint Programming
The solution of CSP with classic algorithms, based on chronological backtracking, has been shown
to have several disadvantages, including the well known trashing [Gaschnig 1987] (the search
always fails for the same “reasons” because of the impracticability of remembering all the past
failure conditions).
One of the solutions proposed in the literature is Explanation-based Constraint Program-
ming (eCP) [Jussien 2001]; the theory behind eCP is briefly discussed here because the algorithm
proposed later in this chapter is inspired by this technology. In brief, explanations contain inform-
ation that justifies the decisions taken by the solver during the search for a solution (e.g. retracting
a constraint). The information contained in eCP explanations is made up of constraints and choices
made by the solver. In eCP, this information is used both to guide the search for solutions and as
a baseline for decision support information for the user.
Consider a CSP defined by Jussien [2003] as follows:
Definition B.1.1 A Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) is defined by:
• a finite set V of variables;
• a finite set C of constraints;
• a function var : C → P(V)
• a family (Dx)x∈V (the domains)
• a family (Tc)c∈C (the constraints semantic)
Note that, even if framed differently, the previous definition is equivalent to Definition 5.3.1.
It follows that:
Definition B.1.2 A solution for a CSP (V,C, var, (Dx)x∈V , (Tc)c∈C) is a tuple s on V such that
∀c ∈ C, s|var(c) ∈ Tc.
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Now consider the case of a CSP whose current state is contradictory (i.e. over-constrained).
In this situations it is possible to isolate a conflict set (also known as a nogood or contradiction
explanation):
Definition B.1.3 A conflict set or nogood is a subset of the current constraint system of the prob-
lem that left alone leads to a contradiction (no feasible solution can contain a conflict set).
A conflict set can be divided in two parts: a subset of the original set of constraints (C′ ⊂ C in
Equation B.1) and a subset of the decision constraints introduced so far (dc1, . . . , dck).
¬(C′ ∧ d1 ∧ . . . ∧ dk) (B.1)






→ dc j (B.2)
Having considered dc j : v = a in Equation B.2, Jussien refers to the left side of the implication
as the eliminating explanation (or explanation for short) because it justifies the removal of a value
a from the domain d(v) of the variable v. The explanation is noted as expl(v , a).
A solution to a CSP is given by the following:
sol(V, (C′ ∧ d1 ∧ . . . ∧ dn)) = ∅ (B.3)
Less formally, Rochart, Jussien and Laburthe [2003] describe an explanation as follows:
Definition B.1.4 An explanation of an inference (X) consists of a subset of the original constraints
(C′ ⊂ C) and a set of instantiation constraints (i.e. choices made during the search: d1, d2, . . . dk)
such that C′∧d1∧ . . .∧dn ⇒ X. C′∧d1∧ . . .∧dn justifies the inference and is called explanation.
Jussien and colleagues add that an explanation-set e1 is said to be more precise than explanation-
set e2 if and only if e1 ⊂ e2. The more precise an explanation, the more useful it is.
In Jussien’s terms, if (during the propagation of the constraints defined for a CSP the domain)
the domain d(v) of variable v is emptied, the problem is over-constrained, i.e. no value is available
for v. The explanations generation mechanism of eCP can be used to understand the reason why
d(v) has been emptied, and this information can be used to implement a repair action (i.e. choose
which of the constraints propagated so far should be retracted). For d(v) = ∅, a contradiction







Usually several explanations exist for every over-constrained situation and more generally for
any inference performed by the solver. Recording all the explanations during the enumeration
process would enable making optimal repair decisions at any time during the search. However,
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this would make the space complexity non tractable for most complex problems. In eCP one
explanation for each inference made by the solver is retained during the enumeration process.
Jussien [2001] introduces PALM (Propagate and Learn with Move), a CSP solver that imple-
ments eCP ideas which is capable of explaining its behaviour and handling dynamic constraints
additions and removals. PALM is developed on top of Choco [Laburthe 2000]. As already men-
tioned, Choco has been extensively used in this thesis to implement the majority of CP technology.
The ideas behind eCP are now put into the context of SaIRA. In the example of the simplified
IMA reconfiguration problem described in Section 5.4.1, a set of six flight control applications
must run in the system; the total bus bandwidth available in nominal conditions is 100 Mb/s but,
as a result of a fault, the bandwidth is drastically reduced to 15 Mb/s. The bandwidth requirements
of the six applications are given in Table B.1.
Bandwidth Required
App 1 b1 = 3 Mb/s
App 2 b2 = 1.5 Mb/s
App 3 b3 = 2.5 Mb/s
App 4 b4 = 2 Mb/s
App 5 b5 = 3 Mb/s
App 6 b6 = 14 Mb/s
Table B.1: Bandwidth requirements for each application.




xi · bi ≤ 15 Mb/s (B.5)
The process of enumerating the applications activation constraints is described in Table B.2.
A generic activation constraint ρi, implemented as a boolean variable x ∈ {0, 1}, indicates whether
the i-th application is requested to execute or not. When ρ6 is propagated the problem becomes
over-constrained (the total bandwidth required exceeds the maximum bandwidth available by 11
Mb/s).
] Constraint Bandwidth Consumed Argument/Conflict
0 ρ0 : Bt =
∑6
i=1 xi · bi ≤ 15 Mb/s — { ρ0 }
1 ρ1 : x1 = 1 Bt=3 Mb { ρ0, ρ1 }
2 ρ2 : x2 = 1 Bt=4.5 Mb { ρ0, ρ1, ρ2 }
3 ρ3 : x3 = 1 Bt=7 Mb { ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 }
4 ρ4 : x4 = 1 Bt=9 Mb { ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4 }
5 ρ5 : x5 = 1 Bt=12 Mb { ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, ρ5 }
6 ρ6 : x6 = 1 Bt=26 Mb { ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, ρ5, ρ6 }
FAIL { ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, ρ5, ρ6 }
↓
{ρ0, ρ5, ρ6}
Table B.2: Computing of a complete explanation during the enumeration process.
Several explanations for the conflict found at the bottom of Table B.2 could be provided to
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the pilot. The full explanation {ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, ρ5, ρ6}, containing all the decisions taken by the
solver before the conflict, is not helpful as a decision making support. A minimal explanation,
which explains in a capsule why a contradiction was found, is more interesting. As previously
mentioned, by default PALM keeps only one explanation per inference made by the constraints
involved in the contradiction. In this example, the explanation for the over-constrained situation
(the domain of x6 was emptied) is {ρ0, ρ5, ρ6}, which could be translated in natural language as “not
enough bandwidth for both Applications 5 and 6”. Note that there are also other valid explanations
(e.g. {ρ0, ρ1, ρ6}, {ρ0, ρ2, ρ6}) even though they are not recorded by the eCP solver.
The explanation generated implicitly suggests the actions to be taken in cases where the pilot
prefers Application 6 to be active in the next configuration, (a) either the maximum bandwidth
is increased (constraint {Bt} is retracted) or (b) Application 1 is deactivated (constraint {ρ1} is
retracted). Whilst the former option is physically impossible to implement (in fact, in a more
realistic example, {Bt} would be implemented as a static/hard constraint), the pilot can choose to
have Application 6 running instead of Application 1.
A family of eCP-based algorithms have been developed to automatically repair over-constrained
CSP: the decision-repair algorithms [Jussien and Lhomme 2002].
The approach adopted in PALM to generate explanations for over-constrained problems is
particularly interesting in the content of ADR because this type of information explains why the
system reaches one conclusion instead of another. However, apart from the problem of trans-
lating the computer-encoded explanations into natural language—which is discussed later in this
Chapter—a few relevant drawbacks of the eCP explanations require attention.
The first limitation concerns the minimality of the explanations, which is not guaranteed.
Jussien [2003] reports that “computed explanations therefore cannot be guaranteed to be minimal
(although experiments show that they remain quite precise) nor exhaustive (other explanations may
exist)”. In the example given the explanation was minimal because of the simplicity of the prob-
lem; larger, over-constrained problems have several explanations for each inference, characterised
by different sizes.
The concision of the decision support information is particularly important during ADR be-
cause of the pilot operating conditions (e.g. time pressure, stress) and because of the limits of space
of the cockpit displays. A statistical investigation of the size of explanations generated with PALM
with different problem configurations and sizes is beyond the scope of this research. This thesis
assumes that explanations generated with PALM remain concise also in large CSP, as claimed and
empirically verified by Jussien.
Another aspect to take into consideration is the elicitation of preferences for explanations.
Given that for each inference that are several explanations, the question of how to select the ex-
planation that is most helpful for the pilot in each situation becomes an important one. This topic
is elaborated below, when three state-of-the-art explanation algorithms are compared and a novel
algorithm, developed by the author, is proposed.
A further aspect of the type of explanations examined here is that they provide information
about why the system came to certain conclusions but no information about the implications of
each repair action are generated. eCP-based explanations reveal why the solver shaped two con-
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figurations in the way it did, not why one configuration should be chosen instead of another with
respect to an objective function. O Sullivan et al. [2005] comment on this pointing out that exist-
ing work on explanation generation for the solution of interactive CSP is focused on “blaming”
the inconsistent set of constraints being propagated instead of explaining to the user what to do to
repair the current situation.
This last aspect of eCP-based explanations is particularly important to enable the type of in-
teraction that is required in SaIRA. Here we speculate (but verify empirically in Chapter 6) that
standard PALM explanations are effective to help the pilot to spot any potential wrong inferences
of the system, but they should be enriched with the implications of each decision alternative, in
order to provide more complete/effective decision support to the pilot.
Some of the issues mentioned in this section, but not all, are addressed by two widely refer-
enced algorithms for constraint-based explanation, QuickXPlain and FastXPlain, which are very
briefly introduced in the next two sections.
B.1.2 Recommendations with QuickXPlain
The QuickXPlain algorithm [Junker 2001] is the industrial standard de facto in terms of constraint-
based explanation systems. It is used as the explanation component of the Configurator tool by
ILOG [ILOG 2010].
The problem of generating minimal and helpful explanations is addressed by a preference-
controlled algorithm that successively adds the preferred constraints until a contradiction is found,
in which case the algorithm backtracks and removes least preferred constraints if this avoids the
contradiction.
The author uses the notation ρi ≺ ρ j to indicate that explanation ρi is preferred to ρ j. He
divides the overall set of constraints of a CSP in two subsets: B is the background, containing
constraints that cannot be relaxed (this corresponds to the static/hard constraints introduced earlier
in this chapter) and C is the set of constraints that can be relaxed. A relaxation problem is then
defined as follows:
Definition B.1.5 A subset R of C is a relaxation of a problem P := (B,C) ⇐⇒ B ∪ R has a
solution.
It follows that:
Definition B.1.6 A subset C′ of C is a conflict of a problem P := (B,C) ⇐⇒ B ∪ C′ has no
solution.
Exploiting the concept of lexicographic relaxation [Brewka 1989], Junker is able to define
preferred relaxations and preferred conflicts of an over-constrained CSP. Adding a constraint to
a relaxation corresponds to the retraction of a constraint from an explanation.
Conflicts and relaxations are calculated by following the constructive definitions. The author
proposes two versions of the QuickXPlain algorithm, a basic version and an optimised version; the
latter, which achieves better performance by adopting a divide-and-conquer approach, is reported
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Algorithm B.1 QuickXPlain(B,C,≺)
1: if isConsistent(B ∪ C) then
2: return ‘no conflict’
3: else







1: if ∆ , ∅ and not isConsistent(B) then
2: return ∅
3: end if
4: if C = {α} then
5: return {α}
6: end if
Require: α1, . . . , αn be an enumeration of C that respects ≺
Require: k be split(n) where 1 ≤ k < n
7: C1 := {α1, . . . , αk} and C2 := {αk+1, . . . , αn}
8: ∆2 := QuickXPlain’(B ∪ C1,C1,C2,≺)
9: ∆1 := QuickXPlain’(B ∪ ∆2,∆2,C1,≺)
10: return ∆1 ∪ ∆2
in Algorithms B.1 and B.2. The algorithm is not discussed in details here for the sake of brevity,
but complete information is provided by Junker [2001].
An interesting aspect of QuickXPlain for the ADR recommendation problem is that it always
terminates; it returns with no explanations if B∪C has a solution, otherwise it provides a preferred
explanation of (B,C, <).
One notorious limit of QuickXPlain is computational time. QuickXPlain needs O(2k·log(n/k+
2k) consistency checks (worst case) to compute a minimal conflict set of size k out of n constraints
[Felfernig et al. 2009]. The computational requirements of QuickXPlain are the rationale for the
development of FastXPlain.
B.1.3 Recommendations with FastXPlain
Schubert et al. [2010] introduce the FastXPlain algorithm for the calculation of minimal conflict
sets. One feature that distinguishes FastXPlain from other constraint-based explanation methods
is that it handles the recommendation task as a new CSP, using a table representation of constraints
(which are ‘requirements’ in SaIRA) and items (which are ‘configurations’ in SaIRA).
Let the ADR CSP consist of a set of constraints C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} and a pool of applicable
configurations P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}. Each configuration pi ∈ P has a set of possible values Di from
the domain. When there is an applicable solution, all the constraints in C are satisfied. For over-
constrained problems, the conflict set CS ⊂ C is defined such that none of the configurations in P
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is satisfied. It follows that CS is minimal if there exists no conflict set CS ′ such that CS ′ ⊂ CS .
The algorithm was originally designed for product configuration (e.g. selection of a mobile
phone from a set on the basis of their characteristics). Hence, it assumes that a set of ‘products’
is provided as an input to the algorithm. This can be achieved in SaIRA by generating a set of
optimal configurations which do not take into account the unexpected event that has affected the
system making the CSP over-constrained. Consequently, repair actions are calculated for each
optimal configuration and minimal conflict sets are generated by means of FastXPlain, which in
turn are used to generate decision support information for the pilot.
The algorithm is reported in Algorithm B.3; a complete discussion is provided by Schubert
et al. [2010].
Algorithm B.3 FastXPlain(root, p)
Require: p - table of constraints and applicable configurations
Require: root - the root node of the resulting tree
Require: MSC - set of all minimal conflicts sets
1: d ← getMinCardinalityDiagnosis(p)
2: for all constraints c from d do
3: p′ ← reduce(ci, p′)
4: child← ok
5: if p′ = ∅ then
6: child ← ok
7: end if
8: if path(child) < MS C then
9: MS C ← path(child)
10: return
11: end if
12: if ∃ cs ∈ CS : CS ⊆ MCS ⊆ path(child) then
13: child ← closed
14: end if




The algorithm is designed to outperform QuickXPlain. However it does not provide any means
to specify preferred explanations and implications.
B.1.4 Qualitative Comparison of Constraint-Based Recommendations Methods
Table B.3 summarises the features of the three state-of-the-art approaches which are more signific-
ant for the applicability of recommendation problems of the type of SaIRA. The three algorithms
in question have been selected because they define three different approach to the same problem.
eCP does not guarantee minimal explanations, but tools have been developed to (a) translate
computer-encoded explanations into user-friendly information, and (b) use heuristics to specify
preferences on preferred explanations and preferred relaxations for over-constrained situations
[Jussien 2003].
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Minimal Explanations Preferred Explanations User-Friendly Explanations
eCP - X X
QuickXPlain X X -
FastXPlain X - -
Table B.3: Comparison of the three state-of-the-art approaches to constraint-based autonomous generation of
explanations for over-constrained CSP.
QuickXPlain generates minimal explanations and allows specification of the preferred ex-
planations, by setting up a lexicographic ordering of the constraints. Although this approach to
specify preferences amongst explanations is particularly neat, establishing a lexicographic order-
ing amongst the constraints becomes particularly challenging as the number of constraints grows,
as we found out in our preliminary investigations. A typical ADR problem has a large number
of inter-dependent constraints and variables; the complexity of ordering the constraints effectively
should not be underestimated. To the best of our knowledge, no bespoke means are provided to
translate computer-encoded information generated by this algorithm into natural language. These
motivations make QuickXPlain difficult to apply to SaIRA.
FastXPlain generates minimal explanations and in an experimental study performed by Schubert
et al. [2010], it proved to perform better than QuickXPlain in different combination of (a) number
of constraints, (b) number of variables, and (c) explanations to be generated. Its drawbacks are
the impossibility of specifying preferred explanations and the unavailability of tools to produce
high-level explanations. The possibility to specify preferred explanations is crucial for SaIRA, for
the reasons discussed earlier in this chapter, a fact that makes FastXPlain inapplicable.
Having discussed the necessity for it, we provide a contribution to current research in constraint-
based explanation generation by proposing a novel eCP-based algorithm for the generation of ex-
planations for over-constrained situations specifically designed for safety-critical contexts: wsm
decision-repair. The algorithm is discussed in detail in the next section and the approach is
validated through a comparison with state-of-the-art techniques.
B.1.5 Weighted-Sum Model Decision Repair
B.1.5.1 Related work
Jussien and Debruyne [2007] give a detailed discussion about explanation-based repair techniques
for constraint programming and convey their observations on the PLM algorithm (Algorithm B.4),
which is an archetype for explanation-based repair.
The Choco solver implements a version of PLM which combines arc-consistency maintenance
and tabu search: decision-repair [Jussien and Lhomme 2002] (Algorithm B.5).
The algorithm starts by assigning CD with an initial set of decisions that is determined by some
initialization method. Then it loops applying the filtering to C ∪ CD and generating new sets of
constraints C′ = φ(C ∪ CD). The function obviousInference interprets the output C′ of the
filtering operator and returns one of the following answers:
• solution: a solution is found; C′ is returned;





4: if check(P) = no solution then
5: P← forget(repair(record(P)))
6: else if check(P) = solution found then
7: return P
8: else if check(P) = not enough information then
9: P← extend(P)
10: end if
11: until conditions of termination
Algorithm B.5 decision-repair(C)
1: CD ← any initial set of decisions
2: repeat
3: if condition of failure satisfied then
4: return false
5: else
6: C′ ← φ(C ∪CD)
7: if obviousInference(C′) = no solution then
8: k ← conflict explaining the failure
9: CD ← neighbour(CD, k,Γ)
10: else if obviousInference(C′) = solution then
11: return C′
12: else
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• flounder: the algorithm tries to extend the current set of decisions CD by adding a decision
constraint through the extend(CD,Γ) function: the function selects a decision constraints
and adds it to CD (the parameter Γ is used for customised versions of the algorithm);
• no solution: in this case C ∪ CD is inconsistent, and CD cannot be extended. The algorithm
tries to repair the conflict by selecting a new set of decision constraints through the function
neighbour(CD, k,Γ).
The authors consider decision-repair a family of algorithms because several parameters
remain undefined, e.g. the way of handling the neighbourhood. Jussien and Lhomme provide the
following description:
decision-repair is a generic algorithm, instances are obtained by specialising sev-
eral parameters:
• the nature and behavior of Γ the storage structure;
• the neighboring computation function (neighbour);
• the extension computation function (extend);
• the failure conditions that indicate when to halt the search;
• the filtering techniques to be used (the φ function).
tabu decision-repair is a member of the decision-repair family which is of particular
interest for this thesis for several reasons, including the fact that it has been found to perform
particularly well with open-shop problems similar to ADR [Jussien and Lhomme 2002]. This is
a version of decision-repair which combines tabu search and bespoke heuristics; the decision
constraint to be evaluated for negation are kept in a tabu list Γ. Jussien and Lhomme provide the
following concise description of the logic of the algorithm:
[The tabu decision-repair algorithm] tries to find one decision in k such that
negating this decision makes the decision set compatible with all the conflicts. When
several decisions can be negated, we use the following heuristics, which we call
weighting-conflict heuristics: a weight is associated with each decision; the weight
characterizes the number of times that the decision has appeared in any conflict. A
weighting-conflict heuristic that works well takes into account the arity of the con-
flicts. Each time a conflict is found, the weight of its decision constraints is increased
by 1/r where r is the arity of the conflict. The neighbour function chooses to negate
the decision with the greatest weight that, when negated, makes the new decision set
compatible with all the conflicts in Γ. If such a decision does not exist, the neighbor-
hood can be extended. For example, we may try to negate two decisions.
Jussien and Lhomme also give the following definitions which offer an introduction to the
material presented later in this section:
Definition B.1.7 (Conflict) A conflict k for a set of constraints C and a decision set CD is a subset
of CD, k ⊆ CD such that CD ∧ k ⇒ false.
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Let c ∈ k be a constraint in the conflict k to be removed from the decisions set CD. A neighbour
C′D of a decision set CD is obtained by removing c from CD and adding its negation.
Definition B.1.8 (Neighbour w.r.t. one conflict) Let k be a conflict for a decision set CD, a neigh-
bour of CD w.r.t. k is a decision set C′D such that ∃c ∈ k,C′D = CD\c ∪ {¬c}
The concept of neighbourhood can be extended to several conflicts.
Definition B.1.9 (Neighbour w.r.t. several conflicts) Let Γ be a set of conflicts and let CD be a
decision set. A neighbour C′D of CD w.r.t. Γ satisfies ∃c ∈ k,C′D = CD\c ∪ {¬c} and C′D is
compatible with the conflicts in Γ.
The neighbour function, which is the core of tabu decision-repair, is reported in Al-
gorithm B.6.
Algorithm B.6 neighbour(CD, k,Γ)
*From the tabu decision-repair algorithm [Jussien and Lhomme 2002]
Require: k ⊂ CD, CD is compatible with Γ
1: add k to the list of conflicts Γ
2: if sizeof(Γ) > s then
3: remove the oldest element of Γ
4: end if
5: L← ordered list (decr. weight) of decisions in k
6: repeat
7: remove the first decision c from L
8: C′D ← CD\{c} ∪ {¬c}
9: if C′D is compatible with all conflicts in Γ then
10: return C′D
11: end if
12: until L is empty
13: return stop (or extend the neighbourhood)
tabu decision-repair is designed for generic combinatorial problems and aims at con-
verging to a solution as quickly as possible. Because the algorithm is generic, no assumptions
are made concerning the nature of the constraints being processed; hence, no preferences can be
expressed. In other words, no information is available a priori concerning the importance of each
constraint and the type of requirement it implements (e.g. safety requirement, functional require-
ment).
The situation is slightly different in the context of SaIRA. For instance, given the safety-critical
nature of the problem, the designers know that certain safety-related constraints have higher prior-
ity over other constraints. In the majority of cases, they are the last constraints to be relaxed in cases
of conflict. Safety is only one example of the metrics of importance of constraints that the design-
ers of the system can have at their disposal. By exploiting the availability of domain-dependent
knowledge, it is possible to design bespoke conflict repair logic (possibly) able to improve the
overall performance of the reconfiguration algorithm.
B.1. GENERATING RECOMMENDATIONS ALGORITHMICALLY 229
Besides performance, there is another aspect of the reconfiguration problem that could bene-
fit from a bespoke conflict repair logic: the capability of the algorithm to generate helpful and
meaningful explanations for the pilot. With tabu decision-repair, each decision taken by the
algorithm can be translated in natural language as follows: ‘Constraint A’ was chosen instead of
‘Constraint B’ because the former has appeared more time in other conflicts previously explored
(in terms of ADR, the two constraints in question could represent the availability of two different
avionics functions, for example). This is not a helpful or convincing explanation for a pilot facing
an ADR decision, even though it explains the ‘generally efficient’ logic followed by the solver. A
more helpful explanation would be: ‘Constraint D’ was chosen instead of ‘Constraint E’. Reason:
safety improvement. In order to generate the latter type of explanation, the conflict repair algorithm
must have knowledge about (a) the nature of the constraints and (b) their relative importance.
The next section proposes a novel member of the decision-repair family of algorithms
based on the Weighted-Sum Model.
B.1.5.2 The wsm decision-repair algorithm
Montano [2007] investigates the applicability of several multi-criteria decision making algorithms
(also known as multi-criteria decision analysis algorithms) to the problem of eliciting preferences
from the constraints of an ADR CSP. The Weighted-Sum Model (WSM) and the lexicographic
approach were found to be particularly suitable for the characteristics of the ADR problem. The
difficulties of applying a lexicographic ordering to the constraints of an ADR CSP were discussed
above with the introduction of the QuickXPlain algorithm (Sections B.1.2 and B.1.4). Here a
WSM-based method developed in this research is proposed.
Let R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn} be a set of n criteria of evaluation for m alternatives. Let w j be the
weight of importance of the criterion r j and let be ai j the performance value of alternative Ai
when it is evaluated in terms of criterion r j. The importance of alternative Ai results from the




w jai j (B.6)
All the criteria are assumed to be monotonically increasing (increasing weight always means
increasing importance) and are expressed using the same unit.
The logic of wsm decision-repair can be informally described as follows:
The designers define n criteria for the evaluation of the constraints. Typical criteria
are ‘safety’, ‘performance’, ‘pilot’s comfort’; a typical safety constraint is one that
enforces the triple bus redundancy, whilst an example of a constraint that is important
both in terms of safety and pilot comfort is one that enforces the availability of the
Elevator Feel System.
A constraint is evaluated against each criterion. Let ∆ = (X,D,Z,H) be the dynamic
constraint network associated with the ADR CSP. In the design phase, weights are as-
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sociated with the dynamic constraints (referred to as ‘decision constraints’ by Jussien
et al.) in H.
A different set of weights is devised for each aircraft operating mode in order to re-
flect the different importance that the same constraint assumes in different modes (or
phases of flight). For instance, the constraints that require the activation of the Way-
Points Generator has high importance in terms of safety in the landing phase but it is
negligible during reconnaissance. Obviously, the set of active weights changes with
the system mode transitions.
In cases of conflict during the search for an applicable configuration, wsm decision-
repair tries to find one constraint in H such that negating this constraints eliminates
the contradiction. If only one solution is found, that constraint is relaxed and the in-
formation about its importance—in terms of the predefined criteria—is used to inform
the pilot about how the aircraft functionality has been affected. For example, consider
the case of a constraint ci which enforces the availability of the Elevator Feel Sys-
tem and that is important both in terms of safety (with weight wsafety(ci)) and comfort
(with weight wcomfort(ci)). When negated, a message for the pilot might be:
Elevator Feel System: DEACTIVATED
Impact: SAFETY (↓), COMFORT (↓)
If more than one constraint in H can be negated, the neighbour function chooses
to negate the constraint that scores less with Equation B.6 and that, when negated,
makes the new decision set compatible with all the conflicts in Γ. As with other
decision-repair algorithms, if such a decision does not exist, the neighborhood is
extended, i.e. an additional decision is negated.
Note that, in cases of conflict and multiple decisions to be negated, the dynamic weights for
each criterion allow the selection of the constraint with the lowest importance given the current
operating conditions.
The neighbour function for wsm decision-repair is now defined more formally. The
following sets are defined:
• C, CD and k are defined as in Definition B.1.7;
• M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk} is the set of all system operating modes;
• R = {r1, r2, . . . , rm} is the set of criteria used for the evaluation of the constraints.
For each operating mode mi ∈ M, a function fweight associates a weight w ∈ W with each
criteria r ∈ R:
fweight : R(mi)→ W , where wi ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R+ (B.7)
For each constraint c ∈ C, a function frank associates a ranking q ∈ Q with each criteria:
frank : C → Q (B.8)
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where Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}, qi ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R+ and |Q| = |R|.
It follows that each constraint c ∈ C is evaluated on the basis of the score calculated by means





In (B.9) the weights wi are used to provide a ranking of the constraints which adapts to the cur-
rent operating mode. The weights have a specific purpose for the problem of user interaction. For
example, suppose that during a reconfiguration the pilot wants to override the logic of the system
and give more importance to preserving one criteria over the others (e.g. giving more importance
to safety); the weights can be changed dynamically through the SaIRA interface. Through this
mechanism, repair options that do not favour the safety of the configuration are implicitly filtered
out when a conflict arises.
Note that both the definition of the weights given a priori by the system designers and the
eventual modification of the weights done by the pilot are much easier problems than setting up a
new lexicographic ordering of the constraints to elicit different preferences (which is the approach
adopted by QuickXPlain). For instance, the interface can be designed to allow the pilot to click on
a button named ‘SAFETY’ in order to dynamically increase the importance of the ‘safety metric’
at the expense of the other metrics in real-time; the proposed configuration would be automatically
recalculated, using Equation B.9, to favour solutions in which constraints that affect the safety of
the system are not retracted. This type of interaction would be impossible having defined the
ordering of the constraints by means of a lexicographic ordering.
The neighbour function for the wsm decision-repair algorithm is reported in Algorithm B.7.
Algorithm B.7 neighbour(CD, k)
*Bespoke neighbour function for the wsm decision-repair algorithm
Require: k ⊂ CD
1: m← getCurrentMode
2: P← getPilotPreferences
3: W ← adjustWeights(P,W)
4: Ω← WSMrank(k,W,m)
5: repeat
6: remove the first decision c from Ω
7: C′D ← CD\{c} ∪ {¬c}
8: if C′D is compatible with all conflicts in Ω then
9: return C′D
10: end if
11: until Ω is empty
12: return stop (or extend the neighbourhood)
WSMrank orders the constraints in the conflict k in decreasing order of importance, implement-
ing Equation B.9. Steps two and three are optional and are executed only in cases where the pilot
wants to modify the pre-defined ranking of importance of the evaluation criteria. In these cases,
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getPilotPreferences retrieves information about the pilot’s preferences from the SaIRA in-
terface and adjustWeights uses the information obtained to adjust the pre-defined vector of
weights.
WSMrank implements function (B.9) and ranks the constraints returning the partial order Ω.
The constraint c which scores less in Ω is negated. Given that Ω is a partial order, in the case
of constraints with equal score, precedence is given to the negation of constraints which are not
related to safety (given the safety-critical operating scenario); this is a decision taken specifically
for SaIRA, another heuristic could be adopted for a different system. If the contradiction is not
resolved, more decision constraints sequentially selected from Ω are negated.
In order to facilitate the process of associating weights with constraints and cope with large
CSP, an Analytic Hierarchy Process [Saaty 1980] can be used by the designer (Figure B.1). Gen-
eral criteria can be divided in sub-criteria and constraints can be grouped into sets which have the
same weight for a number of criteria. It is always possible to establish a hierarchical organisa-
tion for the constraints of a CSP [Jussien and Ouis 2001]. This approach has been found to be



















Figure B.1: Example of how to use an Analytic Hierarchy Process to associate weights to constraints.
B.1.6 Evaluation of WSM Decision-Repair
Jussien and Lhomme [2002] performed an in-depth evaluation of tabu decision-repair vary-
ing the three main tuning parameters of the algorithm:
• the maximum number of allowed movements without improvement;
• the length of the tabu list;
• the selection of the candidate neighbour for repair (handled through the definition of the
weight of each constraint in the conflict).
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The authors conducted several experiments using open-shop problems. Concerning the con-
flict repair strategy—which is the core of wsm decision-repair—Jussien and Lhomme make a
direct comparison between tabu decision-repair and the well-established mac-dbt [Jussien
et al. 2000], which combines arc-consistency with dynamic backtracking and, since it does not
perform a local search because of the completeness requirements, it can be considered a peculiar
member of the decision-repair family.
For the sake of consistency and traceability, a series of experiments is performed here to eval-
uate the performance of wsm decision-repair with respect to tabu decision-repair and
mac-dbt, harking back to the approach of Jussien and Lhomme. Whilst these authors used gen-
eric benchmarking open-shop problems, here typical (programmatically created) ADR problems
are used. Open-shop problems, although quite simple to enunciate, are hard to solve optimally:
simple instances of size 6 x 6 (number of jobs by number of machines) leaves 36 unsolved vari-
ables [Gue´ret and Prins 1998]. Indeed, instead of focusing on performance alone, this study gives
more importance to finding a trade-off between performance and ability to generate explanations
that are helpful for ADR. As a result, the structure of the ADR CSP used here is the one described
in Section 5.4.1 and used throughout this chapter as an example of a typical but simplified ADR
problem. However, in the experiments presented in this section, the size of the problem is strongly
increased and other parameters are manipulated, as discussed hereinafter, in order to reflect a more
realistic case.
The tabu decision-repair has been implemented as described by Jussien and Lhomme
[2002]. The same implementation was used as a baseline for the implementation of wsm decision-
repair but Algorithm B.7 was used to implement the neighbour function. wsm decision-
repair is configured as follows (see Jussien and Lhomme [2002] for the configuration of tabu
decision- repair):
• Filtering techniques. Precedence constraints are handled with 2B-consistency filtering [Lhomme
1993];
• Computation of conflicts. Conflicts are computed using the facilities provided by Choco, as
described by Jussien [2001];
• Neighbourhood. Algorithm B.7 is used;
• Pilot preferences. In order to verify the performance of the wsm decision-repair and
compare it to the other two algorithms, pilot preference elicitation is disabled in these exper-
iments. This means that steps 2 and 3 in Algorithm B.7 are not implemented and WSMrank,
at step 4, uses the pre-defined weights;
• Stopping criterion. As with tabu decision-repair, the algorithm stops either when a
stop is returned by the neighbour function or when the limit of maximum iterations without
improvement since the last solution is reached (1,500 iterations in these experiments).
The experiments were performed on an Apple MacBook computer (Intel Dual Core2, 2.16Ghz,
2Gb RAM) running Mac OSX 10.5 Leopard, Java 1.6 with maximum Java memory heap size of
1.5 Gb. The test application was implemented in Java using Choco 2.1.1.
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B.1.6.1 Satisfaction rate
Satisfaction rate was introduced by Schubert et al. [2010] as an index of how many constraints
in a configuration CSP are satisfied by all the alternatives the user is supposed to decide from.
This value is important because the number and size of the conflict sets (i.e. explanations) is
highly dependent on it. A low satisfaction rate results in a high number of conflict sets with a low
cardinality.
In the context of the ADR problem, the lower the satisfaction rate, the higher the impact of the
unexpected event on the system. Schubert et al. created 7 different settings, increasing satisfaction
rate r from 10% to 70% for a CSP characterised by 10 constraints. This setting is unrealistic for
the ADR problem, because firstly, a typical ADR CSP has many more constraints; as an example,
the simplified ADR problem described earlier in this chapter (Section 5.4.1) has 29 constraints and
it is still an underestimation of a real problem. Secondly, in terms of avionics reconfiguration, a
satisfaction rate of 10% means that the system is so affected by the unexpected event that only 10%
of the constraints can be satisfied by a configuration. Whilst this is acceptable for a mobile phone
configuration problem (like the one examined by Schubert et al.), in the ADR context, such a low
satisfaction rate would mean that the aircraft would be destroyed. As a result, this experiment uses
four CSP settings with an increasing satisfaction rate r (the independent variable) going from 80%
to 95%.
The dependent variable is the runtime, which is the time from the instant at which the al-
gorithm is started to the instant at which it returns with two applicable configurations and annexed
explanations; the CSPs are over-constrained. At this stage, the explanations have not yet been
converted into natural language.
Thirty CSPs were automatically generated, with 56 constraints acting on 37 variables; 22 out
of the 56 constraints defined were static, hence, they could not be negated during the search and
were propagated at the beginning of the enumeration process. For each problem, the constraints set
was manipulated in order to produce four degrees of satisfaction rate: 80%, 85%, 90% and 95%.
As previously discussed, the solution given by the eCP solver is dependent on the enumeration
process; therefore, the first two solutions found mark the end of the search process.
For wsm decision-repair, five different criteria of evaluation of the decision constraints
were defined: safety, communications, redundancy, resilience, automation.
Either because it was not possible to verify the parametric behaviour of the dependent variables
or because there was simply not enough knowledge in this respect, non-parametric significance
tests are used in the experiments presented in this chapter.
The descriptive statistics of the results are reported in Table B.4 and Figure B.2.
The results for each satisfaction rate were compared by means of Friedman’s test; the outcome
is reported in Table B.5.
The results of a post-hoc test using Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests with Bonferroni correction
are reported in Table B.6. Whilst both tabu-dr and wsm-dr performed statistically better than
mac-dbt under all conditions, the post-hoc test reveals that wsm-dr performs better with higher
satisfaction rate whilst tabu-dr is more scalable, overtaking wsm-dr when r is lower. This phe-
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Runtime: effect of satisfaction rate
mac-dbt tabu decision-repair wsm decision-repair
r = 80% 0.757 (0.300) 0.391 (0.041) 0.502 (0.054)
r = 85% 0.364 (0.091) 0.225 (0.047) 0.236 (0.031)
r = 90% 0.211 (0.031) 0.137 (0.027) 0.119 (0.017)
r = 95% 0.175 (0.023) 0.079 (0.010) 0.051 (0.003)
Table B.4: Effect of different percentages of satisfaction rate r on the runtime (measured in seconds) of mac-dbt,
tabu decision-repair and wsm decision-repair. The statistical values in the table are obtained from 30 ADR
problems (56 constraints, 37 variables) for each satisfaction rate.























Figure B.2: Effect of different satisfaction rates (X axis) on the runtime (Y axis, measured in seconds) for mac-dbt,
tabu decision-repair and wsm decision-repair algorithms. Whilst wsm-dr performes better at higher
satisfaction rates, the cost of better explanations it provides is paid in terms of scalability with respect to tabu-dr,
which performs better with lower satisfaction rates.
nomenon is clear in Figure B.2.
In conclusion, wsm-dr shows better performance at a high satisfaction rate; the cost of the
better explanations that this algorithm provides (using domain-dependent knowledge within the
neighbour function) is paid for with less scalability with respect to satisfaction rate than tabu-dr
(e.g. worse performance when satisfaction rate is below approximately 80%). This is not really
an issue in SaIRA because ADR problems with very low satisfaction rates represent situations in
which the aircraft is almost destroyed, which is an unrealistic scenario of application.
B.1.6.2 Problem complexity
In the previous experiment the CSP was characterised by 56 constraints (22 static, 34 dynamic)
and 37 variables.
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Satisfaction rate: significance test
Rate Friedman’s test
r = 80% χ2(2) = 29.267, p < 0.001
r = 85% χ2(2) = 28.467, p < 0.001
r = 90% χ2(2) = 43.4, p < 0.001
r = 95% χ2(2) = 60.0, p < 0.001
Table B.5: Results of Friedman’s tests for the effect of the satisfaction rate.
Satisfaction rate: post-hoc test
Rate Pairwise comparison Significance
tabu-dr↔ wsm-dr Z = −3.615, p < 0.001
r = 80% tabu-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 5.293, p < 0.001
wsm-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 3.678, p < 0.001
tabu-dr↔ wsm-dr Z = −1.42, n.s.
r = 85% tabu-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 5.164, p < 0.001
wsm-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 3.744, p < 0.001
tabu-dr↔ wsm-dr Z = 1.162, n.s.
r = 90% tabu-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 6.197, p < 0.001
wsm-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 5.035, p < 0.001
tabu-dr↔ wsm-dr Z = 3.873, p < 0.001
r = 95% tabu-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 7.746, p < 0.001
wsm-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 3.873, p < 0.001
Table B.6: Post-hoc test (Wilcoxon’s test with Bonferroni correction) for the Friedman’s test on the effect of the
satisfaction rate (Table B.5).
Here the scalability of wsm decision-repair is assessed by increasing the complexity of the
CSP as shown in Table B.7. The number of static constraints is not modified, because they cannot
be negated during the search, therefore, they do not influence the complexity of the problem.
Benchmark configurations
Benchmark name Nr. of variables Nr. of static constraints Nr. of dynamic constraints
Baseline 37 22 34
Large 58 22 71
Complex 1 74 22 103
Complex 2 96 22 153
Table B.7: Characteristics of the four benchmark problems used for the assessment of the effect of problem
complexity on the algorithm runtime. Static constraints cannot be negated at runtime, hence their number is not
manipulated in this experiment.
Thirty over-constrained CSPs were generated for each configuration; the satisfaction rate was
set to 90% for all problems. The descriptive statistics for the results are shown in Table B.8.
The statistical significance of the differences was verified using Friedman’s test; the results are
reported in Table B.9.
A series of Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests with Bonferroni correction was used for post-hoc
analysis; the results are shown in Table B.10.
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Runtime: effect of problem complexity
mac-dbt tabu decision-repair wsm decision-repair
Baseline 0.21 (0.03) 0.14 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02)
Large 0.72 (0.06) 0.49 (0.07) 0.39 (0.05)
Complex 1 1.7 (0.08) 1.4 (0.19) 1.1 (0.07)
Complex 2 8.11 (0.18) 5.28 (0.79) 3.9 (0.09)
Table B.8: Effect of problems complexity (intended as number of variables an constraints) on the runtime (seconds) of
the mac-dbt, tabu-dr and wsm-dr algorithms. The statistical values in the table are obtained from 30 problems for
each benchmark.
Problem complexity: significance test
Benchmark name Friedman’s test
Baseline χ2(2) = 44.838, p < 0.001
Large χ2(2) = 54.2, p < 0.001
Complex 1 χ2(2) = 52.267, p < 0.001
Complex 2 χ2(2) = 58.067, p < 0.001
Table B.9: Results of the Friedman’s tests for the effect of problem complexity.
Figure B.3 shows clearly that wsm-dr scores better than both tabu-dr and mac-dbt. As con-
firmed by the post-hoc test, wsm-dr and tabu-dr have a similar performance on simple problems
(see the statistical non-significance between wsm-dr and tabu-dr in relation to the ‘Baseline’
benchmark, first row in Table B.10), but when the complexity increases, wsm-dr scales much bet-
ter. This result is both positive and expected: the domain-dependent knowledge used by wsm-dr
provides a considerable boost in the search for a solution, especially with growing numbers of
variables and constraints.
Satisfaction rate: post-hoc test
Benchmark Pairwise comparison Significance
wsm-dr↔ tabu-dr Z = 1.291, n.s.
Baseline wsm-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 6.261, p < 0.001
tabu-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 4.97, p < 0.001
wsm-dr↔ tabu-dr Z = 3.486, p < 0.001
Large wsm-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 7.359, p < 0.001
tabu-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 3.873, p < 0.001
wsm-dr↔ tabu-dr Z = 3.615, p < 0.001
Complex 1 wsm-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 7.23, p < 0.001
tabu-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 3.615, p < 0.001
wsm-dr↔ tabu-dr Z = 3.615, p < 0.001
Complex 2 wsm-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 7.617, p < 0.001
tabu-dr↔ mac-dbt Z = 4.002, p < 0.001
Table B.10: Post-hoc test (Wilcoxon’s test with Bonferroni correction) for Friedman’s test on the effect of problem
complexity (Table B.9).
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Figure B.3: Effect of problem complexity on the runtime (in seconds) of wsm decision-repair, tabu
decision-repair and mac-dbt. wsm decision-repair provides the best results both in terms of average runtime
and scalability.
B.1.6.3 Number of criteria of evaluation
Any number of criteria for the evaluation of the constraints during the conflict repair process
could be defined in wsm decision-repair. Intuitively, a large number of criteria leads to higher
granularity in the structure of the explanations and more informed decisions during conflict repair;
on the other hand, a small number of criteria leads to easier problem design, better performance
resulting from lower computation for the WSMrank at the cost of less precise explanations.
This experiment only concerns wsm decision-repair and aims at characterising its per-
formance under the effect of different numbers of criteria considered by the conflict repair func-
tion.
Each of the four benchmarks defined for the previous experiment (Baseline, Large, Complex 1
and Complex 2) were performed again, with 5, 15, 30, 50 and 100 criteria. For each benchmark, 25
CSPs were randomly generated, with the satisfaction rate set at 90%. There were 5 observations
for each of the 5 criteria, leading to a total of 100 observations (5 CSP x 5 criteria levels x 4
benchmarks). The descriptive statistics are presented in Table B.11.
As with the previous experiments, Friedman’s test is used to verify the statistical significance
of the results. The results of the test are reported in Table B.12.
Whilst Friedman’s test reveals a statistical difference at runtime, resulting from different num-
bers of criteria, a post-hoc analysis performed by means of a series of Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests
with Bonferroni correction (not reported here for the sake of brevity given the large number of
permutations) shows that the statistical differences only come from the comparison of the extrema
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Runtime: effect of number of criteria
Baseline Large Complex 1 Complex 2
5 criteria 0.120 (0.002) 0.412 (0.075) 1.095 (0.056) 3.790 (0.101)
15 criteria 0.121 (0.003) 0.385 (0.065) 1.143 (0.052) 3.852 (0.082)
30 criteria 0.122 (0.002) 0.396 (0.052) 1.156 (0.061) 3.856 (0.067)
50 criteria 0.131 (0.002) 0.431 (0.042) 1.173 (0.062) 3.896 (0.085)
100 criteria 0.151 (0.006) 0.432 (0.052) 1.205 (0.045) 4.090 (0.097)
Table B.11: Effect of the number of criteria (used to rank the constraints during conflict repair) on the runtime
(measured in seconds) of wsm decision-repair. The statistical values in the table are obtained from 25 problems
for each level of number of criteria.
Number of criteria: significance test
Benchmark Friedman’s test
Baseline χ2(4) =, p < 0.001
Large χ2(4) = 11.157, p < 0.025
Complex 1 χ2(4) = 28.85, p < 0.001
Complex 2 χ2(4) = 52.0, p < 0.001
Table B.12: Results of Friedman’s tests for the effect of the number of criteria used used by the Weight Sum Function
to rank the constraints.
in the scales (e.g. 5 criteria versus 100 criteria). This phenomenon is clear in Figure B.4. In other
words, the number of criteria has a statistical effect on the runtime, but the size of this effect is
negligible compared to the effects of other factors (e.g. problem complexity). Figure B.4 also
provides a clear idea of how the number of criteria does not affect the scalability of the algorithm,
at least in the context of the type of problems that are typical for ADR.
B.1.6.4 Conclusions
The main conclusions stemming from the experimental evaluation of wsm decision-repair
presented in the sections above, can be summarised as follows:
• wsm-dr has performance comparable to state-of-the-art conflict repair algorithms; it provides
even better performance than tabu-dr in problems characterised by a high satisfaction rate,
but the cost of best explanations is paid for in terms of less scalability (but only in relation
to the satisfaction rate);
• wsm-dr provides better performance than mac-dbt and tabu-dr at any degree of problem
complexity (i.e. better scalability);
• The number of criteria defined for the evaluation of the constraints during conflict repair
allows the practitioners to define the type and granularity of the decision support information
generated by wsm-dr; the experiments reveal that this factor has a negligible effect on the
runtime of wsm-dr and does not scale with the increase of problem complexity.
On the basis of the analyses performed, wsm decision-repair appears highly effective for
performing conflict repair for ADR problems: the algorithm has the main benefits of both pro-
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Figure B.4: Effect of the number of criteria (used to rank the constraints during conflict repair) on the runtime
(measured in seconds) of wsm decision-repair. Whilst there is a statistically significant effect of the independent
variable, the impact is negligible compared to the computational demands of other phases of the algorithm.
ducing the type of decision support information required in SaIRA and providing performance
comparable to state-of-the-art conflict repair algorithms.
B.2 Generating Readily-Understandable Information
The wsm decision-repair algorithm generates computer-encoded explanations of conflict-repair
actions. Depending on the number of conflicts repaired during the search for a configuration, the
explanation generated can possibly become too large to be delivered to the pilot in a way that
would efficiently support the human decision process. Furthermore, the information produced will
not be readily understandable.
Two main problems can be identified: (a) the generation of readily understandable explan-
ations using the information produced by wsm decision-repair, and (b) the generation of
readily-understood implications for each decision alternative. Both problems are addressed in
the following sections, following a brief discussion of relevant research in the literature.
B.2.1 Related work
Using logic puzzles as a case study, Sqalli and Freuder [1996]; Freuder et al. [2001b] introduce the
use of inference-based constraint satisfaction to generate explanations for the decisions of the CSP
solver during combinatorial problems. The type of explanations proposed are intended to improve
the effectiveness of user involvement in the search for a solution to the problem.
The explanations devised by Freuder et al. are strongly user-centric. In the design phase, sys-
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tem developers associate user-relevant information with each constraint; the information attached
to each constraint is directed to the user in cases where the solver finds a contradiction which en-
tails that constraint. The user decides how to proceed on the basis of that information, e.g. to relax
the constraint.
Jussien [2003] has a different approach to explaining the decisions of the CP solver. His re-
search interest is in automatically generating explanations for a given set of constraints without de-
termining in advance the nature of the explanations which will be provided—the solver generates
them dynamically. Jussien’s approach is known as explanation-based constraint programming
(eCP), introduced earlier in the chapter.
In eCP, the solver records specific information whenever a value is deleted from the domain
of a variable, in order to handle situations in which constraints are dynamically added or retracted
from the constraint network. eCP distinguishes between two types of explanations: contradiction
explanations and eliminating explanations. The former explains the conflict between a specific
constraint and the assignments made previously; the latter specifies why values were deleted from
a variable domain. The latter notion of explanation is similar to that of justification developed by
Bessiere [1991] in the context of Dynamic CSPs.
The information recorded by the eCP solver during execution was originally seen as improving
the performance of the solver, not for user support. In a paper titled ‘Explanations for Whom?’,
Wallace and Freuder [2001] question the effectiveness of formal, ‘solver-level’ explanations for
user support. They identify a gap between the formal representation of an explanation, as produced
by the CSP solver, and the way it should be represented in order to be helpful to the user. The
authors distinguish between explanation and explanatory sign, the latter being the way that the
formal explanation, or part of it, can be conveyed to the user.
Jussien and Ouis [2001] overcome the lack of ‘user-friendliness’ of the explanations generated
with eCP by proposing a set of tools to organise the constraints of a CSP hierarchically and produce
more ‘user-friendly’ information, which can effectively support the user during interactions with
the solver.
Having compared Freuder’s and Jussien’s approaches, Van Der Linden [2002] introduces the
concept of meta-constraint. A meta-constraint has a minimum and maximum value and a set of
constraints it ranges over. The CSP is organised into ‘clusters’ of meta-constraints which ‘contain’
sets of constraints. User-friendly explanations are associated with top-level constraints (those
constraints which are at a high level in the hierarchy of clusters) and are directed to the user in cases
when one or more constraints in the cluster reach a contradiction. The principle of organising the
set of constraints in a hierarchical manner and associating high-level explanations with constraints
high in the hierarchy suggested in Van Der Linden is very similar, in many aspects, to the method
proposed earlier by Jussien and Ouis [2001], who also provide a rigorous, formal description of
the explanation generation method.
In summary, the approaches to explaining the decisions of the CSP solver, developed by
Freuder et al. on one side and Jussien et al. on the other, represent the two main trends for
automated explanation generation for interactive CSPs. Freuder focuses on the perspicuity of the
explanation, looking at small and homogeneous problems. Jussien tackles the problem of dy-
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namically explaining the decisions of the solver in complex, big and unstructured combinatorial
problems.
ADR is a complex combinatorial problem with a large search space, a feature of the problem
addressed in this thesis that favours Jussien’s approach to generating readily-understood explana-
tions for pilot decision support.
Jussien and Ouis [2001] propose structuring the CSP in a hierarchical manner (as a tree). Low-
level constraints are projected into higher level nodes. User-friendly information is attached to sets
of constraints by the programmer: when one or more constraints in the set are relaxed, the attached
information is directed to the user, providing a user-friendly information that explains to the user
the function of the constraints in the context of the problem. This information should enable the
user to make an informed choice.
In SaIRA, explanations for reconfiguration decisions are not required for all reconfiguration
decisions, but only in case of over-constrained situations, in which one or more decision con-
straints must be negated. The previous section has already proposed the wsm decision-repair
algorithm for this purpose. The mechanism of attaching user-friendly information to sets of con-
straints can be integrated with the algorithm in order to translate the output of wsm-dr into readily
understandable information. Figure B.5 shows an example of how the ideas from Jussien and Ouis


















































Figure B.5: An example of the application of the hierarchical organisation of user-friendly explanations of constraints
[Jussien and Ouis 2001] to a small portion of a typical ADR problem.
At the bottom of the tree, the user-friendly information is less concise, but better reflects the
B.2. GENERATING READILY-UNDERSTANDABLE INFORMATION 243
information carried by the attached constraints. Higher levels of explanations provide more con-
cise information, but the information becomes more general and less precise. For instance, if one
or more constraints from C14 to C20 are retracted, the user is provide with the message ‘Elevator
Feel System ACTIVE’ (note that the wording is explanatory, a better framing can be used, but this
is not important at this stage) the pilot would understand that the constraints relaxation is necessary
to guarantee the functioning of the EFS function which, as a result, is going to be lost in the next
configuration.
Navigating the tree towards the bottom allows the user to have more precise information about
the specific aspect of the configuration proposed by the system which leads to the deactivation of
the EFS; navigating towards the top of the tree provides greater abstraction and, in the example in
question, would enable the pilot to realise that the deactivation of the EFS would lead to a decrease
in comfort, just like the deactivation of the Waypoints function would do.
Two problems are quickly identified with this baseline approach:
1. Filtering problem. The pilot should only be provided with a limited amount of information
for the decision support process to be effective; this information must be concise and helpful
at the same time, e.g. representative of the current state of the system. When there are a lot
of constraints that must be retracted, only a portion of the user-friendly information attached
to the constraints can be delivered to the pilot. The problem of filtering the information is
not addressed by Jussien and Ouis;
2. Abstraction problem. The method proposed by Jussien and Ouis is static, the hierarchy is
defined at design time and it is used “as is” during the interaction. Whilst this is acceptable in
the type of problems considered by Jussien and Ouis, in the case of ADR it is not possible to
provide the pilot with a full explanation tree, because this would result in unhelpful decision
support. At the same time, the problem of selecting the right degree of abstraction is not
obvious, e.g. how should the system balance between precision of the information provided
(at the expense of brevity) or abstraction (at the risk of not being able to inform the pilot of
the real risks hidden in a configuration)? These questions are addressed hereinafter.
B.2.2 Natural Language Generation in SaIRA
Natural Language Generation is a subfield of Computational Linguistics and language-oriented
Artificial Intelligence research devoted to the production of high-quality text from computer-
internal representation of information.
Dale and Reiter [1995] characterise the input to a single invocation of a NLG system as a
four-tuple 〈k, c, u, d〉, where k is the knowledge source to be used, c is the communicative goal to
be achieved, u is the user model, and d is a discourse history.
The knowledge source k is usually encoded in a database that is accessed by the NLG system.
In SaIRA, k is represented by the low-level explanations generated by the CSP solver (which
include the information generated by wsm decision-repair).
The communicative goal c—the purpose of the message being generated—can be summarised
as follows:
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For each reconfiguration alternative, provide the pilot with readily understandable ex-
planations of the reconfiguration alternative proposed, implications on the function-
ality of the aircraft, and an assessment of the reliability of the information provided.
Relating to the concerns of the user model, Chapter 2 anticipated that in this research the
user model (or profile) u would be developed using basic ideas from the cognitive psychology
domain (Chapters 3 and 4); the conclusions reached were used to define the overall framework for
automated generation of decision support information proposed in this chapter.
The discourse history d represents the text generated by the system before the current message.
At present, SaIRA is designed as a ‘single-interaction’ system, hence no history is taken into
consideration.
The literature contains several architectures for NLG systems. Figure B.6 is an adaptation
from Dale and Reiter [1995]. The left side of the picture highlights the three main building blocks,













Dale and Reiter give the following general description. The purpose of the document planner
is to take the four-tuple 〈k, c, u, d〉 and determine content and structure of the document to generate.
More specifically, content determination is the task of deciding what chunks of information are
going to be included in the output text. Document structuring is the task of building a structure
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that contains the portions of information (or ‘messages’) selected during the content determination
phase.
The purpose of the microplanner is making fine-grained decisions about the form of the text
being produced, e.g. deciding which syntactic structures to use. Lexicalisation is concerned with
selecting the specific words or constructions. The referring expression generation component
then decides how references should be made in the text. Finally, the aggregation step takes care
of ordering the information and translating the structures created by the planner into sentences and
paragraphs.
The surface realiser maps the abstract representation used by the microplanner into actual
text. In particular, linguistic and structure realisation convert meta-content and meta-structures,
as generated by the microplanner, into real text content and structures.
The decision support information required for SaIRA needs to be expressed in English, but it
should have a fixed structure that the pilot can easily recognise and process in a timely manner.
This requirement is motivated by the peculiar operating environment. As a result, the majority
of the components characteristic of state-of-the-art, sophisticated NLG systems are not required.
However, particular attention is paid to the content determination module, which requires some
sophistication.
In SaIRA each message delivered by the system is always made up of the following four
components: (1) fault description, (2) explanations, (3) implications and (4) reliability assessment.
This thesis does not focus on the fault description (which is considered the baseline information
generated by the standard cockpit instrumentation); it is assumed that a descriptive string of text is
available for any fault which can be shown to the pilot when it happens, e.g. “Failure to the Left-
Engine Power Generator”. The attention of this thesis is on the decision support SaIRA associates
with the fault description (components 2, 3 and 4 in the previous list).
The four components of the decision support message delivered by SaIRA are organised ac-
cording to the schema given in Figure 5.10 which was already discussed in Section 5.7.2, when the
design of the SaIRA user interface was described. The schema was designed in order to provide
a fixed basis which is tailored with the data relative to each configuration alternative, so as to al-
low for the rapid processing of the information by the pilots (e.g. the pilots always know which
information is where). SaIRA-XPlain is the algorithm proposed to dynamically fill the schema
with information; SaIRA-XPlain makes use of wsm decision-repair to generate explanations
and implications. The algorithm is discussed in the following section.
B.2.3 The SaIRA-XPlain algorithm
With reference to the schema presented in the Chapter 5 (Section 5.7.2), three portions of the
message need to be generated by SaIRA-XPlain: the uncertainty figures, the explanations and the
implications. The computation of the uncertainty figures is dealt with in the next section; here the
focus is on explanations and implications.
Conflict-repair is a critical step in the reconfiguration process for the generation of explana-
tions and implications. During a minor reconfiguration (i.e. the CSP is not over-constrained) no
explanations and implications are necessary because the functionality of the system is unchanged.
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Intuitively, the information that constitutes the explanations and implications is generated during
the process of restoring an over-constrained problem (i.e. major reconfiguration), which involves
retracting one or more decision constraints and switching to degraded functionality as a result.
In Section B.1.5.2 the wsm decision-repair algorithm for conflict-repair of ADR problems
was proposed. This section shows how the information generated by wsm decision-repair
during the conflict repair is used by a new algorithm, SaIRA-XPlain, which filters the information
about explanations and implications in order to produce decision support to fill the schema shown
in Figure 5.10.
Before presenting the algorithm, the logic is explained with the support of Figure B.7. As
previously mentioned, information about fault diagnosis is assumed to be available before the
execution of SaIRA-XPlain. SaIRA is designed to support the pilot during the process of fault
recovery; fault detection and identification are beyond the scope of this research.
A hierarchical structure is preventively enforced on the decision constraints of the ADR prob-
lem as proposed by Jussien and Ouis (Figure B.5). However, instead of associating a single explan-
atory sign with each set of constraints, two pieces of readily-understood information are attached:
(a) an explanatory sign  and (b) an implication sign ι. More formally:
∀ci ∈ C → (i, ιi) (B.10)
where C is the set of constraints of the ADR problem, as in Definition 5.3.5.
If constraint ci is negated in order to repair a conflict, the implication sign ιi is considered
for inclusion in the message shown to the pilot; the implication sign, pre-defined by the system
designer, tells the pilot in English the implications of negating constraint ci. For instance, let
ci ∈ {0, 1} be the constraint that regulates the activation of the Elevator Feel System (0=inactive,
1=active); if ci = 1 must be retracted, a typical implication sign could be:
Elevator Feel System→ DEACTIVATED
Similarly, being c j = 3 the constraint representing the degree of redundancy of a data bus, an
example of implications sign to be shown when the constraint is negated could be:
Data Bus Redundancy→ TRIPLE REDUNDANCY LOST
In the schema shown in Figure 5.10 (previous section), under the implication sign, there is an
‘impact’ field; SaIRA shows one (or two, if that is the case) metrics which are most affected by
the repair action performed. This information is obtained directly from the results of the WSMrank
function, as described in Section B.1.5.2.
The explanatory sign (formally defined in Section B.2.1) associated with one or more con-
straints explains why the constraints in question have been kept active at the expense of the neg-
ated ones. Typical explanatory signs associated with the same couple of constraints used for the
previous example on implications would read as follows:
Elevator Feel System→ REQUIRED in current mode
Data Bus Redundancy→ TRIPLE (SAFETY requirement)
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In conclusion, in SaIRA an implication sign tells the pilot what happens when constraint ci is
negated; an explanatory sign tells the pilot why the constraint should not be relaxed, providing a
quick insight into the rationale for the reconfiguration suggestion given by the system.
As discussed in the sections above, there could be a need to negate several constraints from the
conflict set in order to repair a contradiction. Similarly, there could be more than one implication
for each decision constraint to be retracted (constraints are linked by inter-dependencies). Many
negated constraints and many implications lead to many explanatory and implications signs, which
cannot be all shown to the pilot; due to the dimensions of the cockpit and human cognitive limits,
only the most important and significant portion of the information should be displayed.
The ranking of constraints generated by the WSMrank function, previously introduced in the
context of the wsm decision-repair function, is used again here to filter the explanatory and
implication signs and select only the most relevant. The ranking produced by WSMrank is based on
the evaluation criteria defined by the system designers (domain-based knowledge which includes
safety and/or performance requirements). As shown above in this chapter, during the conflict
repair process, the logic of wsm decision-repair is such that the decision constraint that scores
less in the ranking produced by WSMrank is negated first (see Figure B.7). If a single-constraint
retraction does not suffice to repair the conflict, another constraint from the conflict set is negated,
the second-less-important in the WSM-raking, and so on.
The negation of these constraints represents the starting point for the construction of all the
implications of the reconfiguration; in fact, the negated constraints represent a set of implications
for the reconfiguration, e.g. negating a constraint that requires the activation of an application
leads to the deactivation of the application in question. There is no guarantee, however, that such
constraints are the most important for decision support. There could be situations in which con-
straints that are dependent from those negated are more important than them in terms of decision
support, because, for instance, they have a greater impact on the safety of the system. To this
purpose, once a conflict is repaired, all its implications are calculated (as discussed later in this
section) and the WSMrank function is once again used to order the implication constraints, on the
basis of domain-dependent knowledge codified by the system designers in the algorithm weights.
For the sake of clarity, it is worth noting that for explanatory signs the WSMrank function is run on
the constraint conflict set, whilst for the implication signs the same function is used to order to set
of implications of decisions taken during the generation of the new configuration (see Figure B.7).
Unlike with the conflict set, the constraints that score higher in the ranking of the implica-
tions are used for decision support (i.e. the set of implication signs attached to them is shown
to the pilot). Given that WSMrank uses domain-dependent knowledge regarding the importance
of the constraints, the constraints that score higher in the ranking are the most relevant ones and,
intuitively, they represent the most relevant information for the pilot.
SaIRA-XPlain is reported in Algorithm B.8.
The wsm decision-repair function returns a solution C′ for the ADR problem which con-
tains a set of negated constraints Cneg (note that Cneg , ∅ in any case otherwise there would be no
need to call SaIRA-XPlain) and a partial order ΩCS over the conflict set CS .
The calcImplication function calculates all the implications of the negated constraints ci ∈
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Figure B.7: SaIRA-XPlain uses the ranking of the decision constraints performed by the WSMrank function
(Section B.1.5.2) during conflict repair.
Algorithm B.8 SaIRA-XPlain()
Require: m: current operating mode
Require: W: constraints weights (used by WSMrank)
Require: γI , γE: limits of number of implication/explanatory (respectively) signs that can be in-
cluded in the decision support message
1: (C′,ΩCS ,Cneg)← wsm decision-repair
2: I ← calcImplications(Cneg)
3: ΩI ← WSMrank(I,W,m)
4: IS ← implicationSigns(ΩI , γI)
5: ES ← explanatorySigns(ΩCS ,Cneg, γE)
6: return IS , ES
Cneg; it returns the set of implications I. The problem of dynamic calculation of the implications of
soft constraints—including issues related to performance—have been already addressed in the lit-
erature [Freuder et al. 2001a; 2003]. SaIRA-XPlain uses the Generalised Arc Consistency GAC3m
algorithm [Lecoutre and Szymanek 2006] which is implemented by the infeasibleTupleAC
function of the Choco library.
The set of implications calculated is ordered by the WSMrank function using the pre-defined
weights wi ∈ W and modified on the basis of the current operating mode m; the partial order ΩI is
returned.
Implication and explanatory signs for pilot support must be generated from I and CS respect-
ively. The number of signs shown on the display depends on the size of the display and on usability
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issues which are further investigated in Chapter 6. Here, γI and γE represent the number of max-
imum implications and explanatory signs respectively that can be shown on the display.
The function implicationSigns generates a set IS of γI implication signs from the partially
ordered set of implication constraints ΩI .
Slightly more complicated is the logic of the explanatorySigns function which produces a
set ES of γE explanatory signs using the partially ordered set of explanation constraints ΩCS and
the set of negated decision constraints Cneg. The logic is as follows:
• the decision constraints in ci ∈ Cneg ⊂ CS that score less when ranked by the WSMrank func-
tion are negated; therefore, they become part of the set of implications of the reconfiguration
proposed;
• the decision constraints remaining in ΩCS ‘justify’ the retraction of the constraints in Cneg,
because the former are more important (according to the domain-dependent knowledge co-
dified in the WSM ranking);
• amongst all the constraints in ΩCS /Cneg, γE constraints must be selected to serve as basis for
the construction of the explanatory signs; these constraints are those that scored ‘just more’
than the negated constraints when evaluated by WSMrank. These constraints are ‘slightly
more important’ than those in Cneg, hence they are meaningful for the construction of ex-
planations.
The overall purpose of SaIRA-XPlain is to perform abstraction and filtering of the basic ex-
planations and implications, in order to provide a meaningful and helpful set of decision support
information for the pilot, getting past problems with the basic approach to user-friendly explana-
tions described in Section B.2.1.
So far, the mechanism for producing readily understandable explanations and implications of
reconfiguration decisions have been described. The next section discusses the need to provide
pilots with uncertainty figures (expanding the argument introduced in Chapter 4) and addresses
the problem of calculating the uncertainty embedded in the fault assessment message included in
the decision support information.
B.3 Limitations
Three main limitations of the approach to automated generation of ADR decision support inform-
ation adopted in SaIRA have been identified.
Global constraints. This limitation pertains to a more general issue with the design of any
kind of CSP, in which explanations of the decisions of the solver are to be given to the user. It has
been found that the way the CSP is designed and the type of constraints used to implement the de-
signers’ knowledge can influence the number, size and effectiveness of the low-level explanations
generated during the search for a solution.
More precisely, global constraints represent a major problem. A constraint is said to be global
if “there exists no decomposition scheme for which the consistency notion removes as many local
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inconsistencies as on the original constraint” [Gaudin et al. 2008]. A typical example of global
constraint is the allDifferent constraints which are used to associate different values from a
specified set with a set of variables. Intuitively, the definition of an effective, user-friendly ex-
planation for the retraction of constraints of this type is particularly challenging (for example,
how could the retraction of an allDifferent constraint be explained to the pilot? Such a con-
straint could affect dozens of variables). The use of global constraints could impair the quality of
explanations generated by SaIRA during ADR.
The problem of explaining global constraints has been recently addressed by a number of
researchers who devise different methodologies to mechanise the explanation process and several
guidelines for the design of CSP that can be easily explained [Rochart et al. 2003; Rochart and
Jussien 2007; Gaudin et al. 2008]. In the code used in this thesis, global constraints have only been
used for the static part of the CSP, which does not require explanations.
Algorithm generality. Another aspect of SaIRA that requires attention is the wsm decision-
repair algorithm. This algorithm is designed to use domain-dependent knowledge about the
ADR problem, in order to improve the performance and quality of the explanations with respect
to a standard version of the decision-repair algorithm archetype. The improvement recorded
in the experiments presented in Section B.1.6 must be taken into consideration only in the context
of the ADR problem and problems with a similar structure (i.e. dynamic reconfiguration of inter-
dependent functions over a distributed network). The applicability of wsm decision-repair to
the explanation of combinatorial problems of a different nature and structure has not been invest-
igated in this thesis, therefore, no inferences are made in this regard.
Natural language generation. The quality of the natural language messages delivered by
SaIRA relies on the ability of the designers to associate effective messages with computer-encoded
constraints. Whilst a single natural language message can be associated with groups of constraints,
and the messages can be organised hierarchically, the problem of associating messages with con-
straints can become difficult with very large CSPs, especially when a hierarchical structure cannot
be easily defined (even though it was proved that it is always possible to do so [Jussien 2003]). A
potential area for further research on SaIRA is the possibility of using more sophisticated natural
language generation techniques to enable the system to automatically produce the explanatory and
implication signs directly from the computer-encoded explanations and implications. The genera-
tion of natural language to explain problems based on large, numerical data-sets has been already
addressed in the literature (e.g. [Goldberg et al. 1994]); there seem to be no reason why similar
technology could not be applicable to the ADR problem.
Appendix C
Evidential Reasoning
C.1 Against Bayesian Reasoning in SaIRA
Suppose D is the diagnosis of an unexpected event (e.g. a fault), E1 and E2 are two pieces of
evidence from sensors s1 and s2. The classic Bayesian Rule for information fusion is:
P(H|E1, E2) = P(E1, E2|H) P(H)P(E2, E1) (C.1)
Assuming that E1 and E2 are independent, we have:
P(E1, E2) = P(E1) P(E2)
P(E2|H, E1) = P(E2|H)
P(E1, E2|H) = P(E1|H) P(E2|H, E1)
(C.2)
We can rewrite P(H|E1, E2) as:
P(H|E1, E2) = P(E1|H) P(E2|H) P(H)P(E1) P(E2) (C.3)
where P(H|E1, E2) is the a posteriori probability after considering two pieces of evidence E1
and E2; P(H), P(E1) and P(E2) are a priori probabilities; P(E1|H) and P(E2|H) are conditional
probabilities of the belief in E1 and E2 when H is considered, and P(E2)P(E1) is a normalization
factor.
The Bayesian approach makes some strong assumptions about the operating scenario that can-
not be satisfied in ADR. Since the operating scenario of SCMS considered in this thesis (e.g.
aircraft, spacecraft) is unstructured, it is not possible to reproduce it in a laboratory. As a con-
sequence, P(H) is usually very difficult to estimate, e.g. the probability of occurrence of any fault.
Furthermore, when more than one sensor are used to make inferences on a specific unexpected
event, the conditional probabilities (e.g. P(E1|H) and P(E2|H)) are usually unavailable. These
probabilities are strongly affected by the contingent operating conditions.
Whilst allowing updating a priori probabilities at run-time, Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory re-
laxes the Bayesian restriction on mutually exclusive hypothesis so that it is possible to assign evid-
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ence to propositions (i.e. union of hypotheses). This mechanism allows specification of partial
knowledge. Pieces of knowledge and uncertainty are processed. At the end of the inference pro-
cess, the pilot can be provided with information about how uncertain are the conclusions achieved
by the system. The pilot has the freedom of either trusting or not trusting the system; in both
cases the choice will be more informed than one made accepting conclusions that hide degrees of
uncertainty.
C.2 General Background about Evidential Reasoning
Evidential Reasoning (ER) is a reasoning framework developed by SRI International and funded
by DARPA. It is based on the theory of belief functions conceived by Dempster [1967] and further
developed by Shafer [1976]. It is a generalisation of probability theory that allows specification of
degrees of precision as well as degrees of uncertainty.
The goal of ER is to assess the effect of all available pieces of evidence upon a hypothesis
by making use of domain-specific knowledge. Bodies of evidence are expressed as probabilistic
opinions about the partial truth or falsity of statements composed of subsets of propositions from
a space of distinct and exhaustive possibilities (called the frame of discernment).
The distribution of beliefs over a frame of discernment is called a body of evidence (BOE).
Several formal methods are provided to fuse (i.e. pooling) two BOE (see Sentz et al. [2002] for
an exhaustive and critical review). The result is a new BOE representing the consensus of the two
original BOE.
The theory allows belief to be assigned to individual propositions in the space or to disjunctions
of propositions or both. Belief assigned to a disjunction explicitly represents a lack of sufficient
information to enable more precise distribution. This allows belief to be attributed to statements
whose granularity is appropriate to the available evidence.
Independent beliefs are expressed by multiple (independent) BOE; dependent beliefs (in which
belief in one proposition depends on that of another) can either be expressed by a single BOE or
by a network that describes the inter-relationships among several BOE.
Given its singular capacity to define uncertainty/ignorance embedded in the input data and
use it to make inferences, ER is proposed for the handling the of uncertain sensor information in
SaIRA and for the generation of uncertainty figures in support of pilots’ decision making activities.
There are three important functions in Dempster-Shafer theory which must be put into context
in SaIRA: the basic probability assignment function (bpa or m), the support (or belief ) function
(Spt), and the plausibility function (Pls). Each of them is introduced and discussed in the following
sections.
C.2.1 Basic probability assignment function
A BOE is represented by means of a basic probability function (bpa). A bpa (m), also known as
mass, is a set mapping from subsets of a frame of discernment, Θ, into the unit interval:
mΘ = 2Θ → [0, 1] (C.4)
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such that:




mΘ(X) = 1 (C.5)
Generally speaking, the term “basic probability assignment” does not refer to probability in
the classical sense. The bpa defines a mapping of the power set to the interval between 0 and 1,
where the bpa of the null set is 0 and the summation of the bpa of all the subsets of the power set
is 1. The value of the bpa for a given set X (represented as m(X)), expresses the proportion of all
relevant and available evidence that supports the claim that a particular element of Θ (the universal
set) belongs to the set X but to no particular subset of X [Klir 1999].
The value of m(X) pertains only to the set X and makes no additional claims about any subsets
of X. Any further evidence on the subsets of X would be represented by another bpa, i.e. Y ⊂ X,
m(Y) would the bpa for the subset Y .
C.2.2 Support and Plausibility functions
Any proposition that has been attributed nonzero mass is called a focal element. One of the rami-
fications of this representation of belief is that the probability of a hypothesis X is constrained to





Pls(X) = 1 − Spt(Y) (C.6b)
[Spt(X),Pls(X)] ⊆ [0, 1] (C.6c)
Spt(X) is referred to as support (or belief ) and indicates the degree to which the evidence
supports the proposition. Pls(X) is referred to as plausibility and indicates the degree to which
the evidence fails to refute the proposition (or, in other words, the degree to which it remains
plausible).
We refer to the frame of discernment as Θ. As a consequence, (C.6b) can be rewritten as:
Pls(X) = 1 − Spt(θ − Y) (C.7)
Complete ignorance is represented as an interval of [0.0, 0.1]. Other degrees of ignorance (or
knowledge) are captured by intervals like [0.5, 0.7], [0.8, 0.4], [0.9, 1.0]
As mentioned before, several formal methods are provided to fuse two BOE. The Dempster
rule [Shafer 1976] is the most commonly used. However, SaIRA uses a modification of this rule
developed by Yager [1987]. They are both briefly introduced in the next two sub-sections with the
support of an intuitive explanatory ADR scenario. The rationale for using the Yager’s rule instead
of Dempster’s is also explained.
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C.2.3 Dempster’s rule
Dempster’s rule is the most common belief combination rule. It combines multiple belief functions
bn through their basic probability assignments (mik).
These belief functions are defined on the same frame of discernment, but are based on in-
dependent arguments or bodies of evidence. Argument independence is a critical factor when
combining evidence within the ADR problem which makes this rule inappropriate. In fact, as
will be shown later, BOEs can be interdependent in the ADR problem. Since Yager’s rule is a
modification of the Dempster’s that relaxes the constraint of interdependence, we briefly describe
Dempster’s rule here and then introduce the Yager’s.
Dempster’s rule is purely conjunctive (AND). The combination m12 is calculated from aggreg-














K represents the basic probability mass associated with the conflict between the BOEs Y and
Z. This is determined by summing the products of the bpas of all sets where the intersection is
null. This rule is commutative, associative, but not idempotent or continuous.
The denominator in Dempster’s rule, 1-K, is a normalization factor. This has the effect of
completely ignoring conflict and attributing any probability mass associated with conflict to the
null set. This is not exactly what is required in SaIRA. Consider the following example:
A sudden and severe lack of power is detected by the Health Monitoring Unit (HMU).
There are three possible causes: a) a fault to the left engine power generator; b) a
fault to the right engine power generator; c) a fault to the APU. A set of sensors
attributes this event mainly to a with support Spt1 = (m({a}) = 0.80,m({c}) = 0.20).
Another set of sensors attributes this event mainly to b with support Spt2 = (m({b}) =
0.80,m({c}) = 0.20).
As highlighted by Zadeh [1979], strongly contradictory evidence like the example above, when
combined with the Dempster combination rule, can produce incoherent results. In this specific
example, applying (C.8), the resulting diagnosis is c, a fault to the APU (which is wrong!). The
reason for this is that contradictory evidence cancels out one another and the cause c “wins” even
if it was given a lower support with respect to a and b.
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This should never happen in SaIRA because, with reference to this specific example, con-
tradictory evidence means that the HMU doesn’t know enough about the fault in question so its
diagnosis is not 100% reliable; this eventuality, as just seen, can potentially cause more harm than
the fault itself.
C.2.4 Yager’s rule
Ronald R. Yager makes an important distinction between the basic probability mass assignment
(m) and what he refers to as the ground probability mass assignment (designated by q). The major
differences between the basic probability assignment and the ground probability assignment are
in the normalization factor and the mass attributed to the universal set. The combined ground





where X is the intersection of subsets Y and Z (both in the power set P(Θ)), and q(X) denotes
the ground probability assignment associated with X. This rule is known as Yager’s combination
rule or sometimes as the Modified Dempster’s Rule.
Note that there is no normalization factor (1 − K). In Yager’s formulation, he circumvents
normalization by allowing the ground probability mass assignment of the null set to be greater
than 0:
q(∅) ≥ 0 (C.11)
q(∅) is calculated in exactly the same manner as Dempster’s K (conflict) in Equation C.8. Then
Yager adds the value of the conflict represented by q(∅) to the ground probability assignment of
the universal set, q(X), to yield the conversion of the ground probabilities to the basic probability
assignment of the universal set mY (X):
mY (X) = q(X) + q(∅) (C.12)
Consequently, instead of normalizing out the conflict, as we find in the case of Dempster’s rule
(C.8), Yager ultimately attributes conflict to the universal set X.
The interpretation of the mass of the universal set (X) is the degree of ignorance. Demp-
ster’s rule has the effect of changing the evidence through the normalization and the allocation of
conflicting mass to the null set. Yager’s rule can be considered as an epistemologically honest
interpretation of the evidence as it does not change the evidence by normalizing out the conflict.
In other words, in Yager’s rule, the mass associated with conflict is attributed to the universal
set and thus enlarges the degree of ignorance. This solves the problems of applying Dempster’s
rule in SaIRA and provides an elegant way to extract information about the ignorance that charac-
terizes the reasoning process that we were looking for in the previous section.
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C.3 Problem Modeling
Let E = {E1, E2, ..., En} be the set of possible events that require ADR, and Ei mean that the type
of a given event is Ei.
A frame of discernment Θ = {Ei,¬Ei} is the set of problem diagnoses under evaluation.
For instance, with reference to Accident 5.1 previously introduced in section 5.5, given the fault
fuel-leak (it is referred to as FL hereinafter), the following bpa is defined:
m({FL}) + m({¬FL}) + m({FL,¬FL}) = 1 (C.13)
where {FL,¬FL} is the ignorance set.
As explained in section C.2, the sum of the bpa of the singleton subsets of Θ may be less than
1, representing the fact that there is ignorance/uncertainty in the inference process. For instance,
given m({FL}) = 0.7, m({¬FL}) = 0, it follows that m({FL,¬FL} = 0.3 which is less than 1 (30%
ignorance). This could be that case in which two sensors diagnose FL, no sensors excludes the fuel
leak (¬FL) and other sensors diagnose some other fault.
For a subset K of Θ, the support function Spt is defined as the sum of the beliefs committed to
the possibilities in K. For example,
Spt({FL,¬FL}) = m({FL}) + m({¬FL}) + m({FL,¬FL}) = 1 (C.14)
For individual members of Θ (in this case FL and ¬FL), Spt and m are equal. As a consequence,
Spt({FL}) = m({FL}) = 0.7 (C.15)
Spt(¬{FL}) = m(¬{FL}) = 0 (C.16)
As anticipated in section C.2, in SaIRA pieces of evidence are combined by means of Yager’s
combination rule. It is worth recalling that this rule is both associative and commutative, which
means that the process of combining evidence from multiple sensors is independent of the order
in which the sensors outputs are combined.
C.3.1 Confusion Sets
Whilst investigating the problem of sensors fusion for forces aggregation and classification in a
battlefield, Yu et al. [2004] introduced the notion of confusion sets with the aim of efficiently
aggregating the information produced by different sensors.
Putting Yu’s notion of confusion set into the context of SaIRA, a confusion set is a set of
possible events, where the sensor S i may confuse one with another when we use the same sensor
to diagnose the event in question.
For example, with reference to the example used in section 5.5, at the occurrence of a fuel leak
(the evidence are oil temperature increase and oil pressure decrease), oil pressure and temperature
sensors could diagnose a FL; fuel valves sensors could diagnose a FL or a fault to the Fuel Cross-
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feed Valve1 (FCV-fault); however, they will usually not confuse these kind of unexpected events
with a fault to the Fuel Vent System (FV-fault), which is of a completely different nature.
Tables C.1 and C.2 show the output of two different types of sensors for a FL fault. Let
E = {E1, E2, ..., En} be the set of possible event types; a confidence level c(Ei) is associated to
each event type Ei. From this assumption, Yu et al. formally define a confusion set as follows
(adapted to the ADR problem from the original definition of Yu et al. which was specific to
vehicles targeting on a battlefield):
Definition C.3.1 Let C = {E1, E2, ..., Em} (m < n) be a subset of E and C sorted by the confid-
ence levels, e.g. c(V1) ≥ c(V2)... ≥ c(Vm), C is a confusion set if and only if (1) for any event type
Ei ∈ C, E j ∈ E and E j < C, c(Ei) ≥ σ > c(E j), where σ is the identification threshold; (2) for
any event type Ei ∈ C, 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, c(Ei) − c(Ei+1) ≤ ρ, where ρ is the minimum distance of
confidence levels.












Table C.2: List of possible events that can be detected by the Fuel Valves Sensors and relative confidence levels
A confusion set is sensor specific and it is dynamically chosen on the basis of the confidence
levels and the relative distances between the confidence levels. In fact, in a multi-sensor network,
depending on the characteristics of the sensors, some of them cooperate to identify an event, others
do not so because they are not designed to reason on that specific event.
For instance, on a Boeing 737, both the oil pressure and oil temperature sensors installed on
the left central tank are suitable to detect faults related to valves of that tank but, most probably,
they are not suitable to diagnose faults to the valves controlled by the Fuel Control Unit of the
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) which is located at the very back of the aircraft. This is a gross
example which anyway clarifies the concept in question.
At the occurrence of an event Ei, all sensors S i for which E j ∈ Ci (we choose the sensors
that are suitable to reason about the event in question) are selected. For each sensor the frame of
1On a Boeing 737, “continued fuel crossfeed use will result in a progressive fuel imbalance” [The Boeing Company
2002]
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discernment for which the sensor has a higher confidence level is selected. Formally, an active
frame of discernment is defined as follows:
Definition C.3.2 Let C = {E1, E2, ..., Em}, (m < n) is a confusion set, c(Ei) is the confidence level
of event Ei, (1 ≤ i ≤ m), a frame of discernment Θk = {Ei,¬Ei} is active frame of discernment for
C if and only if for any event type E j ∈ C, c(Ei) ≥ c(E j).
Consider the sensors S 1 and S 2 with their confusion sets C1 and C2 and their active frames of
discernment Θ1i = {E1,¬E1} and Θ2 j = {E2,¬E2} respectively. The following three possibilities
are available, which are handled in different ways with respect to how the pieces of evidence
involved are fused:
1. Θ1i = Θ2 j (C1 and C2 have the same frame of discernment). The Spt functions are combined
directly using Yager’s rule.
2. Θ1i , Θ2 j but C1 ∩ C2 , ∅. C1 and C2 have different frames of discernment but there is
some intersection between the confusion sets. This means the two sensors are not exactly
‘tuned’ for the same set of events but they can cooperate when the inferences concern the
events they both cover (this is the case of the oil pressure and temperature sensors of the
previous example). The maximum between mi1({E1}) and m2 j({E2}) is chosen. Then, (a)
if E2 ∈ C, Θ1k = {E2,¬E2} is selected as the active frame of discernment for C1. The Spt
function for the reselected frame of discernment Θ1k is combined with the Spt function for
Θ2k; (b) otherwise the outputs cannot be fused and the Spt function for Θ2 j is used as the
fused result for sensors S 1 and S 2.
3. Θ1i , Θ2 j and C1 ∩ C2 = ∅. C1 and C2 have different frames of discernment and there is
no intersection between the confusion sets. The combination of conflicting information is
avoided and the S pt function for Θ2 j is used as the fused result for sensors S 1 and S 2.
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